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Preface
This monograph emerges from the project started three years ago, when
the world was still abundant with liqiudity and investors were eyeing on
new models from Porsche instead of the ﬁnancial hurricane gathering on the
remote horizon. Then hard time came suddenly, and the entire world has
been stuck in quagmire.
This monograph presents the lessons I’ve learned so far in such a rare
opportunity, but surely the research project will go on, as long as there are
still unknowns to be discovered:
”Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,
Und gru¨n des Lebens goldner Baum.”1
— Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
JIN CAO
Munich, Germany
1”All theory, dear friend, is gray, but the golden tree of life springs ever green.”
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Part I
Introduction
2The issues
Liquidity, the ease of converting assets to cash, is perhaps one of the most
mysterious terms in both ﬁnance and macroeconomics. In economic booms
the world is abundant with liquidity, but when crisis hits liquidity drains out
immediately as if it didn’t exist at all. The reason why ﬁnancial institutions
hold liquid — while low yielding — assets, has been extensively explored
since (at least as early as) Keynes (1936) — the liquid assets enable agents to
betterweather shocks in their liabilities. Therefore, when agents face liquidity
shortages, they have to sell their illiquid — yet high yielding — assets, at a
cost (”bid-ask spread”). The burgeoning ﬁnancial innovations in the past
decade, people argue, help eliminate such cost and push the entire world
closer to the perfect Arrow-Debreu economy.
Unfortunately, the subprime crisis that erupted in 2007 turns out to be a
nightmare in nirvana, once again showing how imperfect the ﬁnancial world
can be. In existing banking literature many works focus on the consequences
of liquidity crises and liquidity shocks are thus often assumed to be exoge-
nous, which lack the explanation why systemic liquidity shortages come into
being. Instead, this monograph, which has been started developing before
the crisis, presents a compactmodel showing how liquidity shortages emerge
as endogenous systemic risks, driven by the free-riding incentives of rational
agents even if there are only illiquidity shocks.
However, there are alreadya fewworks onothermechanisms (for example,
the global game approach such as Goldstein & Pauzner, 2005) leading to
systemic liquidity risks, so this monograph doesn’t stop at providing a ”me-
too” explanation. It has been long aware of that ﬁnancial market has an
increasingly huge power on macro economy, however, when one takes a look
at economic research, ﬁnance and macroeconomics are actually two much
insulated ﬁelds — generally there’s little concern on macro policy in ﬁnancial
research, and in the dominating DSGE monetary economics there’s hardly
any role for ﬁnancial sector. This monograph is going to take the challenge
3of bridging these two ﬁelds, and carefully examine the proper macro policy
in liquidity crises and its impact on ﬁnancial market.
Inevitably, severeﬁnancial crises are echoedbya resonanceofdraconian re-
regulation. Theworldwide crisis triggered in 2007will be no exception. After
the meltdown of ﬁnancial markets in September 2008, politicians and voters
from Washington to Warsaw, from Berlin to Beijing, joined in a unanimous
call for drastic regulation of greedy ﬁnancial institutions that stole jobs and
held the entire global economy to ransom. Old fashioned proposals such as
narrow banking and banning of short selling, which for a long time have
been intentionally desecrated, deliberately forgotten, or cautiously disguised
in the regulators’ reports, regained reputation and momentum.
Regulatory rules should, however, be based on sound economic analysis.
First, regulators need to fully understand the driving forces behind misal-
locations in the market economy before designing adequate rules. Second,
the beneﬁt and cost of various regulatory schemes need to be quantiﬁed so
that the optimal one can be picked up. Third, regulators have to go beyond
current crisis measures in order not to run the risk of ﬁghting the last war but
rather to be able to design robust policies, addressing market’s incentives to
circumvent latest regulation.
A key lesson from the current crisis has been that a sound regulatory and
supervisory framework requires a system-wide approach: the macroeco-
nomic impact of risk across exposure across ﬁnancial institutions needs to be
taken into account. Regulation based purely on the soundness of individual
institutions misses a crucial dimension of ﬁnancial stability — the fact that
risky activities undertaken by individual institutions may get ampliﬁed on
the aggregate level. Among academics, this ”macro-prudential” perspective
has been the focus of intensive research for quite some time, stressing the
need to cope with the pro-cyclicality of capital regulation (see Danielsson et
al., 2001 and Borio, 2003). Several recent studies surveyed in the following
section provide a deeper understanding of the nature of externalities creating
a tendency for ﬁnancial intermediaries to lean towards excessive correlation,
4resulting in exposure to systemic risk. Most of these studies concentrate on
solvency issues and capital adequacy regulation. As emphasized by Acharya
(2009), externalities creating incentives to raise systemic risk justify charging
a higher capital requirement against exposure to general risk factors: capital
adequacy requirements should be increasing not just in individual risks, but
also in the correlation of risks across banks.
Surprisingly, however, there are hardly any studies of the systemic impact
of liquidity regulation. Given the recent massive unprecedented scale of
central bank intervention in the market for liquidity, a careful analysis of
incentives for private and public liquidity provision seems to be warranted.
Presumably, one of the reasons for neglecting this issue is the notion that
central bank intervention is the perfect instrument to cope with problems of
systemic liquidity crises. Following several studies (in particular, Holmstro¨m
& Tirole, 1998 and Allen & Gale, 1998), the public provision of emergency
liquidity is frequently considered to be an eﬃcient response to aggregate
liquidity shocks. Central bank’s Lender of Last Resort policy is seen as
optimal insurance mechanism against these shocks. In this view, private
provision of the public good of emergency liquidity would be costly and
wasteful.
But as we will show, this notion is no longer correct if the exposure of
ﬁnancial institutions to systemic shocks is aﬀected by decisions of these in-
stitutions themselves. In Holmstro¨m & Tirole (1998), aggregate liquidity
shocks are assumed to be exogenous. We show, however, that incentives af-
fect endogenously the exposure of ﬁnancial institutions to systemic liquidity
shocks. Based onCao& Illing (2008, 2009a), we demonstrate that externalities
result in excessive investment in illiquid assets (maturity mismatch), creat-
ing systemic liquidity risk. These externalities may be reinforced by central
bank intervention. Ex ante liquidity regulation (the requirements to reduce
maturity mismatch) can raise investor’s payoﬀ.
Another key lesson from the current crisis is how the ambiguity between
illiquidity and insolvency problems complicates the crisis policy as well as
5banking regulation. Usually illiquidity and insolvency have been studied
as separate phenomena and there are a couple of traditional solutions for
either of them. However, it is argued in this monograph that they have been
becoming joint plagues in ﬁnancial market as modern ﬁnancial innovations
are rapidly blurring the boundary in between. Such new feature brings new
challenges to both market practitioners and banking regulators. If there’s no
ambiguity between illiquidity and insolvency, conventional wisdoms work
well: with pure liquidity risks banks can get enough liquidity from the central
bank with their long-term assets as collateral; with pure insolvency risks
equity holding can be a self-suﬃcient cushion for the banks to get rid of
the losses. However, if there’s uncertainty about the banks’ true trouble,
things become complicated — banks cannot get enough liquidity because the
collateral, in the presence of insolvency risk, is no longer considered to be
good, therefore pure liquidity regulation may fail; on the other hand equity
requirementmaybe ineﬃcient aswell because thedual problemsmake equity
holding even costlier. This monograph is thus going to step into the troubled
water, hoping to shed some light on understanding the market failure and
designing proper regulatory rules via extending the basic framework.
Most related literature: A very brief survey
Although there will be sections of literature review in each of the following
chapters, let us take a very brief survey here on the most related existing
literature.
The need for banking regulation is based on the inherent fragility of ﬁ-
nancial intermediation. Whereas traditional models focus on coordination
failures of a representative bank triggered by runs (Diamond&Dybvig, 1983),
recent research analyzes endogenous incentives for systemic risk arising from
correlation of asset returns held by diﬀerent banks. As shown by Acharya
(2009), risk-shifting incentives for banks may result in over-investment in
correlated risk activities, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk.
6In Acharya (2009), these incentives arise from limited liability of banks and
the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of
other banks. If this eﬀect dominates the strategic beneﬁt of surviving banks
from the failure of other banks (expansion and increase in scale), banks ﬁnd
it optimal to increase the probability of surviving and failing together. Thus,
capital adequacy requirements should be increasing not just in individual
risks, but also in the correlation of risks across banks.
The correlation of portfolio selection is also explored by Acharya & Yorul-
mazer (2005). Here, incentives to correlate arise from informational spillovers.
Starting from a two-bank economy, when the returns of bank’s investments
have a systemic factor, the failure of one bank conveys negative information
about this factor which makes market participants skeptical about the health
of the banking industry, inﬂating the borrowing cost of the surviving bank
and increasing its probability to fail. Since such informational spillover is
costly for banks, they herd ex ante (i.e. they choose perfectly correlated port-
folio) to boost the likelihood of joint survival, given that bankers’ limited
liability mitigates concerns about their joint failure. Again, systemic risk
arises out of excessive correlations.
Wagner (2009) considers a ﬁnancial market with a continuum of banks,
all oﬀering ﬁxed deposit contracts, their portfolios being invested in two
types of assets. A bank is run when it cannot meet the contract. Liquidation
costs increases with the number of the banks run. However, since each bank
is atomistic in this economy, the marginal liquidation cost when one more
bank fails is zero. Therefore, when deciding about its investment portfolio,
each single bank never internalizes its impact on the social cost of bank
runs, imposing a negative externality on the banking industry. As a result,
the banks equilibrium portfolios correlate in an ineﬃcient way. Therefore,
small banking failures may ripple to a large amount of banks with similar
investment strategies. Optimal banking regulation should take correlation of
the banks assets into account, encouraging heterogeneous investment.
7In Korinek (2008), endogenous systemic risk arises from the feedback be-
tween incomplete ﬁnancial markets and the real economy. Adverse shocks
tighten individuals’ credit constraints, triggering the contraction of economic
activities. This depresses the prices of productive assets, hence the net worth
of their owners, and worsens their credit constraints. The ﬁnancial accel-
erator ampliﬁes negative shocks to the economy, giving rise to externalities:
atomistic agents take the level of asset prices in the economy as given. In their
demand for productive assets, they do not internalize the externalities that
arise when aggregate shocks lead to aggregate ﬂuctuations. So decentralized
agents undervalue social beneﬁts of having stronger buﬀers when ﬁnancial
constraints are binding, taking on too much systemic risk in their investment
strategies. Again, capital requirements need to address the externality so as
to implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation.
All studies surveyed look at endogenous incentives to create systemic sol-
vency risk, arising from excessive correlation of assets invested. In contrast,
this monograph analyzes endogenous incentives to create systemic liquidity
risk. Our model attempts to capture the unease many market participants
felt for a long time about abundant liquidity being available, before liquidity
suddenly dried outworld-wide inAugust 2007. We characterize incentives of
ﬁnancial intermediaries to rely on liquidity provided by other intermediaries
and the central bank. Traditional models of liquidity shortages claim that
provision of liquidity by the central bank is the optimal response to systemic
shocks. We argue, however, that this view neglects the endogenous nature of
liquidity provision. As we will show, incentives to rely on liquidity provided
by the market may result in excessively illiquid investment. Enforcing strict
liquidity requirements ex ante can tackle the externalites involved.
The classicpaper aboutprivate andpublicprovisionof liquidity isHolmstro¨m
& Tirole (1998). In their model, liquidity shortages arise when ﬁnancial in-
stitutions and industrial companies scramble for, and cannot ﬁnd the cash
required to meet their most urgent needs or undertake their most valuable
projects. They show that credit lines from ﬁnancial intermediaries are suﬃ-
8cient for implementing the socially optimal (second-best) allocation, as long
as there is no aggregate uncertainty. In the case of aggregate uncertainty,
however, the private sector cannot cope with its own liquidity needs. In
that case, according to Holmstro¨m & Tirole (1998), the government needs
to inject liquidity. The government can provide (outside) liquidity (addi-
tional resources) by committing future lump sum tax revenue to back up
the reimbursements. In their model, public provision of liquidity is a pure
public good in the presence of aggregate shocks, causing no moral hazard
eﬀects. The reason is that aggregate liquidity shocks are modeled as exoge-
nous events. The aggregate amount of liquidity available is not determined
endogenously by the investment choice of ﬁnancial intermediaries. Further-
more, according to Holmstro¨m & Tirole (1998) and also Fahri & Triole (2009),
the Lender of Last Resort can redirect resources ex post at not cost via lump
sum taxation. Allowing for lump sum taxation ex post, however, amounts to
liquidity constraints becoming eﬀectively irrelevant ex ante.
Allen & Gale (1998) analyze a quite diﬀerent mechanism for public provi-
sion of liquidity, closer to current central bank practice. They allow for nom-
inal deposit contracts. The injection of public liquidity works via adjusting
the price level in an economy with nominal contracts: the public liquidity the
central bank injects, the lower the real value of nominal deposits. Diamond
& Rajan (2006) adopt this mechanism to characterize post crisis intervention
in an elegant framework of ﬁnancial intermediation with bank deposits and
bank runs triggered by real illiquidity. Similar to Holmstro¨m & Tirole (1998),
however, shocks to real liquidity are again assumed to be exogenous.
Any ex post intervention, however, usually has profound impact on the in-
dustry players’ ex ante incentives. Financial intermediaries relying on being
bailed out by the central bank in case of illiquidity may be encouraged to cut
down on investing in liquid assets. If so, taking liquidity shocks as exoge-
nously given and concentrating on crisis intervention misses a decisive part
of the problem: ex post eﬀective intervention may exacerbate the problems ex
9ante that lead to the turmoil. So policy implications from models based on
exogenous liquidity shocks may be seriously misleading.
Concerning introducing joint problems of both illiquidity and insolvency
risks, the mostly closely related work is probably the model considered in
Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2009a, a.k.a. BSS as in the following). The
feature that the market participants can hardly distinguish between illiquid-
ity and insolvency is captured in their model, but they mainly focus on the
supply side of liquidity, i.e. liquidity from ﬁnancial institutions’ own cash
reserve (inside liquidity) or from the proceeds from asset sales to the other
investors with longer time preference (outside liquidity) and the timing per-
spective of liquidity trading. This monograph takes BSS’s view that (outside)
liquidity shortage arises from the banks’ coordinative failure, but the timing
of liquidity trading is not going to be my focus. Rather, this monograph
provide a diﬀerent explanation of systemic liquidity risk, i.e. liquidity under-
provision may come from the banks’ incentive of free-riding on each others’
liquidity supply, which is not covered in BSS (in which they restrict attention
to pure strategy equilibria); and clear-cut results from a more compact and
ﬂexible model in this monograph make it easier to be applied on banking
regulation. What’s more, since ﬁnancial contracts in BSS are real, they (BSS,
2009b) conclude that eﬃciency can be restored by central banks’ credible sup-
porting (real) asset prices. However, in contrast, this monograph shows that
the introduction of (more realistic) nominal contracts may alter the policy im-
plications drastically — nominal liquidity injection from central banks may
crowd out market liquidity supply without improving eﬃciency, therefore
policy makers should take a more careful view on designing regulatory rules
and bailout policies.
Key contributions
This monograph contributes to the existing research for the following three
aspects:
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First, we endogenize systemic liquidity risk in an intuitive and tractable
way. We provide a baseline model for regulatory analysis of pure liquidity
shocks. We show that even with rational ﬁnancial market participants, no
asymmetric information and pure illiquidity risk the free-riding incentive
on liquidity provision may be large enough to generate bankers’ excessive
appetite for risks, at a cost of the stability of the ﬁnancial market. Our
framework captures two major sources of ineﬃciency: (a) competitive forces
encourage bankers with limited liability to take on more risk, resulting in
inferior mixed strategy equilibrium and (b) bank runs forcing ineﬃcient liq-
uidation impose social costs. The mix of both externalities creates a role for
liquidity regulation;
Second, following Diamond & Rajan (2006), we extend the baseline model
by allowing for nominal deposit contracts. This captures the popular notion
that central banks can ease nominal liquidity constraints using the stroke of
a pen. Doing so, central banks don’t produce real wealth. Instead, their in-
tervention works via redistribution of real wealth. Flooding the market with
nominal liquidity in times of crisis may help to prevent ex post ineﬃcient
bank runs; at the same time, however, it encourages ﬁnancial intermediaries
to invest excessively on high yielding, but illiquid projects, lowering liquid
resources available for investors. We show that with unconditional liquidity
support by central banks, all banks will free ride on liquidity in equilibrium,
reducing the expected payoﬀ for investors substantially. In contrast, ex ante
liquidity regulation combined with ex post Lender of Last Resort policy can
implement the constrained second-best outcome from the investor’s point of
view. Further on, we explicitly compare the eﬀectiveness of various regula-
tory schemes. To the best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work providing
such an analysis;
Third, we extend the baseline model of pure illiquidity risks by including
insolvency risks. Generally, allowing both plagues in one singlemodel brings
out many diﬃculties in endogenizing the systemic risks — as such setting
explodes the state space and usually ends up with intractable mixed strategy
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equilibria. However, in thismonograph the problem is avoided by adesigned
trick of trimming oﬀ less interesting states, allowing the author to capture
the kernel of the problem without loss of generality and arrive at clear-cut
analytical results. This enables the author to go further with quantitative
policy analysis and propose hybrid regulatory schemes of lower cost. To the
best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work providing such an analysis based
on the mixture of both illiquidity and insolvency risks.
The structure of the monograph
Part II, Chapter 1 (adapted from Cao & Illing, 2008) presents the baseline
framework of pure illiquidity risks and the feedback mechanism between
monetary policy and ﬁnancial market. Part III extends the baseline model:
Chapter 2 (adapted from Cao & Illing, 2009a, b) compares the eﬀectiveness
of various regulatory schemes in the baseline framework; and Chapter 3
re-examines the schemes in an extended framework with co-existence of
illiquidity and insolvency risks, then proposes policies with lower regulatory
cost. Part IV concludes.

Part II
Liquidity Shortages as
Endogenous Systemic
Risks

1
Liquidity Shortages and
Monetary Policy
Moral hazard fundamentalists misunderstand the insurance analogy.
—Lawrence Summers, Financial Times, Sept. 24th, 2007
Just as imprudent banks have been saved from their mistakes by indulgent central
bankers, so CDO-makers could be rewarded for the mess that they helped to
create. ... The creators of CDOs and conduits may end the year with new Porsches.
Vroom-vroom.
—Croesus’s cousins, The Economist, Sept. 22nd, 2007
2 LIQUIDITY SHORTAGES AND MONETARY POLICY
1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.1.1 The issues
For quite some time, at least a few market participants had the feeling that
ﬁnancial markets have been susceptible to excessive risk taking, encouraged
by extremely low risk spreads. There was the notion of abundant liquidity,
stimulated by a ”savings glut”; by an ”investment drought” or by central
banks running too-loose monetary policies. In that context, some brave
economists warned against the rising risk of a liquidity squeeze which might
force central banks to ease policy again (compare, for example, Aﬂuid concept,
The Economist, February 2007). Frequently it was argued that it was exactly
the anticipation of such a central bank reaction which encouraged further ex-
cessive risk taking: the belief in ”abundant” provision of aggregate liquidity
might have resulted in overinvestment in activities creating systemic risk.
Since August 2007, liquidity indeed has dried out worldwide. There has
been an unprecedented freeze on the money markets, triggering desperate
calls within the ﬁnancial sector to lower interest rates1. Initially, central banks
have been split over how to respond to the credit squeeze. Some central banks
immediately pumped billions of extra money into the ﬁnancial system; some
even lowered interest rates. Others warned of the hazards of providing
central bank insurance to those institutions that have engaged in reckless
lending. MervynKing, Bank of England governor, argued (FT, Sept. 12 2007):
”The provision of large liquidity facilities penalises those ﬁnancial institutions that
sat out the dance, encourages herd behavior and increases the intensity of future
crises.”
1The eruption in credit market turmoil has taken some by surprise — see Alan Greenspans
remark ”I ask you if anybody in early June could contemplate what we are now confronted with?” WSJ
September 7, 2007. Others have been puzzled that it took so long to trigger ﬁre sales — see the
references in Illing (2007).
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The current problems in ﬁnancial markets provoked a heated debate on
causes andpotential solutions. At JacksonHole, JamesHamilton (2007) called
for regulatory and supervisory reforms, pointing out that signiﬁcant negative
externalities have been created. This chapter tries to shed some light on a
crucial type of externality involved: the incentive of ﬁnancial intermediaries
to free-ride on liquidity. This chapter, the main part having been written
before the outbreak of the crisis, concentrates on a particular, but — from our
point of view — key issue: it focuses on the interaction between risk taking
in the ﬁnancial sector and central bank policy. For that purpose, we analyze
an economy with pure illiquidity risk. Intuition suggests that injection of
public liquidity should always bewelfare improving in that highly unrealistic
case. A surprising result of this chapter is that even for pure illiquidity risk,
intuition turns out not to be correct in general.
We prove that insuring against aggregate risks will result in a higher share
of less liquid projects funded. So liquidity provision as public insurance
does indeed encourage higher risk taking. But one has to be careful about
the impact on welfare: this eﬀect will not necessarily result in ”excessive”
risk. For some parameter values, liquidity provision turns out to be welfare
improving (as suggested in the traditional literature on lender of last resort,
see Goodhart & Illing, 2002). In the presence of aggregate risk, banks may
prefer to take no precaution against the risk of being run in bad states, when
these states are highly unlikely. If so, public provision of liquidity to prevent
ineﬃcient bank runs improves upon the allocation, even though it encourages
more risk taking (less liquid investment) by private banks. So liquidity
provision by central banks provides an insurance against aggregate risk in an
incomplete market economy, encouraging investment in projects which give
a higher return, but at the same time exhibit higher risk of illiquidity.
But, unfortunately, this result does not hold in general. As we will show,
the incentive of ﬁnancial intermediaries to free-ride on liquidity in good states
may result in excessively low liquidity in bad states. In the prevailing mixed
strategy equilibrium, depositors are worse oﬀ than if banks would coordinate
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on more liquid investment. When the mixed strategy equilibrium prevails,
public liquidity injection would increase the incentive to free-ride, making
the free-riding problem even worse. If that case prevails, the central bank
should commit to abstain from intervening in order to discourage free-riding.
The results derived show that liquidity injection is a delicate issue possibly
creating severe moral hazard problems.
The present chapter builds on the set up of Diamond & Rajan (2006) and
extends it to capture the feedback from liquidity provision to risk taking
incentives of ﬁnancial intermediaries. As in Diamond & Rajan, deposit con-
tracts solve a hold up problem for impatient lenders investing in illiquid
projects: these contracts give banks as ﬁnancial intermediaries a credible
commitment mechanism not to extract rents from their speciﬁc skills. But
at the same time deposit contracts make non-strategic default very costly.
Consequently, negative aggregate shocks may trigger bank runs with serious
costs for the whole economy, thus destroying the commitment mechanism.
Diamond & Rajan (2006) show that monetary policy can alleviate this prob-
lem in an economy with nominal deposits: via open market operations, the
central bank can mimic state contingent real debt contracts by adjusting the
nominal price level to the size of the aggregate shock.
This chapter extends the set up of Diamond & Rajan in several ways.
In their model, the type of risky projects is exogenously given. Banks can
either invest in risky, possibly illiquid projects or invest instead in a safe
liquid asset with inferior return. In the equilibrium they characterize, banks
invest all resources either in illiquid or liquid assets. They do not analyze
the feedback mechanism from monetary policy towards the risk taking of
ﬁnancial intermediaries when central bank policy works as an insurance
mechanism against aggregate risk.
In contrast, the present chapter determines endogenously the aggregate
level of illiquidity out of private investments. As in Diamond & Rajan,
illiquidity is captured by the notion that some fraction of projects turns out
to be realized late. In contrast to their approach, however, we allow banks to
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choose the proportion of funds invested in less liquid projects continuously.
These projects have a higher expected return, but at the same time also a
higher probability of late realization. Because of that feature, some banks
will have an incentive to free-ride on liquidity. Banks investing a larger
share in illiquid projects with higher, yet delayed returns will always be more
proﬁtable as long as they stay solvent. Yet there is an economic role for
liquidity to satisfy the need for early withdrawals by investors in our model.
The problem is that ”naughty” free-riding banks can always attract funds
away from those prudent banks which had invested in more liquid, but less
proﬁtable assets (to use the poetic phrase by Mervyn King: those ﬁnancial
institutions that sat out the dance).
In times of a liquidity crisis, the ”naughty” banks will run into trouble.
They would have to leave the market, to make sure that ex ante expected
returns for depositors are the same for all banks. If, however, the central
bank provides liquidity to the market in bad states, this helps ”naughty”
banks to survive, allowing them to indeed pay out high returns later. The
at ﬁrst sight surprising, but at second thought quite intuitive reason is that
”naughty” banks are always in a better position to attract funds even in a
crisis — as long as policy helps them to stay solvent (Note that in this chapter
we abstract from insolvency except if triggered by illiquidity). The problem is
that relying on such interventions ex ante will give all banks strong incentives
to behave ”naughty”, so liquidity is bound to dry out in the sense that there
will be insuﬃcient supply of real goods in the intermediate period. Of course,
a commitment not to intervene in these cases is not really credible, as sadly
has been demonstrated in the UK in September 2007, when Northern Rock
(a mortgage bank in the UK which promised high deposit rates as a way
to ﬁnance attractive investment in real estate) smashed the credibility of
the Bank of England just the day after Mervyn King reconﬁrmed his brave
statements in a letter to the chancellor.
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1.1.2 Related literature
Liquidity provision has been mainly analyzed in the context of models with
real assets — see Diamond & Dybvig (1983), Bhattacharya & Gale (1987), Di-
amond & Rajan (2001, 2005), Fecht & Tyrell (2005) and for a survey the reader
of Goodhart & Illing (2002). Only a few recent papers explicitly include nom-
inal assets and so are able to address monetary policy, such as Allen & Gale
(1998), Diamond & Rajan (2006), Skeie (2006) and Sauer (2007). Skeie (2006)
shows that nominal demand deposits, repayable in money, can prevent self-
fulﬁlling bank runs of the Diamond / Dybvig type, when interbank lending
is eﬃcient.
Here, we are concerned with bank runs triggered by real shocks as in
Diamond & Rajan (2006). Demand deposits provide a credible commitment
mechanism. A related, but quite diﬀerent mechanism has been analyzed by
Holmstro¨m & Tirole (1998). They model credit lines as a way to mitigate
moral hazard problems on the side of ﬁrms. In their model, Holmstro¨m &
Tirole also characterize a role for public provision of liquidity, but again they
do not consider feedback mechanisms creating endogenous aggregate risk.
Apart from Diamond & Rajan (2006), the paper most closely related is
Sauer (2007). Building on the cash-in-the-market pricing model of Allen
& Gale (2004), Sauer analyzes liquidity provision by ﬁnancial markets and
characterizes a trade-oﬀ between avoiding real losses by injecting liquidity
and the resulting risks to price stability in an economy with agents subject
to a cash-in-advance constraint. The present chapter uses the more tradi-
tional framework with banks as ﬁnancial intermediaries. This framework
can capture the impact of ﬁnancial regulation of leveraged institutions in a
straightforward way.
1.1.3 Sketch of the chapter
Section 3.2 presents the basic settings of the model. Let us here sketch
the structure informally. There are three types of agents, and all agents are
assumed to be risk neutral.
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1. Entrepreneurs. They have no funds, just ideas for productive projects.
Each project needs one unit of funding in the initial period 0 and will
either give a return early (at date 1) or late (at date 2). There are two
types of entrepreneurs: entrepreneurs of type 1 with projects maturing
for sure early at date 1, yielding a return R1 > 1 and entrepreneurs
of type 2 with projects yielding a higher return R2 > R1 > 1. The
latter projects, however, may be delayed: with probability 1 − p, they
turn out to be illiquid and can only be realized at date 2. For projects
being completed successfully, the speciﬁc skills of the entrepreneur
are needed. Human capital being not alienable entrepreneurs can only
commit to pay a fraction γRi > 1 to lenders. They earn a rent (1−γ)Ri for
their speciﬁc skills. Entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between consuming
early or late;
2. Investors. They have funds, but no productive projects on their own.
They can either store their funds (with a meagre return 1) or invest in
the projects of entrepreneurs. Investors are impatient and want to con-
sume early (in period 1). Resources being scarce, there are less funds
available than projects of either type. In the absence of commitment
problems, investors would put all their funds in early projects R1 and
capture the full return; Entrepreneurs would receive nothing. But ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries are needed to overcome commitment problems.
In addition to the entrepreneur’s commitment problem, speciﬁc collec-
tion skills are needed to transfer the return to the lender. As shown in
Diamond & Rajan (2001, 2005), by issuing deposit contracts designed
with a collective action problem (the risk of a bank run), bank managers
can credibly commit to use their collection skills to pass on to depositors
the full amount received from entrepreneurs. So limited commitment
motivates a role for banks as intermediaries;
3. Banks. Due to their fragile structure, bank managers are committed to
pay out deposits as long as banks are not bankrupt. Holding capital (eq-
8 LIQUIDITY SHORTAGES AND MONETARY POLICY
uity), which will be allowed in the next chapter, can reduce the fragility
of banks, but it allows bank managers to capture a rent (assumed to
be half of the surplus net of paying out depositors) and so lowers the
amount of pledgeable funds. Like entrepreneurs, bank managers are
indiﬀerent between consuming early or late.
Banks oﬀer deposit contracts. There is assumed to be perfect competition
among bank managers, so investors deposit their funds at those banks of-
fering the highest expected return at the given market interest rate. Most of
the time (see Footnote 3), we assume that investors are able to monitor all
bank’s investment. So if, in a mixed strategy equilibrium, banks diﬀer with
respect to their investment strategy, the expected return from deposits must
be the same across all banks.
Except for introducing two types of entrepreneurs, the structure of the
model is essentially the same as the set up of Diamond & Rajan (2006). By
assuming that depositors (investors) value consumption only at t = 1, all
relevant elements are captured in the most tractable way: at date 1, there is
intertemporal liquidity trade with inelastic liquidity demand. Banks compet-
ing for funds at date 0 are forced to oﬀer conditionswhichmaximize expected
consumption of investors at the given expected interest rates. Whereas Dia-
mond&Rajan (2006) just present numerical examples for illustrating relevant
cases, we fully characterize the type of equilibria as a function of parameter
values. Furthermore, we derive endogenously the extent of ﬁnancial fragility
as a function of the parameter values.
As a reference point, Section 1.3 analyzes the case of pure idiosyncratic
risk. It is shown that banks will choose their share of investment in safe
projects such that all banks will be always solvent, given that there is liq-
uid trading on the inter bank market. Section 1.4 introduces aggregate
shocks. The outcome strongly depends on the probability of a bad aggregate
shock occurring. If this probability is low, banks care only for the good state
(Proposition 1.4.1 a)) and accept the risk of failure with costly liquidation in
the bad state. In contrast, banks play safe if the probability of a bad shock
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is very high (Proposition 1.4.1 b)). For an intermediate range, however
(Proposition 1.4.2), ﬁnancial intermediaries have an incentive to free-ride on
excess liquidity available in the good state. This leads to low liquidity in bad
states. In the prevailing mixed strategy equilibrium, depositors are worse oﬀ
than if banks would coordinate on more liquid investment.
Section 1.5 analyzes central bank intervention. With nominal bank con-
tracts, monetary policy can help to prevent costly runs by injecting additional
money before t = 1. The real value of depositswill be reduced such that banks
on the aggregate level are solvent despite the negative aggregate shock. It
turns out that if the probability of a bad aggregate shock is low enough,
central bank intervention is welfare improving, even though banks relying
on liquidity injection will invest more in illiquid late projects. If, however,
the probability of a bad aggregate shock is high, central bank intervention
will make the free-riding problem even worse. In any case, the central bank
needs to be able to commit to restrict liquidity provision only to prudent
banks. Otherwise, free-riding crowds out all prudent banks in equilibrium.
Such a commitment, however, is not dynamically consistent. So liquidity
injection is a delicate issue, possibly creating severe moral hazard problems.
Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 THE MODEL — BASIC SETTINGS
1.2.1 Agents, technologies and preferences
There is a continuum of risk-neutral investors with unit endowment at t = 0
who want to consume at t = 1. They have access only to a storage technology
with return 1, i.e. their wealth may be simply stored without perishing for
future periods. As an alternative, they can lend their funds to ﬁnance prof-
itable long term investments of entrepreneurs. Due to commitment problems,
lending has to be done via ﬁnancial intermediation.
There are two types of entrepreneurs who have ideas for projects: when
funded, type i = 1, 2 entrepreneurs can produce:
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• Type 1: safe projects, yielding R1 > 1 for sure early at date 1;
• Type 2: risky projects, yielding R2 > R1 > 1 either early at date 1 with
probability p (and pR2 < R1), or late at date 2 with probability 1 − p.
Borrowing and lending is done via competitive and risk-neutral banks
of a limited number N, who have no endowment at t = 0. Banks use the
investors’ funds (obtained via deposits or equity) to ﬁnance and monitor
entrepreneurs’ projects. They have a special collection technology such that
they can capture a constant share 0 < γ < 1 of the projects’ return. The fragile
banking structure allows them to commit to pass those funds which have
been invested as deposits back to investors (see below). For funds obtained
via equity (to be explored in the next chapter), banks are able to capture a
rent (assumed to be 12 of the captured return net of deposit claims).
Entrepreneurs and banks are indiﬀerent between consumption at t = 1 or
t = 2. Because only banks have the special skills in collecting deposits from
investors and returns fromentrepreneurs, entrepreneurs cannot contractwith
investors directly; instead, they can only get projects funded via bank loans.
Resources are scarce in the sense that there aremoreprojects than aggregate
endowment of investors. This excludes the possibility that entrepreneurs
might bargain with banks on the level of γ.
1.2.2 Timing
There are 4 periods:
1. t = 0. The banks oﬀer deposit contract to investors, promising ﬁxed
payment d0 in the future for each unit of deposit. The investors deposit
their endowments if d0 > 1. The banks then decide the share α of total
funds to be invested in safe projects. Funded entrepreneurs receive
loans and start their projects. d0 and α are observable to all the agents,
but p may be unknown at that date.
The ﬁxed payment deposit contract has the following features:
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• Investors can claim a ﬁxed payment d0 for each unit of deposit at
any date after t = 0;
• Banks have tomeet investors’ demandwith all resources available.
If liquidity at hand is not suﬃcient, delayed projects have to be
liquidated at a cost: premature liquidation yields only c (0 < c <
1 < γR1) for each unit.
These contracts are adopted in the banking industry as a commitment
mechanism. Since collecting returns from entrepreneurs requires spe-
ciﬁc skills, the bank managers would have an incentive to renegotiate
with lenders at t = 1 in order to exploit rents. So a standard contract
would break down. As shown in Diamond & Rajan (2001), the debt
contract can solve the problemof renegotiation: whenever the investors
anticipate a bank might not pay the promised amount, they will run
and the bank’s rent is completely destroyed by the costly liquidation.
Therefore the banks will commit to the contract.
2. t = 12 . At that intermediate date, p is revealed and so the investors
can calculate the payment from the banks. If a banks resources are
not suﬃcient to meet the deposit contract, i.e. the investors’ expected
average payment at t = 1 is d1 < d0 for each unit of deposit, all investors
will run the bank already at t = 12 in the attempt to be the ﬁrst in the
line, and so still being paid d0. When a bank is run at t = 12 , it is forced to
liquidate all projects immediately (even those which would be realized
early) trying to satisfy the urgent demand of depositors — so in the
case of a run, the bank will not be able to recover more than c from each
project.
To concentrate on runs triggered by real shocks, we exclude self fulﬁll-
ing panics: as soon as d1 > d0 investors are assumed never to run and
to believe that the others don’t run either.
3. t = 1. If the investors didn’t run in the previous period, they withdraw
and consume. The banks collect a share γ from the early projects.
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But as long as entrepreneurs are willing to deposit their rents at t = 1
at banks, banks can pay out more resources to investors. Since early
entrepreneurs retain the share 1−γof the returns and they are indiﬀerent
between consumption at t = 1 or t = 2, the banks can borrow from them
against the return of late projects at the market interest rate r ≥ 1. r
clears market by matching aggregate liquidity demand with aggregate
liquidity supply. We assume that there is a perfectly liquid inter bank
market at t = 1, so even if early entrepreneurs trade with other banks,
the initial bank will be able to borrow the liquidity needed to reﬁnance
delayed projects as long as it is not bankrupt.
4. t = 2. Banks collect return from late projects and repay the liquidity
providers at t = 1. Both early and late entrepreneurs consume.
Table 1.1 summarizes the basic elements of the model, and and Fig. 1.1
summarizes the timing of the game.
Investorsgetdeposit
contract 
Run  
Wait Withdraw 
  :  unknown    	:  reveals   
   


  

 
 
  with
prob. 
 with
prob.   
   
Banker
decides
Fig. 1.1 The timing of the game
In the following sections we analyze the outcomes of the game in various
scenarios.
1.3 PURE IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS
As a baseline, consider the case in which p is deterministic and known to all
the agents at t = 0. Equilibrium is characterized by the share α of funds banks
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Table 1.1 The basic elements of the model: Agents, technologies, and preferences
Investors • Unit t = 0 endowment — stored or invested in projects;
• Investors want to consume at t = 1.
Entrepreneurs • With type 1 project
— Return R1 > 1, safely realized at t = 1;
• With type 2 project
— Highest return R2 > R1, risky. It may return at t = 1,
but may also be delayed to t = 2.
Banks • Engage in Bertrand competition;
• Expertise to collect 0 < γ < 1 from projects return;
• Oﬀer deposit contracts
— Commitment device not to abuse the expertise, and
— Making banking industry fragile;
• Risk of bank runs: poor liquidation return 0 < c < 1.
choose to invest in safe projects and the interest rate r for deposits invested
at t = 1. The outcome is captured in the following lemma:
Lemma 1.3.1 When p is deterministic, there exists a symmetric non-idle pure strat-
egy equilibrium in which
1. All the banks set
αi(p, r) = α∗(p, r) =
γ
1−p
r − (1 − γ)p
γ
1−p
r + (1 − γ)
(
R1
R2
− p
) ,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,N};
2. Interest rate r is determined by
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r
N∑
i=1
(1 − γ) [αiR1 + (1 − αi)pR2] =
N∑
i=1
γ(1 − αi)(1 − p)R2
and
r ≤ R2
R1
.
What’s more, there exists no equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Proof See Appendix A.1.1.
By Lemma 1.3.1 multiple equilibria exist for all 1 ≤ r ≤ R2R1 . To make
the analysis interesting, we introduce the following equilibrium selection
criterion:
Deﬁnition An optimal symmetric pure strategy equilibrium proﬁle α∗(p, r∗) is
given by
(1) r∗ = argmax
r
κi = αi(p, r)R1 + (1 − αi(p, r))pR2;
(2) ∀α′i (p, r∗)  α∗(p, r∗) with α−i(p, r∗) = α∗(p, r∗),
κi(α∗(p, r∗)) ≥ κi(α′i (p, r∗), α−i(p, r∗)) with − i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}\{i}.
The optimal symmetric equilibrium is the dominant equilibrium from the
investor’s point of view. Resources of investors being scarce, the market so-
lution would maximize the payoﬀ of investors in the absence of commitment
problems (that is, in the case of γ = 1). Since the optimal symmetric equilib-
rium comes closest to achieving that market outcome, from now on we will
focus our analysis on this speciﬁc equilibrium.
Lemma 1.3.2 When p is deterministic, there exists a unique optimal symmetric
equilibrium of pure strategy in which
1. All the banks set
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α∗(p, r∗) =
γ − p
γ − p + (1 − γ)R1R2
,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,N};
2. Interest rate r∗ = 1.
Proof See Appendix A.1.2.
From now on, denote α∗(p, r∗) by α(p) for simplicity. Then if the risks are
purely idiosyncratic, the equilibrium outcome is given by:
Corollary 1.3.3 When there are idiosyncratic risks such that for one bank i the
probability pi follows i.i.d. with pdf f (pi) with a non-empty supportΩ ⊆ [0, γ], then
there exists a unique optimal symmetric equilibrium of pure strategy in which
1. All the banks set
α(E[pi]) =
γ − E[pi]
γ − E[pi] + (1 − γ)R1R2
,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,N};
2. Interest rate r∗ = 1.
This is pretty intuitive: as long as there are just idiosyncratic shocks, banks
are always solvent via trade on the liquid inter bank market.
In the absence of aggregate risk, the optimal equilibrium can thus be
characterized in a straightforward way. When there is only idiosyncratic
risk, a share p of risky projects will always be realized early in the aggregate
economy. The representative bank chooses the share α∗ of funds invested in
safe projects such that in period 1, it is able to pay out depositors and equity to
all investors. Otherwise, the bank would be bankrupt and forced to liquidate
late projects at high costs (liquidation gives an inferior return of c < 1).
Depositors having a claim of γE[R(α, r)] = γ
[
α(p, r)R1 + (1 − α(p, r))R2] per
unit deposited, the total amount to be paid out via deposits at r∗ = 1 is
γ [αR1 + (1 − α)R2]. The representative bank will choose α∗ such that at t = 1,
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there are just enough resources available to pay out all depositors, taking
into account that early entrepreneurs are reinvesting their rents at banks as
deposits at t = 1. The condition αR1 + (1 − α)pR2 = γ [αR1 + (1 − α)R2] gives
as solution for α∗ as a function of p (see Fig. 1.2):



%
Fig. 1.2 α∗ (the optimal share of funds invested in safe projects) as a function of p
(the aggregate share of type 2 projects realized early)
α∗(p) =
γ − p
γ − p + (1 − γ)R1R2
with
∂α∗
∂p
=
−(1 − γ)R1R2[
γ − p + (1 − γ)R1R2
]2 < 0; ∂α
∗
∂
(
R1
R2
) > 0.
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And also
α∗ ∈ [0, α] with α∗(p = 0) = α = γ
γ + (1 − γ)R1R2
;
α∗(p = γ) = 0;α∗(γ = 1) = 1.
The higher p (the larger the share of early projects with a high payoﬀ R2),
the lower the share of funds invested in projects of type R1. If p > γ, the
representative bank would be solvent at t = 1 even when all funds were
invested in risky type 2 projects. But even if p = 0, there will be some
investment in projects with a high payoﬀ R2 as long as γ < 1. The reason
is that all early entrepreneurs, deferring consumption until t = 2, provide
liquidity at t = 1. They are willing to deposit their rents at solvent banks.
Thus, banks are able to pay out investors all funds available at t = 1 as long
as they stay solvent. This way, with low interest rates, investors can also gain
from the higher payoﬀ of late projects, so α∗(p = 0) > γ. With R1R2 increasing,
the share α invested in safe projects will rise, allowing investors to proﬁt from
higher returns of less liquid projects already at t = 1. Again, this is due to
the fact that early entrepreneurs provide liquidity. Note, however, that there
would be no funding of risky projects at all in the absence of a commitment
problem (that is, if γ = 1).
1.4 THE CASE OF AGGREGATE RISK
The interesting case is the case of aggregate risk. Assume that p is now
unknown to all the agents at t = 0 and realizes at t = 12 as an aggregate risk.
We assume that
1. p can take just two possible values pH or pL with 0 < pL < pH < γ;
2. pH realizes with probability π and pL with probability 1 − π.
In the presence of aggregate risk, a bank has several options available: the
bank may just take care for provisions in the good state, choosing α∗ = α(pH)
and may take no precaution against the risk of a bank run in the bad state pL.
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If so, the bank is run when pL realizes and is forced to liquidate all projects.
Obviously, this does not make sense if the probability of the bad state is high
enough. Instead, the bank may increase the share of safe assets to α∗ = α(pL)
trying to prevent insolvency. If all banks would follow that strategy, there
would be excess supply of liquidity in the good state pH. This may give banks
an incentive to free-ride on the provision of liquidity by other banks, and a
pure strategy equilibrium may not exist2. So a careful analysis of all cases is
required. We will now show that there are 3 types of equilibria, depending
on the probability π — the probability that a high share of early projects is
realized:
1. If π is high enough (for π ∈ [π2, 1], all banks will choose α∗ = α(pH).
With that strategy, banks will be run at pL, so depositors get only the
return c if the share of early projects with high yields turns out to be
unpleasantly low. All agents in the economy being risk neutral, it is
more proﬁtable for banks to take that risk into account in order to gain
from the high returns in aggregate state pH, as long as that event is not
very likely;
2. If π is low enough (for π ∈ [0, π1], all banks will choose α∗ = α(pL). In
that case, banks will never be bankrupt, so they will be able to payout
all depositors at t = 1 even if the share of delayed projects is high. But if
the share of delayed projects is low (in the state pH), there will be excess
liquidity ﬂoating around at t = 1;
3. For some parameter constellations (for the intermediate range π ∈
(π1, π2)), banks will be tempted to free-ride3 on the excess liquidity
in state pH. These banks invest all their funds in the risky projects
2Banks may also hold some equity in order to cushion shocks. We will discuss this in the next
chapter but ignore equity here.
3Bhattacharya & Gale (1987) have already shown that there is free-riding on liquidity provision
when investors cannot monitor the amount of projects invested by the intermediaries. Footnote
4 conﬁrms their argument in our context. But we derive a stronger result. We show that for an
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(α = 0), trying to proﬁt from the high returns available in case a large
share of proﬁtable projects happens to be realized early. The high ex-
pected returns in this case compensate depositors ex ante for the risk of
getting just c in the other aggregate state of the world.
These equilibria are summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 1.4.1 Given pH and pL, and suppose that α’s are observable4 to all
investors, a) There is a unique optimal symmetric equilibrium of pure strategy such
that all the banks setα∗ = α(pH) and d∗0 = γ
[
α(pH)R1 + (1 − α(pH))R2] = α(pH)R1+
(1−α(pH))pR2 as soon as the probability of pH satisﬁes π > π2 = γE[RL]−cγE[RH]−c , in which
E [Rs] = α(ps)R1 + (1−α(ps))pR2, s ∈ {H,L}; b) When 0 ≤ π < γE[RL]−cγR2−c = π1, there
exists a unique optimal symmetric equilibrium of pure strategy such that all the banks
set α∗ = α(pL) and d∗0 = γ
[
α(pL)R1 + (1 − α(pL))R2] = α(pL)R1 + (1 − α(pL))pR2.
Proof See Appendix A.1.3.
The intuition behind Proposition 1.4.1 is the following: when it is very
unlikely that the low state realizes, i.e. π is very high, then the cost of a
bank run is too small relative to the high return in the high state. So the best
strategy for the banks is to exploit the maximum return from the high state
intermediate range of parameter values, evenwith perfectmonitoring of banks, some banks have
an incentive to free-ride on liquidity in good states, giving rise to a mixed strategy equilibrium,
resulting in excessively low liquidity in bad states. In the prevailing mixed strategy equilibrium,
depositors are worse oﬀ than if banks would coordinate on more liquid investment.
4This condition is crucial for π ∈ [0, π2]. If α’s were not observable to investors in this range,
α(pL) would fail to be a symmetric equilibrium of pure strategy. The reason is straightforward:
suppose that all the banks coordinate and set α∗ = α(pL), then there is always incentive for
one single bank i to deviate and set αi = α(pH) because it earns positive proﬁt at pH , i.e.
γ
[
α(pH)R1 + (1 − α(pH))R2] − γ [α(pL)R1 + (1 − α(pL))R2] > 0, and at pL it is run with zero proﬁt
because of limited liability. In the end its expected proﬁt is positive, which is larger than its peers
who get zero proﬁt because of perfect competition. Anticipating this, the banks would never
coordinate to set α∗ = α(pL).
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and neglect the cost in the low state. On the contrary, when it is very likely
that the low state realizes, then the cost of bank run is too high relative to
the high return in the high state. Therefore the best strategy for the banks is
to stick to the safest strategy and avoid the high cost in the low state. The
interesting outcome takes place for intermediate π such that the cost of bank
run is also intermediate and return from liquidity free-riding is suﬃciently
high in the high state:
Proposition 1.4.2 When γE[RL]−cγR2−c < π <
γE[RL]−c
γE[RH]−c , there exists no symmetric equi-
librium of pure strategies. What’s more, given pHR2 < R1 and c not too high (c < 1)
there exists a unique equilibrium of mixed strategies such that for a representative
bank
1. With probability θ the bank chooses to be risky — it sets α∗r = 0, and with
probability 1 − θ to be safe — it sets α∗s > 0;
2. Interest rates at states pH and pL are rH > rL > 1;
3. At t = 0 a risky bank oﬀers a deposit contract with dr0 = γ
[
pHR2 +
(1−pH)R2
rH
]
and a safe bank with ds0 = γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pHR2 +
(1−α∗s)(1−pH)R2
rH
]
;
4. Equal return condition: κr = πdr0 + (1 − π)c = ds0 = κs;
5. Market clearing conditions:
(a) At pH: θDr + (1 − θ)Ds = θSr + (1 − θ)Ss, in which
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Dr = dr0 − γpHR2,
Ds = ds0 − γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pHR2
]
,
Sr = (1 − γ)pHR2,
Ss = (1 − γ) [α∗sR1 + (1 − α∗s) pHR2] ;
(b) At pL: rL(1 − γ) [α∗sR1 + (1 − α∗s) pLR2] = γ (1 − α∗s) (1 − pL)R2, i.e.
α∗s = α∗
(
pL, rL
)
.
Proof See Appendix A.1.4.
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Though complicated, the intuition behind is still not diﬃcult to see (To
help the reader see the insight a numerical example is provided in Appendix
A.2). Suppose that we increase π from 0 where all the banks set αi = α(pL).
When π just gets higher than π1 free-riding on liquidity provision becomes
proﬁtable because
1. The cost of bank run is no longer too high;
2. At pH the early entrepreneurs have excess liquidity supply. Therefore,
an arbitrary bank i can free-ride and set its α′i = 0. By doing so it can
trade liquidity at t = 1 from early entrepreneurs with high return from
its late projects and promise d′0 = γR2 > γE[RL] to the investors. The
higher return in state pH compensates the fact that it is surely run at pL
due to liquidity shortage.
But if every bankwouldbehave as a free-rider, therewouldnot be suﬃcient
liquidity supply. So free-riders and prudent banks must co-exist, i.e. the
equilibrium is of mixed strategies.
The free-riding behavior results in two consequences:
1. As more banks become free-riders, the interest rate rH is bid higher;
2. The prudent banks set lower α∗s < α(pL) in order to cut down the oppor-
tunity cost of investing in safe projects.
And in the end, rH and α∗s are adjusted such that depositors are indiﬀerent
between the two types of banks.
On the aggregate level the probability of being a free-rider is determined
by market clearing conditions for both states.
The resulting ineﬃciency is captured by the following corollary:
Corollary 1.4.3 For the equilibrium of mixed strategies deﬁned by Proposition
1.4.2, the banks are worse oﬀ than the case if they coordinate and choose αi = α(pL)
and d∗0 = γ
[
α(pL)R1 + (1 − α(pL))R2] = α(pL)R1 + (1 − α(pL))pR2.
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Proof The banks return is equal to ds0 = κ
(
α∗
(
pL, rL
)
, ds0
)
< κ
(
α∗, d∗0
)
, in which
α∗ = α(pL) and d∗0 = γ
[
α(pL)R1 + (1 − α(pL))R2] = α(pL)R1 + (1 − α(pL))pR2, by
Lemma 1.3.2, given the fact that rL > 1.
Fig. 1.3 illustrates the expected payoﬀ for investors as characterized in
Proposition 1.4.1 and 1.4.2. When π (the probability that a large share of
type 2 projects will be realized early) is very high, banks prefer to exploit
the higher proﬁtability of these projects rather than to self insure against the
risk of a bank run. As long as the probability of a bank run is small enough
(less than 1 − π2), the risky strategy gives investors a higher expected return
(Proposition 1.4.1 a).
&'( )* Nofreeriding
Freeriding
  
&"# $!
&'(+)*
Fig. 1.3 Expected payoﬀ for investors as a function of π (the probability that the
share of early type 2 projects is high)
In contrast, when it is very likely that the bad state (with a low share of
early type 2 projects) occurs, banks prefer to play safe by investing suﬃciently
in type 1 projects so as to make sure to be never run (Proposition 1.4.1 b).
Whenever π < π2, such a strategy would give investors the highest expected
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payoﬀ, even though the safe strategy results in excess liquidity if the good
state turns out to be realized. But as shown in Proposition 1.4.2, for π high
enough there is an incentive of naughty banks to free-ride on the excess
supply of liquidity available in the good state. In the range π1 < π < π2,
a mixed strategy equilibrium prevails with inferior return to investors, free-
riding down the expected payoﬀ for investors below the level feasible in the
absence of free-riding in this range.
1.5 CENTRAL BANK INTERVENTION
Let us now consider the role of monetary policy. Suppose that central bank
is now the fourth player in the game. We make some slight changes to the
original game in the following way
1. At t = 0 the banks provide nominal deposit contracts to investors,
promising a ﬁxed nominal payment d0 in the future. The central bank
announces a minimum level α of investment on safe projects required
to be eligible for liquidity support in times of a crisis;
2. At t = 12 the banks decide whether to borrow liquidity from central
bank. If yes, the central bank commits to provide liquidity for banks
provided they fulﬁl the requirement α;
3. At t = 1 the central bank supports those banks having fulﬁlled the
requirement deﬁned in (2) by injecting money at the low borrowing
rate rCB = 1 if asked for.
For simplicity we assume that one unit of money is of equal value to one
unit real good in payment. And the price level is determined by cash-in-the-
market principle (Allen & Gale, 2005), i.e. the ratio of amount of liquidity (the
sum of money and real goods) in the market to amount of real goods.
Central bank intervention may help to prevent ineﬃcient liquidation in
the case of aggregate shocks for high values of π (the probability of a high
share of early projects pH being high enough). This intervention reduces the
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critical threshold π2 to the left (to π
′
2) and so expands the range of parameter
values forwhich it is optimal to choose the risky strategy α∗ = α(pH). To avoid
incentives for free-riding, however, central bank intervention has to be made
contingent on banks having investing a minimum level α in safe projects at
stage 0.
By injecting liquidity in case of a crisis, the central bank can prevent inef-
ﬁcient liquidation of early projects via bank runs, raising expected returns of
those banks choosing a risky strategy α∗ = α(pH) when pL is realized. So let us
consider the case of aggregate shockswhenπ is high and the central bank sets
α = α(pH). In this case banks will set α∗ = α(pH) and borrow liquidity from
central bank only at pL. Given this the investors will no longer run at pL be-
cause they can only get c real goods plus d0−c money for each unit of deposit.
Instead if theywait till t = 1, theywill get κ
[
RH |pL] = α(pH)R1+(1−α(pH))pLR2
real goods plus d0 − κ [RH |pL] = (1 − α(pH))(pH − pL)R2 money, and they are
better oﬀ by waiting.
Now the lower bound for α∗ = α(pH) being the dominant strategy is shifted
towards:
π′2 =
γE[RL] − κ [RH |pL]
γE[RH] − κ [RH |pL] <
γE[RL] − c
γE[RH] − c = π2.
So free-riding is partially deterred and the investors are better oﬀ with
higher return,
πγE[RH] + (1 − π)κ [RH |pL] > πγE[RH] + (1 − π)c.
For high enough π (π > π′2), injection of money before t = 1 can help to
improve the allocation. Since it prevents costly runs, obviously, banks relying
on central interventionwill investmore in illiquid lateprojects. So the rangeof
parameter values forwhich it is optimal to choose the risky strategyα∗ = α(pH)
is expanded. Nevertheless, liquidity provision improves the allocation in an
incomplete market economy, provided central bank intervention is made
contingent on banks having investing a minimum level α in safe projects at
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stage 0. The central bank’s goal is consistent with the banks’ strategies since
α = α(pH).
Suppose now that π is low enough (0 ≤ π ≤ π1, with π1 being the same
as that in Proposition 1.4.1). The equilibrium is very similar to Proposition
1.4.1 b. The central bank can simply announce α = α(pL). The banks would
coordinate to meet this requirement, since the cost of free-riding is too high
(anyone who sets a lower α would not be bailed out by the central bank and
is run at pL).
When π is intermediate (π1 < π < π
′
2) the equilibrium is again of mixed
strategies, as in Proposition 1.4.2. The diﬀerence is that the prudent banks
now have an outside option to obtain cheap liquidity from the central bank
when the market rate is bid up. Given that the central bank announces
α = α(pL) and a prudent bank i sets αi = α, when at pH the market rate is bid
up by naughty banks, the prudent bank is able to obtain liquidity from the
central bank instead of buying expensive liquidity from early entrepreneurs.
In contrast, the naughty banks have to obtain liquidity at the higher market
rate rM >> 1 from early entrepreneurs. Naughty banks will be run at pL. In
the end, the expected nominal returns from both types of banks have to be
equal in equilibrium.
The targeted injection is designed so as not to save the naughty bank: due
to the competitive banking service, the prudent banks will be forced to trans-
fer all injected liquidity to their investors. So in the bad state, the naughty
banks cannot obtain liquidity via the inter-bank market. Consequently, the
prudent banks can meet their nominal deposit contract with cheap liquidity
provided by the central banks, whereas the naughty banks would be pun-
ished struggling in vain to get liquidity from the market at a higher rate. Such
a policy might work, provided the central bank has perfect knowledge about
the type of banks. But if there is the slightest doubt whether a bank is really
prudent or not, such a scheme runs the risk to fail.
Surely the central bank’s intervention improves allocation when π is high,
which seems to make the intervention justiﬁed. However, the welfare im-
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provement for intermediateπ is limited, or at least ambiguous, in comparison
to the laissez-faire equilibrium as stated in Proposition 1.4.2. Remember that
what makes free-riding attractive there is the abundant liquidity supply at
pH. Here the prudent banks simply ask the central bank for liquidity, and all
their early entrepreneurs have to go to the market seeking for buyers. This
makes the market more abundant in liquidity at pH, which makes free-riding
more attractive. It lures more banks to be naughty. In the end, in comparison
to the laissez-faire mixed strategy equilibrium, the share of naughty banks
may increase — implying that there is less investment in safe project, hence
less aggregate real return in t = 1 and more paper money — making the
investors’ welfare inferior.
On the other hand, the prudent banks set αP = α = α(pL) as required by
the central bank. This is higher than the α∗S in the laissez-faire equilibrium.
So the real early return from an individual prudent bank is higher. However,
as just argued, the share of prudent banks is reduced. Thus, the aggregate
level of real return to investors is ambiguous, likely to be lower.
Fig. 1.4 illustrates the eﬀects of targeted central bank liquidity provision on
investors expected payoﬀ. In the expanded range π > π′2 for which the risky
strategy is dominant, liquidity injection prevents bank runs with ineﬃcient
liquidation of early projects and thus raises expected returns to investors. In
contrast, in the intermediate range with mixed strategy equilibria π1 < π <
π′2, the payoﬀ of laissez-faire equilibrium is likely to be lower as compared to
the outcome in the absence of liquidity provision by the central bank.
In reality, however, things are likely to be even much worse because of a
serious time inconsistency problem. Itmakes free-riding evenmore attractive
in the case of central bank intervention: since banks face a pure illiquidity
problem (all projects are known to be realized at some stage), illiquid banks
can always credibly promise to pay back later. Therefore, ex post it is al-
ways welfare improving for the central bank to support the naughty banks,
avoiding costly bank runs. Obviously, anticipating this behavior ex ante in-
creases incentives for free-riding: naughty banks, having invested all their
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Fig. 1.4 Expected payoﬀ for investors under targeted central bank liquidity provision
funds in the risky projects (α = 0), can always aﬀord to pay early investors
a higher rate of return as long as central bank intervention helps to prevent
bankruptcy. The problem is that naughty (free-riding) banks have a higher
average return than prudent banks, provided that they will be bailed out by
central bank intervention. Because the naughty banks are absolutely better
oﬀ than prudent banks when central bank money is provided, the incentive
to free-ride will be aggravated.
In formal terms, the time inconsistency problem turns liquidity provision
(as deﬁned at the beginning of this section) into liquidity ﬂooding: the central
bank just ﬂoods the market with liquidity via open market operation to
keep the market rate at rM = 1. This seems to be a fair description of the
strategy central banks usually follow in times of crises. It may, however, have
disastrous eﬀects. The central bank is ﬂooding the market for the following
reasons:
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1. A central bank has limited instruments for implementation. Rather
than provide liquidity to speciﬁc targeted types of banks, open market
operation is the central bank’s most eﬀective (and simplest) device. It
acts in its good faith that the city of Sodom should be spared from the
destruction if a few righteous are found within (Genesis, 18:26);
2. When crisis hits, the naughty banks are those crying ﬁrst. If the central
bank gives in to their pressures too early, most of the liquidity injected is
likely to be directed towards the naughty banks instead of the prudent
ones.
In the end, the market (which is only needed for the naughty banks at this
time) is ﬂooded by liquidity as a result.
In the end, liquidity ﬂooding will crowd out all the prudent banks in
equilibrium, as we prove now in Proposition 1.5.1 for a special case.
Proposition 1.5.1 Assume that πpHR2 + (1 − π)c ≥ 1 and that for π1 < π < π2,
dj0 = γR2 > πpHR2 + (1 − π)c. If the central bank is willing to provide liquidity
to the entire market in times of crisis, all banks have an incentive to play naughty,
choosing α j = 0.
Proof Suppose that a representative bank chooses to be prudent with αi = α,
and promises a nominal deposit contract di0 = γ
[
αR1 + (1 − α)R2
]
in order to
maximize its investors return. Then when the bad state with high liquidity
needs is realized, the central bank has to inject enough liquidity into the
market to keep interest rate at r = 1 in order to ensure bank i’s survival.
However, given r = 1, a naughty bank j can always proﬁt from setting α j = 0,
promising the nominal return dj0 = γR2 > d
i
0 to its investors. Thus, surely
the banks prefer to play naughty. For other parameter values, there may not
exist any equilibrium at all with liquidity injection, suggesting that liquidity
provisionmakes theworldmorevulnerable, drivingbanks to corner solutions
(see Appendix A.1.5).
Proposition 1.5.1 shows that providing market liquidity can be quite dan-
gerous. Abraham argued in Genesis, God should save the entire city because
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a few good men are living in it. The problem with this advice is that such a
rescue simplymakes the naughtymen (banks) better oﬀwithout suﬀering the
punishment (the bank runs) they deserve. So in order not to encourage even
more free-riding, the central bank should commit to abstain from bailing out
naughty banks. It should stick ﬁrmly to its commitment as credible ”lender
to quality” instead of playing ”lender of last resort”. Obviously, such a com-
mitment is not really credible during a crisis: once the bad state has been
realized, liquidity injecting can prevent investors from running the banks, so
ex post it will always be welfare improving. The eﬃcient solution (targeting
only prudent banks) is dynamically inconsistent.
These results show that liquidity injection is a delicate issue possibly creat-
ing severemoral hazard problems. It casts serious doubt on the desirability of
central bank intervention. This argument seems to be very robust. It would
be straightforward to introduce vulture funds in the model trying to buyout
some of the bankrupt naughty banks in the bad state, ﬁnanced by liquidity
provision of early entrepreneurs. These vulture funds could at least partly
mitigate the social costs involved with bank runs. We plan to do this in a
future extension. Obviously, public liquidity provision will prevent the mar-
ket price of failed banks from falling suﬃciently to be proﬁtable for vulture
funds.
The current setup models pure illiquidity risk. With asymmetric informa-
tion about insolvency risk, intuition suggests that the moral hazard problem
is likely to become even worse. It is left for Chapter 3 to ﬁnd out whether
this notion is indeed true.
As is often the case with economic models, some policy conclusions are
not clear cut: assume the central bank would be really able to strictly commit
to targeted liquidity provision. If that is the case, liquidity injection could
deﬁnitely be welfare improving for some range of parameter values (for very
high π); for lower values, however, it turns out to have ambiguous eﬀects.
Which case is more relevant? The sets with diﬀerent ranges of local equilibria
are the result of the discrete probability space.
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A natural extension would be to extend the set up to a continuous prob-
ability distribution for p. Our intuition is that the generic outcome for the
continuous case is captured by the mixed strategy equilibrium for the follow-
ing reason: the set-up is characterized by serious non-convexities which are
likely to result in mixed strategy equilibria even for continuous state space.
We plan to analyze this in future research. In any (or rather in the realistic)
case, if commitment is not feasible, liquidity provision is haunted by moral
hazard issues with disastrous impact.
Furthermore, liquidity injection may also impede the role of money as a
medium to facilitate ordinary transactions. This question is left for future
work (see Sauer, 2007 for a ﬁrst analysis of the trade-oﬀ between ﬁnancial
stability and price stability).
1.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter analyzes the interaction between risk taking in the ﬁnancial
sector and central bank policy in an economy with pure illiquidity risk. We
extend the model of Diamond & Rajan (2006) to capture the feedback from
liquidity provision to risk taking incentives of banks. We show that liquidity
provision encourages higher risk taking: insuring against aggregate risks
results in a higher share of less liquid projects funded.
It turns out that the impact on welfare is ambiguous: assume ﬁrst the
central bank is able to strictly commit to targeted liquidity provision. For
some parameter values, liquidity provision turns out to be welfare improv-
ing, allowing banks to take more socially valuable risks. But we show that
liquidity provision has ambiguous eﬀects for other parameter values. More
seriously: central banks need to be able to commit to abstain from providing
liquidity via open market operations in order discourage free-riding. Such a
commitment, however, is not credible. In the absence of commitment, provi-
sion of public liquidity may have disastrous eﬀects. It increases the incentive
of ﬁnancial intermediaries to free-ride on liquidity in good states, resulting in
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excessively low liquidity in bad states. There is a serious dynamic consistency
problem.
The surprising result is that — contrary to prevailing intuition — the
moral hazard problem is inherent even in an economy with pure illiquidity
risk. Of course in reality, unlike in models, there is no clear cut distinction
between illiquidity and insolvency risk. It should be fairly straightforward to
make the model more realistic and introduce asymmetric information about
solvency of theﬁnancial intermediaries. Apromising routemight be to follow
Brunnermeier & Pederson (2009). With private information about solvency
risk the moral hazard problem is likely to become more serious. Chapter 3
will explore this issue based on an extended version of current framework.
In the model presented, the optimal policy response depends to some ex-
tent on speciﬁc parameter values (the probability of the bad state occurring).
This is an artifact of the discrete probability space. Our conjecture is that the
generic outcome in continuous state space is the mixed strategy equilibrium
with commitment to no intervention as optimal solution. Again, we leave
this to future research.
How should the dynamic consistency problem be solved? Do we really
suggest not to intervene during an acute crisis? Following the ”Austrian
hangover theory” some argue that creating a recession might be necessary
to purge the excesses of previous booms, leaving the economy in a healthier
state. The ”winds of creative destruction” would cause healthy pain. We
don’t think this is a sensible solution to the problem. Bad investments in the
past should not require the unemployment of good workers in the present.
Rather, we think the incentive problemneeds to be addressed in otherways—
by stronger regulationor alternative instruments. Just as in standarddynamic
consistency problems, the right approach is to tackle the externalities directly.
Currently, central banks are caught in a trap reminding of a Greek tragedy.
It was a humiliating experience to see the credibility of the Bank of England
being smashed by a Northern rock engaged in reckless lending.
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The key challenge, of course, is the question what instruments should be
used in order to address the underlying externalities. The current set-up
provides some foundation to analyze this question: it is ﬂexible enough to
incorporate equity and the role of capital requirements. We will do this in
the next chapters.
Somemay argue that a bankingmodel cannot address realities of amodern
economy with highly securitized markets. In our view, this is a misunder-
standing: following Diamond & Rajan (2006), we analyzed the impact of
liquidity injection in a sound model based on an explicit optimal contract for
the underlying commitment problem which turns out to be a fragile banking
system. As impressively demonstrated by Northern Rock, a run on mar-
kets with the risk of ﬁre sales can be at least as devastating as a run on
traditional banks, whenever there are leveraged institutions borrowing short
and lending long. We have, however, serious doubts that the securitization
arrangements in the US subprime markets have been based on an optimal
principal agent contract addressing the inherent incentive problems in an
adequate way. We are still waiting for an optimal contract model of securi-
tization and are happy to analyze the impact of liquidity provision again in
such a model whenever it will be available.
Appendix
A.1 PROOFS
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1.3.1
The proof is done by the following steps:
Claim 1 Any non-idle equilibrium must be symmetric.
Since the banks are competitive, therefore in equilibrium no bank is able
to make strictly positive proﬁt. Without restriction there exists a kind of
equilibria in which some banks stay idle with zero proﬁt by taking inferior
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strategies and getting no deposit at all. To make the results interesting, we
exclude such equilibria throughout the chapter.
As a direct conclusion, a representative bank i being active must achieve
the same expected return d0i = γ
[
αiR1 + (1 − αi)pR2]+ γ(1−αi)(1−p)R2r (otherwise
any bank j with d0 j smaller than the others will lose all its business). Given
equilibrium outcome r being equal for all banks (since r is determined by
aggregate liquidity demand and supply), all of them should take the same
(αi, d0i) (so far we don’t require αi be pure strategy).
Claim 2 Any non-idle symmetric equilibrium of pure strategy takes the form stated
in Lemma 1.3.1.
Since the equilibrium is symmetric, we can simply denote the equilibrium
strategyproﬁle by
(
α∗, d∗0
)
for all the banks. Market clearing condition requires
that the market interest rate is determined by the aggregate liquidity supply
and demand, i.e.
rN(1 − γ) [α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2] = Nγ(1 − α∗)(1 − p)R2,
and the equilibrium interest rate r∗ is thus given by
r∗ =
γ(1 − α∗)(1 − p)R2
(1 − γ) [α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2] .
Express α∗ as a function of r∗,
α∗
(
p, r∗
)
=
γ
1−p
r∗ − (1 − γ)p
γ
1−p
r∗ + (1 − γ)
(
R1
R2
− p
) .
A bank manager’s expected return under r∗ is
κ∗ = γ
[
α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2] + γ(1 − α∗)(1 − p)R2r∗ = α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2,
which is the upper bound of d∗0. Since Bertrand competition allows zero proﬁt
for the bank managers,
d∗0 = κ
∗ = α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2.
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Now it’s clear that r∗ and d∗0 are uniquely determined for any given α
∗,
and α∗ may take its value in [0, α] (such that r (0, α) ≤ R2R1 ). So we guess that
∀α∗ ∈ [0, α], with d∗0 = α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2 and r∗ = γ(1−α
∗)(1−p)R2
(1−γ)[α∗R1+(1−α∗)pR2] , such(
α∗, d∗0
)
is an equilibrium strategic proﬁle.
To see that such strategy proﬁle is indeed in equilibrium, suppose that
bank i deviates by setting
(
α′i
(
p, r′
)
, d′0
)

(
α∗
(
p, r∗
)
, d∗0
)
. Then, should both
the deviator and the rest get any deposit from the investors,
1. If α′i
(
p, r′
)
< α∗
(
p, r∗
)
, by market clearing condition
r′
{
(1 − γ) [αiR1 + (1 − αi)pR2] + (N − 1)(1 − γ) [α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2]}
=
[
γ(1 − αi)(1 − p)R2 + (N − 1)γ(1 − α∗)(1 − p)R2] ,
it’s clear that r′ > r∗, given γ > p, i.e. the deviator bids up the market
interest rate at t = 12 by investing less on safe assets. For the non-
deviators, the expected return now becomes
κ−i = γ
[
α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2] + γ(1 − α∗)(1 − p)R2r′
< γ
[
α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2] + γ(1 − α∗)(1 − p)R2r∗
= d∗0,
i.e. they’ll not be able to meet d∗0 and will be run by investors at t =
1
2 . In
the end, the deviator can only get liquidity from its own entrepreneurs
at t = 1, and at t = 0 set d′0 at most as
d′0 = α
′R1 + (1 − α′)pR2 < α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2 = d∗0
— but this implies that the deviator is never able to get any business
at t = 0 (because all the investors would choose to deposit at the non-
deviators, ensuring the return d∗0) and the deviation is not optimal;
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2. If α′i
(
p, r′
)
> α∗
(
p, r∗
)
, given r ≤ R2R1 , it’s clear that r′ < r∗ with the non-
deviators’ return becoming
κ−i = γ
[
α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2] + γ(1 − α∗)(1 − p)R2r′
> γ
[
α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2] + γ(1 − α∗)(1 − p)R2r∗
= d∗0,
and they’ll all survive at t = 12 . However, the deviator’s own expected
return
κi = γ
[
α′iR1 + (1 − α′i )pR2
]
+
γ(1 − α′i )(1 − p)R2
r′
< γ
[
α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2] + γ(1 − α∗)(1 − p)R2r′
= κ−i
implying that such deviation is not proﬁtable. To see that ”<” in the
second line holds, note that κ is linear in α, so if any α′i
(
p, r′
)
> α∗
(
p, r∗
)
achieves higher κi, it must be α′i = 1. That is, the highest expected
return for such deviator must be κi
(
α′i = 1
)
= γR1.
On the other hand, the worst expected return for non-deviators is
achieved under r′ = R2R1 , and such worse case corresponds to
κ−i = γ
[
α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2] + γ(1 − α∗)(1 − p)R2r′
= γ
[
α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2] + γ(1 − α∗)(1 − p)R1.
If we can show κ−i ≥ κi
(
α′i = 1
)
, then the deviating strategy is domi-
nated in any case. This is to show
γ
[
α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pR2] + γ(1 − α∗)(1 − p)R1 ≥ γR1,
γpR2 − γα∗pR2 − γpR1 + γα∗pR1 ≥ 0,
(R2 − R1) (1 − α∗) ≥ 0,
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and the last step holds for sure, meaning that such deviation is indeed
inferior.
Therefore no unilateral deviation is proﬁtable.
Claim 3 There exists no equilibrium of mixed strategies.
First, notice that even undermixed strategies the expected return d0 should
be the same across all the banks because of Bertrand competition, given that
p is deterministic. Therefore we can simply concentrate on mixed strategies
with respect to α. Suppose that there exists an equilibriumofmixed strategies
in which a representative bank i takes a mixed strategy σi with #suppσi ≥ 2.
Take two arbitrary elements α1i , α
2
i ∈ suppσi and α1i  α2i , given σ−i and
equilibrium outcome r the following equation must hold
κi
(
α1i , σ−i
)
= κi
(
α2i , σ−i
)
meaning that α1i = α
2
i . A contradiction.
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 1.3.2
Since ∂κi∂r =
∂κi
∂αi(p,r)
∂αi(p,r)
∂r < 0 and r ≥ 1, so r∗ = 1 maximizes κi. Also in
symmetric case r∗ is directly determined by α∗, and d∗0 depends on r
∗ and
α∗, the problem then boils down to the bank managers’ decision on α∗ that
maximizes their expected return via getting liquidity at the lowest price, i.e.
r∗ = 1.
Suppose now bank i sets α′i  α
∗ (p, r∗), then the liquidity it can borrow
from early entrepreneurs is given by
γ
(
1 − α′i
)
(1 − p)R2
r
because of the resource constraint. Then
1. For α′i > α
∗ (p, r∗), r = r∗ = 1,
κi
(
α′i , α−i
(
p, r∗
))
= γ
[
α′iR1 + (1 − α′i )R2
]
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< γ
[
α∗
(
p, r∗
)
R1 + (1 − α∗ (p, r∗))R2]
= κi
(
α∗
(
p, r∗
))
;
2. For α′i < α
∗ (p, r∗), r is bid up so that all the other banks are run,,
κi
(
α′i , α−i
(
p, r∗
))
= α′iR1 + (1 − α′i )pR2
< α−i
(
p, r∗
)
R1 + (1 − α−i (p, r∗))pR2
= κi
(
α∗
(
p, r∗
))
.
So theredoesn’t exist anyα′i
(
p, r∗
)
 α∗
(
p, r∗
)
such thatκi
(
α∗
(
p, r∗
))
< κi
(
α′i
(
p, r∗
)
, α−i
(
p, r∗
))
.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1.4.1
By Lemma 1.3.2 α(pH) and α(pL) maximize the banks’ expected return at pH
and pL respectively. The banks’ expected return at pH is higher than that at pL
because
κ
(
α(pH), pH
)
= γ
[
α(pH)R1 + (1 − α(pH))R2] = γE[RH]
> κ
(
α(pL), pL
)
= γE[RL].
However banks with α(pH) are run at pL and only get return of c, because
κ
(
α(pH), pL
)
= α(pH)R1 + (1 − α(pH))pLR2
< α(pH)R1 + (1 − α(pH))pHR2 = κ (α(pH), pH) .
So the banks prefer α(pH) to α(pL) only if γE[RH]π + (1 − π)c > γE[RL], solve
to get
π >
γE[RL] − c
γE[RH] − c = π2.
When π = 0 the problem degenerates to deterministic case, so α∗ = α(pL)
is still the unique optimal symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
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When 0 < π < π2 any strategic proﬁle α∗ in which all banks set α∗  α(pL)
cannot be an optimal symmetric pure strategy equilibrium:
1. For α∗ ∈ (α(pH), α(pL)), the maximum return one bank can obtain at pL
is α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pLR2 < α(pL)R1 + (1 − α(pL))pLR2 = κ (α(pL)), and the
maximum return one bank can obtain at pH is γ [α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)R2] >
γ
[
α(pL)R1 + (1 − α(pL))R2] = κ (α(pL)). Given this fact, the banks are run
at pL and only get an actual return of γ [α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)R2]π + (1 − π)c,
but one can deviate by setting αi = α(pH) making a higher expected
return;
2. For α∗ ∈ [0, α(pH)) in which the banks are run at pL (because α∗R1 +
(1 − α∗)pHR2 > α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)pLR2), α∗ is dominated by the optimal
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium α∗ = α(pH) for deterministic pH;
3. For α∗ = α(pH), by Proposition 1.4.1 α∗ is dominated by α∗ = α(pL);
4. For α∗ ∈ (α(pL), 1] in which the banks survive at both states, α∗ is domi-
natedbyα∗ = α(pL) becauseγ [α∗R1 + (1 − α∗)R2] < γ [α(pL)R1 + (1 − α(pL))R2].
Now suppose that π = δ > 0 and the banks still stick to α∗ = α(pL).
Then when pH realizes with probability π, all early entrepreneurs have excess
liquidity supply
(1 − γ) [α(pL)R1 + (1 − α(pL))pHR2]︸︷︷︸
(A)
−γ(1 − α(pL))(1 − pH)R2︸︷︷︸
(B)
= (1 − γ) [α(pL)R1 + (1 − α(pL))pLR2] − γ(1 − α(pL))(1 − pL)R2
= 0
in which term (A) is the entrepreneurs’ rent from early projects and term (B)
is the deposit from early entrepreneurs in t = 1. Knowing this, one bank i can
exploit this opportunity by setting αi < α(pL) because all its liquidity shortage
can be fulﬁlled by early entrepreneurs’ deposit given r∗ = 1. In this case αi = 0
maximizes its return at pH, i.e. κi
(
0, α−i(pL)
)
= γR2 > γE[RL] = κi
(
αi(pL)
)
.
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However any deviation αi < α(pL) makes bank i run at pL. Since αi is
observable by its depositors, its expected return for its investors is now
γR2π + (1 − π)c > γE[RL],
π >
γE[RL] − c
γR2 − c .
Otherwise all the banks would stick to α∗ = α(pL).
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1.4.2
The proposition is proved by construction.
Claim 1 When γE[RL]−cγR2−c < π <
γE[RL]−c
γE[RH]−c , there exists no optimal symmetric pure
strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 1.4.1 already shows that for γE[RL]−cγR2−c < π <
γE[RL]−c
γE[RH]−c there exists
no optimal symmetric pure strategy equilibriumbecause proﬁtable unilateral
deviation is always possible.
Claim 2 If an equilibrium of mixed strategies exist, the equilibrium can only have
a two-point support
{
α∗r, α∗s
}
such that one bank survives at both states by
choosing α∗s and survives at only one state by choosing α∗r.
Suppose that α1 and α2 (α1  α2) are two arbitrary elements in the support
of the mixed strategies equilibrium, rH and rL are the corresponding equilib-
rium interest rates at pH and pL respectively. One bank shall be indiﬀerent
between choosing α1 and α2.
Suppose that one bank survives at both states by choosing either α1 and
α2. So its expected return should be the same for both strategies,
γ
[
α1R1 + (1 − α1) pHR2 + (1 − α1)
(
1 − pH)R2
rH
]
= γ
[
α2R1 + (1 − α2) pHR2 + (1 − α2)
(
1 − pH)R2
rH
]
,
i.e. α1 = α2, a contradiction. Therefore there is at most one strategy by which
one bank survives at both states.
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Suppose that by choosing either α1 and α2 one bank survives at one state
but is run in the other, so its expected return should be the same for both
strategies:
γ
[
α1R1 + (1 − α1) pHR2 + (1 − α1)
(
1 − pH)R2
rH
]
π + (1 − π)c
= γ
[
α2R1 + (1 − α2) pHR2 + (1 − α2)
(
1 − pH)R2
rH
]
π + (1 − π)c,
i.e. α1 = α2, a contradiction.
Suppose that by choosing α1 one bank survives at pH and is run at pL, and
by choosing α2 one bank survives at pL and is run at pH. This implies that
γ
[
α1R1 + (1 − α1) pHR2 + (1 − α1)
(
1 − pH)R2
rH
]
> γ
[
α1R1 + (1 − α1) pLR2 + (1 − α1)
(
1 − pL)R2
rL
]
,
i.e. pHR2 +
(1−pH)R2
rH
> pLR2 +
(1−pL)R2
rL
, as well as
γ
[
α2R1 + (1 − α2) pHR2 + (1 − α2)
(
1 − pH)R2
rH
]
< γ
[
α2R1 + (1 − α2) pLR2 + (1 − α2)
(
1 − pL)R2
rL
]
,
i.e. pHR2 +
(1−pH)R2
rH
< pLR2 +
(1−pL)R2
rL
, a contradiction.
Therefore there is at most one strategy by which one bank survives at one
state and is run at the other. The equilibrium proﬁle of mixed strategies is
supported by
{
α∗r, α∗s
}
such that one bank survives at both states by choosing
α∗s and survives at only one state by choosing α∗r.
Claim 3 In such equilibrium, interest rates at states pH and pL are rH > rL > 1.
By choosing α∗s one bank should have equal return at both states: ds0 =
ds0(pH) = d
s
0(pL), i.e.
γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pHR2 +
(
1 − α∗s
) (
1 − pH)R2
rH
]
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= γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pLR2 +
(
1 − α∗s
) (
1 − pL)R2
rL
]
.
With some simple algebra this is equivalent to
1
rH
=
1 − pL
1 − pH
1
rL
− pH − pL
1 − pH .
Plot 1rH as a function of
1
rL
, as in Fig. A.1
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Fig. A.1 1rH as a function of
1
rL
The slope 1−pL1−pH > 1 and intercept −
pH−pL
1−pH < 0, and the line goes through
(1, 1). But rH = rL = 1 cannot be equilibrium outcome here, because α(pL)
is dominant strategy in this case and subject to deviation. So whenever
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rH > 1 (suppose 1rH = A in the graph), there must be rH > rL > 1 (because
1
rH
< 1rL = B < 1).
Claim 4 In such equilibrium, risky banks set α∗r = 0 and safe banks α∗s > 0. Risky
banks promise dr0 = γ
[
pHR2 +
(1−pH)R2
rH
]
and are run at pL; safe banks survive
at both states by promising ds0 = γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pkR2 +
(1−α∗s)(1−pk)R2
rk
]
in
which k ∈ {H,L}. Moreover, πdr0 + (1 − π)c = ds0.
Since (
1−α∗s)(1−pH)R2
rH
<
(1−α∗s)(1−pL)R2
rL
, i.e. the safe banks get less liquidity
from their early entrepreneurs at pH, and also these early entrepreneurs have
higher liquidity supply at pH (because (1 − γ) [α∗sR1 + (1 − α∗s) pHR2] > (1 −
γ)
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pLR2
]
), therefore theremust be excess liquidity supply from
these early entrepreneurs atpH. This excess liquidity supplymust be absorbed
at rH by the risky banks. As a result, the risky banks survive at pH by free-
riding excess liquidity supply and are run at pL.
At rH by setting α∗r the risky banks get a return of
dr0 = γ
[
α∗rR1 +
(
1 − α∗r
)
pHR2 +
(
1 − α∗r
) (
1 − pH)R2
rH
]
.
Since the banks are risk-neutral, the risky banks maximize the expression
above by setting eitherα∗r = 0 orα∗r = 1 depending on all the other parameters.
α∗r = 1 is excluded because if so the banks become autarkic and survive at
both states. Therefore for pHR2 not too small and rH not too big the risky
banks maximize their return at rH with α∗r = 0. This determines dr0 in the
claim.
Moreover the expected return should be equal for both types of banks,
πdr0 + (1 − π)c = ds0, to deter the deviation between types.
Claim 5 In such equilibrium, the strategy for the safe banks is given by α∗s =
α∗
(
pL, rL
)
, i.e. rL(1 − γ) [α∗sR1 + (1 − α∗s) pLR2] = γ (1 − α∗s) (1 − pL)R2.
Since the risky banks are run and safe banks survive at pL, given rL the
safe banks maximize their return by setting α∗s = α∗
(
pL, rL
)
by exhausting all
liquidities provided by early entrepreneurs. By the proof of Lemma 1.3.1 any
unilateral deviation can only make lower return.
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Claim 6 There exists proper solution of α∗s for such equilibrium proﬁle of mixed
strategies.
By πdr0 + (1 − π)c = ds0,
γ
[
pHR2 +
(1 − pH)R2
rH
]
π + (1 − π)c
= γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pHR2 +
(
1 − α∗s
) (
1 − pH)R2
rH
]
. (A.1)
By ds0 = d
s
0(pH) = d
s
0(pL),
γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pHR2 +
(
1 − α∗s
) (
1 − pH)R2
rH
]
= α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pLR2. (A.2)
From (A.1) and (A.2), solve to get
γ
(
1 − pH)R2
rH
=
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pLR2 − (1 − π)c − πγpHR2
π
. (A.3)
Apply (A.3) into (A.2), by some simple algebra we get a quadratic equation
of α∗s
(
R1 − pLR2)α∗2s − [π (γR1 − c) − (pLR2 − c) + (1 − π) (R1 − pLR2)]α∗s
− (pLR2 − c) (1 − π) = 0. (A.4)
Deﬁne the left hand side of equation (A.4) as a function of α∗s, f
(
α∗s
)
= ωα∗2s +
φα∗2s + ψ in which
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ω = R1 − pLR2 > 0,
φ = − [π (γR1 − c) − (pLR2 − c) + (1 − π) (R1 − pLR2)] ,
ψ = − (pLR2 − c) (1 − π) < 0.
Since φ2 − 4ωψ > 0, the quadratic equation has two real roots, denoted by
α∗s,2 < α
∗
s,1. And by
ψ
ω < 0 and f (0) = ψ < 0, we know α
∗
s,2α
∗
s,1 < 0, i.e.
α∗s,2 < 0 < α
∗
s,1.
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Moreover we ﬁnd that
f (1) = ω + φ + ψ
= R1 − pLR2 − [π (γR1 − c) − (pLR2 − c) + (1 − π) (R1 − pLR2)]
− (pLR2 − c) (1 − π)
= π(1 − γ)R1
> 0,
we know that α∗s,2 < 0 < α
∗
s,1 < 1.
And again we can ﬁnd that
f (1 − π) = (R1 − pLR2) (1 − π)2 − [π (γR1 − c) − (pLR2 − c)+
(1 − π) (R1 − pLR2)] (1 − π) − (pLR2 − c) (1 − π)
= −π (γR1 − c) (1 − π)
< 0,
we know that α∗s,2 < 0 < 1−π < α∗s,1 < 1. This implies that in current settings,
there always exists a plausible solution: α∗s,1 ∈ (1 − π, 1).
All the arguments above can be captured by Fig. A.2.
By equation (A.1) we already know that when π = π1, α∗s = α(pL) and
rH = 1. When π = π1 + δ, α∗s ∈ (1 − π, 1), then rH has to be larger than 1 to
make the equation still hold. From Claim 3, this implies that rH > rL > 1.
Claim 7 Given features described in previous claims, there exists no proﬁtable uni-
lateral deviation.
Suppose that one bank i deviates by choosing αi  α∗s and αi  0. Then by
doing so there are three possible consequences:
1. The bank survives at both states. But by Claim 5 its return at pL must
be lower than ds0. If it survives at both states, it cannot promise d
i
0 > d
s
0.
Given this, no investor would deposit at all;
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Fig. A.2 The existence of the proper solution for α∗s
2. It survives at pH but is run at pL. Since αi > 0 by Claim 4 its return at
pH must be lower than dr0;
3. It survives at pL but is run at pH. By (1) its return is di0 < d
s
0 at pL and c
at pH. Its expected return is di0π + (1 − π)c < ds0.
Therefore strategic proﬁle σi cannot be a proﬁtable unilateral deviation such
that σi contains αi  α∗s and αi  0 with probability p ∈ (0, 1].
And section 5 of the proposition is simply market clearing condition bal-
ancing aggregate liquidity supply and demand.
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A.1.5 Addendum to Proposition 1.5.1
For those parameter values such that πpHR2 + (1 − π)pLR2 < 1 there exists no
equilibrium with liquidity injection. The reason is the following:
1. Any symmetric strategic proﬁle cannot be equilibrium, because
(a) If there is no trade under such strategic proﬁle, i.e. α is so small
that the real return is less than 1, one bank can deviate by setting
α = 1 and trading with investors;
(b) If there is trade under such strategic proﬁle, i.e. α > 0 for all the
banks, then one bank can deviate by setting α = 0 and getting
higher nominal return than the other banks.
2. Any asymmetric strategic proﬁle, or proﬁle of mixed strategies, cannot
be equilibrium, because
(a) If there is no trade under such strategic proﬁle, then the argument
of 1 (a) applies here;
(b) If there is trade under such strategic proﬁle, then one bank can
deviate by choosing a pure strategy, α = 0, and get better oﬀ —
there is no reason to mix with the other dominated strategies.
A.2 A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE FOR THE EQUILIBRIUM OF MIXED
STRATEGIES
Suppose that pH = 0.4, pL = 0.3, γ = 0.6, R1 = 2, R2 = 4, c = 0.8. Then
α(pH) =
γ − pH
γ − pH + (1 − γ)R1R2
=
1
2
,
α(pL) =
γ − pL
γ − pL + (1 − γ)R1R2
= 0.6,
E[RH] = α(pH)R1 +
(
1 − α(pH))R2 = 3,
E[RL] = α(pL)R1 +
(
1 − α(pL))R2 = 2.8,
π2 =
γE[RL] − c
γE[RH] − c = 0.88,
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π1 =
γE[RL] − c
γR2 − c = 0.55.
Take π = 0.7 ∈ (π1, π2) and by πdr0 + (1 − π)c = ds0
γ
[
pHR2 +
(1 − pH)R2
rH
]
π + (1 − π)c
= γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pHR2 +
(
1 − α∗s
) (
1 − pH)R2
rH
]
,
0.6
[
0.4 × 4 + 0.6 × 4
rH
]
× 0.7 + 0.3 × 0.8
= 0.6
[
α∗s × 2 +
(
1 − α∗s
) × 0.4 × 4 +
(
1 − α∗s
) × 0.6 × 4
rH
]
. (A.5)
By ds0 = d
s
0(pH) = d
s
0(pL),
γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pHR2 +
(
1 − α∗s
) (
1 − pH)R2
rH
]
= α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pLR2,
0.6
[
α∗s × 2 +
(
1 − α∗s
) × 0.4 × 4 +
(
1 − α∗s
) × 0.6 × 4
rH
]
= α∗s × 2 +
(
1 − α∗s
) × 0.3 × 4. (A.6)
Solve equations (A.5) and (A.6) to get α∗s = 0.47 < α(pH) < α(pL), rH = 1.519.
And ds0 = α
∗
sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pLR2 = 1.576, dr0 =
ds0−(1−π)c
π = 1.908.
Market clearing at pL:
rL(1 − γ) [α∗sR1 + (1 − α∗s) pLR2] = γ (1 − α∗s) (1 − pL)R2,
rL × 0.4 [0.47 × 2 + 0.53 × 0.3 × 4] = 0.6 × 0.53 × 0.7 × 4,
solve to get rL = 1.414.
Market clearing at pH:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Dr = dr0 − γpHR2 = 0.948,
Ds = ds0 − γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pHR2
]
= 0.503,
Sr = (1 − γ)pHR2 = 0.64,
Ss = (1 − γ) [α∗sR1 + (1 − α∗s) pHR2] = 0.715,
as well as θDr + (1 − θ)Ds = θSr + (1 − θ)Ss, solve to get θ = 0.402.

Part III
Endogenous Systemic
Liquidity Risk and
Banking Regulation

2
Endogenous Systemic
Liquidity Risk
The events earlier this month leading up to the acquisition of Bear Stearns by
JP Morgan Chase highlight the importance of liquidity management in meeting
obligations during stressful market conditions. ... The fate of Bear Stearns was the
result of a lack of conﬁdence, not a lack of capital. ... At all times until its agreement
to be acquired by JP Morgan Chase during the weekend, the ﬁrm had a capital
cushion well above what is required to meet supervisory standards calculated
using the Basel II standard.
—Chairman Cox, SEC, March 20, 2008
Bear Stearns never ran short of capital. It just could not meet its obligations. At
least that is the view from Washington, where regulators never stepped in to force
the investment bank to reduce its high leverage even after it became clear Bear
was struggling last summer. Instead, the regulators issued repeated reassurances
that all was well. Does it sound a little like a doctor emerging from a funeral to
proclaim that he did an excellent job of treating the late patient?
—Floyd Norris, New York Times, April 4, 2008
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
For a long time, presumably starting in 2004, ﬁnancial markets seemed to
have been awash with excessive liquidity. But suddenly, in August 2007, liq-
uidity dried out nearly completely as a response to doubts about the quality
of subprime mortgage-backed securities. Despite massive central bank inter-
ventions, the liquidity freeze did not melt away, but rather spread slowly to
other markets such as those for auction rate bonds. On March 16th, 2008, the
investment bank Bear Sterns which — according to the SEC chairman — was
adequately capitalized even a week before had to be rescued via a Fed-led
takeover by JP Morgan Chase.
Following the turmoil on ﬁnancial markets, there has been a strong debate
about the adequate policy response. Some have warned that central bank
actions may encourage dangerous moral hazard behavior of market partici-
pants in the future. Others instead criticized central banks of responding far
too cautiously. The most prominent voice has been Willem Buiter who —
jointly with Ann Sibert — right from the beginning of the crisis in August
2007 strongly pushed the idea that in times of crises, central banks should act
as market maker of last resort. As adoption of the Bagehot principles to mod-
ern times with globally integrated ﬁnancial systems, central banks should
actively purchase and sell illiquid private sector securities and so play a key
role in assessing and pricing credit risk. In his FT blog ”Maverecon”, Willem
Buiter stated the intellectual arguments behind such a policy very clearly on
December 13th, 2007:
”Liquidity is a public good. It can be managed privately (by hoarding inherently
liquid assets), but it would be socially ineﬃcient for private banks and other
ﬁnancial institutions to hold liquid assets on their balance sheets in amounts
suﬃcient to tide them over when markets become disorderly. They are meant to
intermediate short maturity liabilities into long maturity assets and (normally)
liquid liabilities into illiquid assets. Since central banks can create unquestioned
liquidity at the drop of a hat, in any amount and at zero cost, they should be
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the liquidity providers of last resort, both as lender of last resort and as market
maker of last resort. There is no moral hazards as long as central banks provide
the liquidity against properly priced collateral, which is in addition subject to
the usual ’liquidity haircuts’ on this fair valuation. The private provision of the
public good of emergency liquidity is wasteful. It’s as simple as that.”
Buiter’s statement represents the prevailing main stream view that there
is no moral hazard risk as long as the Bagehot principles are followed as best
practice in liquidity management.
According to the Bagehot principles, a Lender of Last Resort policy should
target liquidity provision to the market, but not to speciﬁc banks. Central
banks should ”lend freely at a high rate against good collateral.” This way,
public liquidity support is supposed to be targeted towards solvent yet illiq-
uid institutions, since insolvent ﬁnancial institutions should be unable to
provide adequate collateral to secure lending. This chapter wants to chal-
lenge the view that a policy following Bagehot principle does not createmoral
hazard. The key argument is this view neglects the endogeneity of aggregate
liquidity risk. Starting with Allen & Gale (1998) and Holmstro¨m & Tirole
(1998), there have been quite a few models recently analyzing private and
public provision of liquidity. But as far as we know, in all these models except
Chapter 1 or our companion paper Cao & Illing (2008), aggregate systemic
risk is assumed to be an exogenous probability event.
In Holmstro¨m & Tirole (1998), for instance, liquidity shortages arise when
ﬁnancial institutions and industrial companies scramble for, and cannot ﬁnd
the cash required to meet their most urgent needs or undertake their most
valuable projects. They show that credit lines from ﬁnancial intermediaries
are suﬃcient for implementing the socially optimal (second-best) allocation,
as long as there is no aggregate uncertainty. In the case of aggregate uncer-
tainty, however, the private sector cannot satisfy its own liquidity needs, so
the existence of liquidity shortages vindicates the injection of liquidity by the
government. In their model, the government can provide (outside) liquidity
by committing future tax income to back up the reimbursements.
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In the model of Holmstro¨m & Tirole (1998), the Lender of Last Resort
indeed provides a free lunch: public provision of liquidity in the presence of
aggregate shocks is a pure public good, with no moral hazard involved. The
reason is that aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events;
there is no endogenous mechanism determining the aggregate amount of
liquidity available. The same holds in Allen & Gale (1998), even though
they analyze a quite diﬀerent mechanism for public provision of liquidity:
the adjustment of the price level in an economy with nominal contracts. We
adopt Allen & Gale’s mechanism. But we show that there is no longer a
free lunch when private provision of liquidity aﬀects the likelihood of an
aggregate (systemic) event.
The basic idea of our model is fairly straightforward: ﬁnancial interme-
diaries can choose to invest in more or less (real) liquid assets. We model
illiquidity in the following way: some fraction of projects turns out to be re-
alized late. The aggregate share of late projects is endogenous; it depends on
the incentives of ﬁnancial intermediaries to invest in risky, illiquid projects.
This endogeneity allows us to capture the feedback from liquidity provision
to risk taking incentives of ﬁnancial intermediaries. We show that the an-
ticipation of unconditional central bank liquidity provision will encourage
excessive risk taking (moral hazard). It turns out that in the absence of liq-
uidity requirements, there will be overinvestment in risky activities, creating
excessive exposure to systemic risk.
In contrast towhat theBagehotprinciple suggests, unconditional provision
of liquidity to the market (lending of central banks against good collateral)
is exactly the wrong policy: it distorts incentives of banks to provide the
eﬃcient amount of private liquidity. In our model, we concentrate on pure
illiquidity risk: there will never be insolvency unless triggered by illiquidity
(by a bank run). Illiquid projects promise a higher, yet possibly retarded
return. Relying on suﬃcient liquidity provided by the market (or by the
central bank), ﬁnancial intermediaries are inclined to invest more heavily
in high yielding, but illiquid long term projects. Central banks liquidity
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provision, helping to prevent bank runs with ineﬃcient early liquidation,
encourages bank to invest more in illiquid assets. At ﬁrst sight, this seems to
work ﬁne, even if systemic risk increases: after all, public insurance against
aggregate risks should allow agents to undertake more proﬁtable activities
with higher social return. As long as public insurance is a free lunch, there is
nothing wrong with providing such a public good.
The problem, however, is that due to limited liability some banks will be
encouraged to free-ride on liquidity provision. This competition will force
other banks to reduce their eﬀorts for liquidity provision, too. Chuck Prince,
at that time chief executive of Citigroup, stated the dilemma posed in fairly
poetic terms on July 10th 2007 in a (in-) famous interview with Financial
Times1:
”When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated.
But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still
dancing.”
The naughty dancing banks simply enjoy liquidity provided in good states
of the world and just disappear (go bankrupt) in bad states. The incentive
of ﬁnancial intermediaries to free-ride on liquidity in good states results in
excessively low liquidity in bad states. Even worse: as long as they are not
run, naughty ”dancing” banks can always oﬀer more attractive collateral in
bad states — so they are able to outbid prudent banks in a liquidity crisis. For
that reason, the Bagehot principle, rather than providing correct incentives, is
1The key problem is best captured by the following remark about Citigroup in the New York
Times report ”Treasury Dept. Plan Would Give Fed Wide New Power” on March 29, 2008: ”Mr.
Frank said he realized the need for tighter regulation of Wall Street ﬁrms after a meeting with Charles O.
Prince III, then chairman of Citigroup. When Mr. Frank asked why Citigroup had kept billions of dollars
in ’structured investment vehicles’ oﬀ the ﬁrm’s balance sheet, he recalled, Mr. Prince responded that
Citigroup, as a bank holding company, would have been at a disadvantage because investment ﬁrms can
operate with higher debt and lower capital reserves.”
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the wrong medicine in modern times with a shadow banking system relying
on liquidity being provided by other institutions.
This chapter extends a model developed in the last chapter, i.e. Cao &
Illing (2008). There we did not allow for banks holding equity, so we could
not analyze the impact of equity requirements. As we will show, imposing
equity requirements can be inferior even relative to the outcome of a mixed
strategy equilibrium with free-riding (dancing) banks. In contrast, imposing
binding liquidity requirements ex ante combined with Lender of Last Resort
policy ex post is able to implement the optimal second best outcome. In our
model, it yields a strictly superior outcome compared to imposing equity
requirements. We also prove that n¨arrow banking” (banks being required to
hold suﬃcient equity so as to be able to pay out demand deposits in all states
of the world) is inferior relative to ex ante liquidity regulation.
Allen & Gale (2007, p 213f) notice that the nature of market failure leading
to systemic liquidity risk is not yet well understood. They argue that ”a care-
ful analysis of the costs and beneﬁts of crises is necessary to understandwhen
intervention is necessary.” In this chapter, we try to ﬁll this gap, providing a
cost / beneﬁt analysis of diﬀerent forms of banking regulation to better under-
stand what type of intervention is desired. We explicitly compare the impact
of both liquidity and capital requirements. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the ﬁrst work providing such an analysis.
Our argument also seems to be valid for the modelling approach used in
Goodfriend & McCallum (2007). They introduce a banking sector in the stan-
dard new Keynesian framework to reconsider the role of money and banking
in monetary policy analysis. Goodfriend & McCallum show that ”banking
accelerator” transmission eﬀects work via an ”external ﬁnance premium.” In
their model, the central bank should react more aggressively to problems in
the banking sector. This result may need to be qualiﬁed if these problems
within the banking sector are generated endogenously rather than being the
result of exogenous shocks.
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2.2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
In the economy, there are three types of agents: investors, banks (run by bank
managers, or bankers) and entrepreneurs. All agents are risk neutral. The
economy extends over 3 periods. We assume that there is a continuum of
investors each initially (at t = 0) endowed with one unit of resources. The
resource can be either stored (with a gross return equal to 1) or invested in the
form of bank equity or bank deposits. Using these funds, banks as ﬁnancial
intermediaries can fund projects of entrepreneurs. There are two types i of
entrepreneurs (i = 1, 2), characterized by their projects return Ri. Projects of
type 1 are realized early at period t = 1 with a safe return R1 > 1. Projects of
type 2 give a higher return R2 > R1 > 1. With probability p, these projects will
also be realized at t = 1, but they may be delayed (with probability 1−p) until
t = 2. In the aggregate, the share p of type 2 projects will be realized early.
The aggregate share p, however is not known at t = 0. It will be revealed
between 0 and 1 at some intermediate period t = 12 . Investors are impatient:
they want to consume early (at t = 1). In contrast, both entrepreneurs and
bank managers are indiﬀerent between consuming early (t = 1) or late (t = 2).
Resources of investors are scarce in the sense that there aremore projects of
each type available than the aggregate endowment of investors. Thus, in the
absence of commitment problems, total surplus would go to the investors. In
the absence of commitment problems, investors would simply put all their
funds in early projects and capture the full return. We take this friction-
less market outcome as reference point and analyze those equilibria coming
closest to implement that market outcome. Since there is a market demand
for liquidity only if investors’ funds are the limiting factor, we concentrate
on deviations from the frictionless market outcome and consider investors
payoﬀ as the relevant criterion.
Due toholdupproblemsasmodelled inHart&Moore (1994), entrepreneurs
can only commit to pay a fraction γRi > 1 of their return. Banks as ﬁnancial
intermediaries can pool investment; they have superior collection skills (a
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higher γ). Following Diamond & Rajan (2001), banks oﬀer deposit contracts
with a ﬁxed payment d0 payable at any time after t = 0 as a credible com-
mitment device not to abuse their collection skills. The threat of a bank run
disciplines bank managers to fully pay out all available resources pledged
in the form of bank deposits. There are a ﬁnite number of active banks en-
gaged in Bertrand competition. Banks compete by choosing the share α of
deposits invested in type 1 projects, taking their competitors choice as given.
Investors have rational expectations about each banks default probability;
they are able to monitor all banks investment. So if, in a mixed strategy equi-
librium, banks diﬀer with respect to their investment strategy, the expected
return from deposits must be the same across all banks. Due to Bertrand
competition, all banks will earn zero proﬁt in equilibrium. In the absence of
aggregate risk, ﬁnancial intermediation via bank deposits can implement a
second best allocation, given the hold up problem posed by entrepreneurs.
Note that because of the hold up problem, entrepreneurs retain a rent
— their share (1 − γ)Ri. Since early entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between
consuming at t = 1 or t = 2, they are willing to provide liquidity (using
their rent to buy equity and to deposit at banks at t = 1 at the market
rate r). Banks use the liquidity provided to pay out depositors. This way,
impatient investors can proﬁt indirectly from investment in high yielding
long term projects. So banking allows transformation between liquid claims
and illiquid projects.
At date 0, banks competing for funds oﬀer deposit contracts with payment
d0 and equity claims which maximize expected consumption of investors
at the given expected interest rates. Investors put their funds into those
assets promising the highest expected return among all assets oﬀered. So in
equilibrium, expected return from deposits and equity must be equal across
all active banks. At date t = 1, banks and early entrepreneurs trade at a
perfect market for liquidity, clearing at interest rate r. As long as banks are
liquid, the payoﬀ structure is described as in Fig. 2.1.
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Fig. 2.1 Timing and payoﬀ structure, when banks are liquid
Deposit contracts, however, introduce a fragile structure into the economy:
whenever depositors have doubts about their bank’s liquidity (the ability to
pay depositors the promised amount d0 at t = 1), they run the bank early (they
run already at the intermediate date t = 12 ), forcing the bank to liquidate
all its projects (even those funding safe early entrepreneurs) at high costs:
early liquidation of projects gives only the inferior return c < 1. We do not
consider pure sunspot bank runs of the Diamond & Dybvig type. Instead we
concentrate on runs happening if liquid funds (given the interest rate r) are
not suﬃcient to payout depositors.
If the share p of type 2 projects realized early is known at t = 0, there is no
aggregate uncertainty. Banks will invest such that — on aggregate — they
are able to fulﬁl depositor’s claims in period 1, so there will be no run. But we
are interested in the case of aggregate shocks. We model them in the simplest
way: the aggregate share of type 2 projects realized early can take on just
two values: either pH or pL with pH > pL. The ”good” state with a high share
of early type 2 projects (the state with plenty of liquidity) will be realized
with probability π. Note that the aggregate liquidity available depends on
the total share of funds invested in liquid type 1 projects. Let α be this share.
If α is so low that banks cannot honor deposits when pL occurs, depositors
will run at t = 12 . The payoﬀ is captured in Fig. 2.2.
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Fig. 2.2 Timing and payoﬀ structure, when banks are illiquid
Given this structure, a bank seems to have just two options available: it
may either invest so much in safe type 1 projects that it will be able to pay
out its depositors all the time (that is, even if the bad state occurs). Let us
call this share α(pL). Alternatively, it may invest just enough, α(pH), so as
to pay out depositors in the good state. If so, the bank will be run in the
bad state. Obviously, the optimal share depends on what other banks will do
(since that determines aggregate liquidity available at t = 1 and so the interest
rate for liquid funds between period 1 and 2), but also on the probability π
for the good state. To gain some intuition, let us ﬁrst assume that all banks
behave the same — just as a representative bank. If so, it will not pay to
take precautions against the bad state if the likelihood for that outcome is
considered to be very low. Thus, if π is very high, the representative bank
will obviously invest only a small share α(pH) — just enough to pay out
depositors in the good state. Alternatively, if π is very low (close to 0), it
always pays to be prepared for the worst case, so the representative bank
will invest a high share α(pL) > α(pH) in safe projects. Since α(ps) is the share
invested in safe projects with return R1, the total payoﬀ out of investment
strategy α(ps) is: E[Rs] = α(ps)R1 + [1 − α(ps)]R2 with E[RH] > E[RL].
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With a high share α(pL) of safe projects, the banks will be able to pay out
depositors in all states. There will never be a bank run. So independent
of π, the expected payoﬀ for depositors is γE[RL] (assuming that the gross
interest rate between t = 1 and t = 2 is r = 1, which is the case maximizing
the investors payoﬀs).
With α(pH) there will be a bank run in the bad state, giving just the
bankruptcy payoﬀ c with probability 1−π. So strategy α(pH) gives πγE[RH]+
(1−π)c, increasing inπ. Depositors preferα(pH), ifπγE[RH]+(1−π)c > γE[RL]
or
π > π2 =
γE[RL] − c
γE[RH] − c .
Obviously, for π below π2 depositors are better oﬀ with the safe strategy, so
they prefer banks to choose α(pL) rather than to exploit high proﬁtability of
type 2 entrepreneurs. The intuition is straightforward: when π is not high
enough, the high return R2 will come too late most of the time, triggering
frequent bank runs in period 1. So depositors rather prefer banks to play
the safe strategy in the range. In contrast, for π > π2 it would be ineﬃcient
for private banks to hold enough liquid assets on their balance sheets to
prevent disasters when markets become disorderly. As long as all banks play
according to the strategies outlined above, depositors’ payoﬀ is characterized
by the dotted red line in Fig. 2.3.
Up to now, we simply assumed that all banks follow the same strategy,
maximising depositor’s payoﬀ. But when all banks choose the strategy α(pL),
there will be excess liquidity at t = 1 if the good state occurs (with a large
share of type 2 projects realized early). A bank anticipating this event has
a strong incentive to invest all their funds in type 2 projects, reaping the
beneﬁt of excess liquidity in the good state. As long as the music is playing,
such a deviating bank gets up and dances. Having invested only in high
yielding projects, the naughty dancing bank can always credibly extract en-
trepreneur’s excess liquidity at t = 1, promising to pay back at t = 2 out of
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Fig. 2.3 Depositors’ expected return
highly proﬁtable projects. After all, at that stage, this bank, free-riding on
liquidity, can oﬀer a capital cushion with expected returns well above what
prudent banks are able to promise. Of course, if the bad state happens, there
is no excess liquidity. The naughty ”dancing” banks would just bid up the
interest rates, urgently trying to get funds. Rational depositors, anticipating
that these bankswon’t succeed, will already trigger a bank run on these banks
at t = 12 .
When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things get complicated. As
long as the naughty dancing banks are not supported in the bad state, they
are driven out of the market, providing just the return c. Nevertheless, a bank
free-riding on liquidity in the good state can on average oﬀer the attractive
return πγR2 + (1 − π)c as expected payoﬀ for depositors. Thus, a free-riding
bank will always be able to outbid a prudent bank whenever the probability
π for the good state is not too low. The condition is
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π > π1 =
γE[RL] − c
γR2 − c .
Since R2 > E[RH], it pays to dance within the range π1 ≤ π < π2.
Obviously, there cannot be equilibrium inpure strategieswithin that range.
As long as the music is playing, all banks would like to get up and dance. But
then, there would be no prudent bank left providing the liquidity needed to
be able to dance. In the resulting mixed strategy equilibrium, a proportion
of banks behave prudent, investing some amount αs < α(pL) in liquid assets,
whereas the rest free-rides on liquidity in the good state, choosing α = 0.
Prudent banks reduce αs < α(pL) in order to cut down the opportunity cost
of investing in safe projects. Interest rates and αs adjust such that depositors
are indiﬀerent between the two types of banks. At t = 0, both prudent and
naughty dancing banks oﬀer the same expected return to depositors. The
proportion of free-riding banks is determined by aggregate market clearing
conditions in both states. Naughty dancing banks are run for sure in the bad
state, but the high return R2 > E[Rs] compensates depositors for that risk.
As shown in Proposition 2.2.1, free-riding drives down the return for
investors (see Fig. 2.3). They are deﬁnitely worse oﬀ than if all banks would
coordinate on the prudent strategy α(pL). As illustrated in Fig. 2.3, the
eﬀective return on deposits for investors deteriorates in the rangeπ1 ≤ π < π2
as a result of free-riding behavior.
Proposition 2.2.1 In the mixed strategy equilibrium, investors are worse oﬀ than
if all banks would coordinate on the prudent strategy α(pL).
Proof See Appendix A.1.1.
2.3 LENDER OF LAST RESORT POLICY
ALender of LastResort cannot create real liquidity at periodone. But a central
bank can add nominal liquidity at the stroke of a pen. FollowingAllen&Gale
(1998, 2004) and Diamond & Rajan (2006), assume from now on that deposit
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contracts are arranged in nominal terms. The liquidity injection is done such
that the banks are able to honor their nominal contracts, reducing the real
value of deposits just to the amount of real resources available at that date.
This intervention raises the real payoﬀ of depositors compared to ineﬃcient
liquidation, increasing expected payoﬀ of the risky strategy α(pH).
Consider that the central bank injects liquidity in order to prevent bank
runs if the bad state (with low payoﬀs at t = 1) occurs. Such a policy,
preventing ineﬃcient costly liquidation, seems to raise investor’s expected
payoﬀ and so deﬁnitely improve upon the allocation for high values π >
π2. Essentially, nominal deposits allow the central bank to implement state
contingent payoﬀs. This argument seems to conﬁrm the view that Lender of
Last Resort indeed is a free lunch, providing a public good at no cost. It turns
out, however, that the anticipation of these actions has an adverse impact on
the amount of aggregate liquidity provided by the private sector, aﬀecting
endogenously the exposure to systemic risk.
The incentive for free-riding prevalent in modern times of competitive ﬁ-
nancialmarkets complicates the picture dramatically. In themodel presented,
a Lender of Last Resort, providing liquidity support to the market requesting
good collateral as the only condition, will drive out all prudent banks. Just
as in Gresham’s law, all banks are encouraged to dance and choose the risky
strategy α(pH), knowing that they can get liquidity support against good col-
lateral. The public provision of emergency liquidity results in serious moral
hazard. It’s as simple as that.
Proposition 2.3.1 Assume thatπpHR2+(1−π)pLR2 ≥ 1 and that forπ ∈ (π1, π2),
dj0 = γR2 > πpHR2 + (1 − π)c. If the central bank is willing to provide liquidity to
the entire market in times of crisis, all banks have an incentive to dance, choosing
α j = 0.
Proof See Appendix A.1.2.
The reason for this surprising result is the following: by purpose, we
concentrate on the case of pure illiquidity risk. In our model, the liquidity
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shock just retards the realization of high yielding projects: in the end (at
t = 2), all projects will certainly be realized. So there is no doubt about
solvency of the projects, unless insolvency is triggered by illiquidity. Central
bank support against allegedly good collateral, creating artiﬁcial liquidity at
the drop of a hat, destroys all private incentives to care about ex ante liquidity
provision. The key problem with the Bagehot principle here is that naughty
dancing banks do invest in projects with higher return, as long as they have
not to be terminated. In reality, there is no clear-cut distinction between
insolvency and illiquidity. We leave it to the next chapter to allow for the
risk of insolvency. But we’ll show that our basic argument will not be much
aﬀected.
So what policy options should be taken? One might argue that a central
bank should provide liquidity support only to prudent banks (so conditional
on banks having invested suﬃciently in liquid assets). As shown in the last
chapter, such a policy may improve the allocation at least to some extent. But
we argued that such a commitment is simply not credible: as emphasised by
Rochet (2004, 2008), there is a serious problem of dynamic consistency.
Rather than relying on an implausible commitment mechanism, the ob-
vious solution would be a mix between two instruments: ex ante liquidity
regulation combined with ex post Lender of Last Resort policy. It seems to be
rather surprising that perceived wisdom argues that central banks can pur-
sue both price stability and ﬁnancial stability using just one tool, interest rate
policy. Instead, the second best outcome from the investors’ point of view
needs to be implemented by the following policy: in a ﬁrst step, a banking
regulator has to impose ex ante liquidity requirements. Requesting minimum
investment in liquid type 1 assets of at least α(pL) for π < π
′
2 and α(pH) for
π > π′2 would give investors the highest expected payoﬀ as characterized
in Fig. 2.4. For π < π′2, playing safe gives investors the highest payoﬀ. In
contrast, for π > π′2 investors are better oﬀ if banks invest in liquid assets as
low as α(pH) as long as Lender of Last Resort policy helps to prevent runs.
Since such a rule would not allow banks to operate when liquidity holdings
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are less than required, it could get rid of incentives for free-riding. Given
that the ex ante imposed liquidity requirements have been fulﬁlled, ex post the
central bank can safely play its role as lender in the range π > π′2 whenever
the bad state turns out to be realized. Note that this policy raises expected
payoﬀ for investors, even though it increases the range of parameter values
with systemic risk.
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Fig. 2.4 Depositors’ expected return with ex ante liquidity regulation and ex post
LoLR policy (E
[
R(pH), π, κ
]
) versus the expected return in the laissez-faire economy
(E
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]
) when π is high
The key task for regulators and the central bank is to cope with free-
riding incentives. An alternative mechanism compared to ex ante liquidity
regulation, the central bank might commit to try to mop up the excessive
liquidity available in the good state. If that can be done, potential free-riders
would have no chance to survive. We doubt, however, that the central will
be able to implement such a policy.
THE ROLE OF EQUITY AND NARROW BANKING 67
As further alternative, one might impose narrow banking in the sense
that banks are required to hold suﬃcient liquid funds so as to pay out in
all contingencies. Finally, one might expect that imposing equity, or capital
requirements are suﬃcient to provide a cushion against liquidity shocks. As
shown in the next section, both these options turn out to be strictly worse
than imposingminimum liquidity standards ex ante combinedwith Lender of
Last Resort policy. They are even likely to be inferior relative to the outcome
of a mixed strategy equilibrium with free-riding (dancing) banks.
2.4 THE ROLE OF EQUITY AND NARROW BANKING
Let us now introduce equity requirements in the model, i.e. banks are re-
quired to hold some equity in their assets. Keep the same settings as before
with the presence of aggregate uncertainty, except that instead of pure ﬁxed
deposit contract, the banks issue a mixture of deposit contract and equity for
the investors (Diamond & Rajan, 2000, 2005, 2006). To make it clear, equity
is a claim that can be renegotiated such that the bank managers and the cap-
ital holders (here the investors) split the residual surplus after the deposit
contract has been paid. The mixture of deposit contract and equity seems
to be a quite artiﬁcial setting at the ﬁrst sight. But actually it turns out to
be a convenient modelling device. In particular, in the symmetric equilibria
of the banks, such a mixture will exactly be the portfolio held by a repre-
sentative agent out of the homogenous investors. In other words, whenever
investors are homogenous, it’s not necessary to separate equity holders from
the depositors.
Equity can reduce the fragility, but it allows the bank manager to capture
a rent. Being a renegotiatable claim, equity is always subject to the hold-up
problem, i.e. equity holders can only get a share of ζ (ζ ∈ [0, 1]) from the
surplus. To make it simpler, in the following we simply assume that ζ = 12 .
With ζ = 12 the bank managers get a rent of
γE[R]−d0
2 , sharing the surplus
over deposits equallywith the equity holders. Suppose that all the banks have
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to meet the level of equity k which comes from the central bank’s regulatory
rules, then if a bank i is not run k is deﬁned as
k =
γE[Rs,i]−d0,i
2
γE[Rs,i]−d0,i
2 + d0,i
in which Rs,i is bank i’s return achieved under state s.
One additional, but crucial assumptions concerning timing are that (1)
the dividend of the equity is paid after the payment of d0,i and (2) capital
requirement has to be met till the last minute before the dividend payment
— this deters the bank managers’ incentive to transfer their dividend income
to the investors ex post, which increases d0,i ex ante.
Solve for d0,i to get
d0,i =
1 − k
1 + k
γE[Rs,i].
Then one would ask: under what conditions would it make sense to
introduce equity requirements? It is easy to see that introducing equity will
deﬁnitely reduce investor’s payoﬀ in the absenceof aggregate risk. Somewhat
counterintuitive, capital requirements even reduces the share α invested in
the safe project in that case. The reason is that with equity, bank managers get
a rent of γE[R]−d02 , sharing the surplus over deposits equally with the equity
holders. So investors providing funds in form of both deposits and equity to
the banks will get out at t = 1 just 11+kγE[R] < γE[R]. Since return at t = 2 is
higher than at t = 1, bank managers prefer to consume late, so the amount of
resources needed at t = 1 is lower in the presence of equity. Consequently,
the share α will be reduced. Of course, banks holding no equity provide
more attractive conditions for investors, so equity could not survive. This
at ﬁrst sight counterintuitive result simply demonstrates that there is no role
(or rather only a payoﬀ reducing role) for costly equity in the absence of
aggregate risk.
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But when there is aggregate risk, equity helps to absorb the aggregate
shock. In the simple 2-state set up, equity holdings need to be just suﬃcient
to cushion the bad state. So with equity, the bank will chose α∗ = α
(
pH
)
. The
level of equity k needs to be so high that, given α∗ = α
(
pH
)
, the bank just
stays solvent in the bad state — it is just able to payout the ﬁxed claims of
depositors, whereas all equity will be wiped out.
With equity k, the total amount that can be pledged to both depositors
and equity in the good state is 11+kγE[RH] with claims of depositors being
d0 = 1−k1+kγE[RH] and equity EQ =
k
1+kγE[RH]. In the bad state, a marginally
solvent bank can pay out to depositors d0 = α
(
pH
)
R1 +
(
1 − α (pH)) pLR2. So
k is determined by the condition:
1 − k
1 + k
γE[RH] = α
(
pH
)
R1 +
(
1 − α (pH)) pLR2,
and solve to get
k =
γE[RH] − d0
γE[RH] + d0
. (2.1)
It’s observed that k is decreasing in pL: the higher pL, the lower the equity
k needed to stay solvent in the bad state. k = 0 for pL = pH, and for pL close to
pH equity holding is superior to the strategy α∗ = α
(
pH
)
. That is if
d0 ≥ γE[RH]π + (1 − π)c.
Such (d0, k) is the equilibrium for the banks. The reason is easy to see: ﬁrst,
no banks are willing to set higher ki — because equity holding is costly and
she is not able to compete the other banks for
(
d0,i, ki
)
; second, no banks are
able to set higher d0,i given (d0, k) set by all the other banks — because k has
to be met when d0,i is paid, the only thing the deviator can do is to bid up
interest rate and this leads to bank runs across the whole banking industry
— the deviation is not proﬁtable.
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From the regulator’s point of view, the unique optimal equity requirement
k it imposes is exactly the k determined by condition (2.1), which is so high
that the bank just stays solvent in the bad state — it is just able to payout the
ﬁxed claims of depositors, whereas all equity will be wiped out. The reason
is simple: since equity holding is costly, the only reason for the central bank
to make it sensible is to eliminate the costly bank run. Therefore neither too
low k (which is purely a cost and doesn’t prevent any bank run) nor too high
k (which prevent bank runs, but incurs a too high cost of holding equity) is
optimal. Thus from now on we can concentrate on such level of k without
loss of generality.
Now the interesting question is: can capital requirement improve the
allocation in this economy, in comparison to the laissez-faire outcome we
studied before?
Deﬁnition Deﬁnea representativedepositor’s expected return functionwith-
out equity requirements as Π(π, ·), such that
Π(π, ·) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
γE[RL], if π ∈ [0, π1] ;
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
pLR2, if π ∈ (π1, π2) ;
γE[RH]π + (1 − π)c, if π ∈ [π2, 1]
and her expected return function under equity requirements as Πe(π, ·), as
well as the set S in which the investor’s payoﬀ is improved under equity
requirement, such that
S := {πˆ|Πe(πˆ, ·) ≥ Π(πˆ, ·)} .
The blue lines of Fig. 2.5 describe the laissez-faire outcome Π(π, ·), and the
red line shows the depositors expected returnΠe(π, ·) = d0+ Π2 π under capital
requirement, which consists of two terms:
• The deposit payment d0;
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Fig. 2.6 Expected return with / without equity — Case 2
• The dividend of equity holdings Π2 , which is only achieved in the good
state, and its value is determined by
Π
2
=
γE[RH] − d0
2
=
γE[RH] − 1−k1+kγE[RH]
2
=
k
1 + k
γE[RH].
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Fig. 2.7 Expected return with / without equity — Case 3
Denote the intersection of Πe(π, ·) = d0 + Π2 π and γE[RL] by A, which is
equal to (see Appendix A.1.4 for detail)
A =
2(R1 − pLR2)
(1 − γ)R1 + (γ − pL)R2 ,
as well as the intersection of Πe(π, ·) = d0 + Π2 π and γE[RH]π + (1 − π)c by B,
which is equal to (see Appendix A.1.4 for detail)
B =
2
[
(1 − γ)(cR1 − pLR1R2) + (γ − pH)(cR2 − R1R2)]
2(1 − γ)cR1 + 2(γ − pH)cR2 + [γ(pH − 1) − (γ − pH) − (1 − γ)pL]R1R2 .
Now it’s straightforward to compare investor’s payoﬀ under equity re-
quirements with the laissez-faire free-riding equilibrium for some extreme
values:
Lemma 2.4.1 The depositors’ expected return under equity requirement is lower
than the laissez-faire outcome when π = 0 or π = 1.
Proof See Appendix A.1.3.
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The intuition of Lemma 2.4.1 is straightforward: there is no uncertainty
when π = 0 or π = 1, so it’s inferior to hold costly equities as we already
explained before.
Then Proposition 2.4.2 characterizes the improvement in investor’s payoﬀ
achievable by introducing equity requirements.
Proposition 2.4.2 Given equity requirement k imposed by the regulator,
• When A ∈ (0, π1], i.e.
(
2γR2 − γE[RH] − d0) (γE[RL] − d0) + (2γE[RL] − γE[RH] − d0) (d0 − c) ≤ 0,
then S = [A,B] ⊇ [π1, π2];
• When A ∈ (π1, π2], i.e.
(
2γR2 − γE[RH] − d0) (γE[RL] − d0) + (2γE[RL] − γE[RH] − d0) (d0 − c) > 0,
and
γ (E[RH] − E[RL]) (d0 − c) ≥ (γE[RH] − c) (γE[RL] − d0) ,
then S = [π˜,B] in which π˜ ∈ (π1, π2] and S⋂ [π1, π2] = [π˜, π2];
• When A ∈ (π2, 1], i.e.
2
(
γE[RL] − d0) (γE[RH] − c) ≥ (γE[RH] − d0) (γE[RL] − c) ,
then S ⊆ [π˜,B] in which π˜ ∈ (π1, π2] and S⋂ [π1, π2] = [π˜, π2].
Proof See Appendix A.1.4.
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The three possible cases are characterized in Fig. 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7, re-
spectively. Numerical examples simulating these cases are presented in the
Appendix A.2.
Equity requirements give investors a higher payoﬀ than the laissez-faire
market outcome whenever their payoﬀ with a safe bank holding suﬃcient
equity exceeds the payoﬀ of the mixed strategy equilibrium with free-riding
banks for all parameter values. This case is captured as case 1, shown in
Fig. 2.5. Since free-riding partly destroys the value of deposits held by
prudent banks (forcing them to hold a riskier portfolio), it seems obvious that
imposing equity requirements will always dominate the laissez-faire outcome
with mixed strategies. Unfortunately, this need not be the case. It is quite
likely that equity requirements result in inferior payoﬀs for some range of
parameter values (as shown in case 2 — see Fig. 2.6). It might even be that
imposing equity requirements makes investors worse than laissez-faire for all
parameter values. This is shown in Fig. 2.7, representing case 3.
The intuition behind this at ﬁrst surprising result is that holding equity
can be quite costly; if so, it may be superior to accept the fact that systemic
risk is a price to be paid for higher returns on average.
The mix of ex ante liquidity requirements with ex post Lender of Last Resort
policy is always dominating equity requirements. See Fig. 2.8. The reason is
as following: consider that the banks are required to hold α = α(pH) when π
is high. Then when pH reveals, the investor’s real return is γE[RH]; and when
pL reveals, the investor’s real return is α(pH)R1 + (1 − α(pH))pLR2. Therefore
the investor’s overall expected return turns out to be
Πm = γE[RH]π + (1 − π) [α(pH)R1 + (1 − α(pH))pLR2] ,
which is linear in π, as the green line of Fig. 2.8 shows. Note that when π = 1,
Πm = γE[RH] > d0+Π2 π; andwhenπ = 0,Πm = α(pH)R1+(1−α(pH))pLR2 = d0.
Therefore, Πm line is above d0 + Π2 π, ∀π ∈ (0, 1], i.e. the mix of liquidity
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requirements with Lender of Last Resort policy is always dominating equity
requirements when aggregate uncertainty exists.
p
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1,6
Fig. 2.8 Expected return with credible liquidity injections (for the case of Fig. A.4)
In times of crises, frequently there are calls to go back to narrow banking in
order to avoid the risk of runs. Under narrow banking, institutions with de-
posits would be required to hold as assets only themost liquid instruments so
as to be always able to meet any deposit withdrawal by selling its assets. Ob-
viously, narrow banking can be extremely costly. In our model, banks would
be required to hold suﬃcient liquid funds to pay out in all contingencies:
α > α(pL). As Fig. 2.9 illustrates, under narrow banking investor’s payoﬀ can
be much lower for high π compared to ex ante liquidity regulation combined
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with ex post Lender of Last Resort policy. Just as with equity requirements,
narrow banking (imposing the requirement that banks hold suﬃcient equity
so as to be able to pay out demand deposits in all states of the world) can be
quite inferior: if the bad state is a rare probability event, it simply makes no
sense to dispensewith all the eﬃciency gains out of investing in high yielding
illiquid assets despite its impact on systemic risk.
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( )*

&"# -!
&'(+)*
Fig. 2.9 Expected return with narrow banking compared to ex ante liquidity regulation
2.5 CONCLUSION
Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks have been modelled as exogenous
events. In this chapter, we derive the aggregate share of liquid projects
endogenously. It depends on the incentives of ﬁnancial intermediaries to
invest in risky, illiquid projects. This endogeneity allows us to capture the
feedbackbetweenﬁnancialmarket regulation and incentives of private banks,
determining the aggregate amount of liquidity available.
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Wemodel (real) illiquidity in the followingway: liquidprojects are realized
early. Illiquid projects promise a higher return, but a stochastic fraction of
these type of projects will be realized late. We concentrate on pure illiquidity
risk: there will never be insolvency unless triggered by illiquidity (by a bank
run). Financial intermediaries choose the share invested in high yielding but
less liquid assets. As a consequence of limited liability, banks are encouraged
to free-ride on liquidity provision. Relying on suﬃcient liquidity provided
by the market, they are inclined to invest excessively in illiquid long term
projects.
Liquidity provision by central banks can help to prevent bank runs with
ineﬃcient early liquidation. In the last chapter, we showed that the anticipa-
tion of unconditional liquidity provision results in overinvestment in risky
activities (moral hazard), creating excessive exposure to systemic risk.
Extending our previous work, this chapter analyzes the adequate policy
response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk, providing a cost / beneﬁt
analysis of diﬀerent forms of banking regulation to better to understand
what type of intervention is desired. We explicitly compare the impact both
of liquidity and equity requirements.
We show that it is crucial for eﬃcient Lender of Last Resort policy to impose
ex ante minimum liquidity standards for banks. In addition, we analyze the
impact of equity requirements in the following sense: banks are required
to hold suﬃcient equity so as to pay out ﬁxed claims of depositors in all
contingencies. We prove that such a policy is strictly inferior to imposing
minimum liquidity standards ex ante combined with Lender of Last Resort
policy. We show that it is even likely to be inferior relative to the outcome
of a mixed strategy equilibrium with free-riding banks. For similar reasons,
imposing narrow banking (require banks to hold suﬃcient liquid funds to
pay out in all contingencies) turns out to be strictly inferior relative to the
combination of liquidity requirements with Lender of Last Resort policy.
By purpose, our model focuses on the case of pure liquidity risk. Since the
return of all projects is non-stochastic as long as they ﬁnally can be realized,
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there is no insolvency unless triggered by illiquidity. Given that insolvency
is not an issue, it may not be surprising that there is no role for equity
requirements. After all, in our set up equity is always costly, since it allows
bank managers to extract rents. We expect that equity requirements can
improve the allocation when we allow solvency to be of concern (by making
return of illiquid projects at period 2 stochastic). We leave it for the next
chapter to analyze that issue.
FollowingDiamond&Rajan (2006), wemodel ﬁnancial intermediation via
traditional banks oﬀering fragile deposit contracts. Systemic risk is triggered
by bank runs. In modern economies, a signiﬁcant part of intermediation is
provided by the shadow banking sector. These institutions (like hedge funds
and investment banks) are not ﬁnanced via deposits, but they are highly
leveraged. Incentives to dance (to free-ride on liquidity provision) seem to
be even stronger for the shadow banking industry. So imposing liquidity
requirements only for the banking sector will not be suﬃcient to cope with
free-riding. In future work, we plan to analyze incentives for leveraged
institutions within our framework.
Appendix
A.1 PROOFS
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2.1
The mixed strategy equilibrium is characterized as Proposition 1.4.2 of the
last chapter. By chooseing α∗s a prudent bank should have equal return at
both states, ds0 = d
s
0(pH) = d
s
0(pL), i.e.
γ
[
α∗sR1 + (1 − α∗s)pHR2 +
(1 − α∗s)(1 − pH)R2
rH
]
= γ
[
α∗sR1 + (1 − α∗s)pLR2 +
(1 − α∗s)(1 − pL)R2
rL
]
.
With some simple algebra this is equivalent to
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1
rH
=
1 − pL
1 − pH
1
rL
− pH − pL
1 − pH .
Plot 1rH as a function of
1
rL
as Fig. A.1 shows.
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Fig. A.1 Higher interest rates in the mixed strategy equilibrium
The slope 1−pL1−pH > 1 and intercept −
pH−pL
1−pH < 0, and the line goes through
(1, 1). But rH = rL = 1 cannot be equilibrium outcome here, because α(pL)
is dominant strategy in this case and subject to deviation. So whenever
rH > 1 (suppose 1rH = A in the graph), there must be rH > rL > 1 (because
1
rH
< 1rL = B < 1).
At pL, given that rL > 1 the prudent bank’s return is equal to ds0 =
κ(α∗s(pL, rL)) < κ(α(pL)), since the latter maximizes the bank’s expected return
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with r∗ = 1 by Lemma 1.3.2 of the last chapter. Therefore in the mixed strategy
equilibrium, investors are worse oﬀ than if all banks would coordinate on the
prudent strategy α(pL).
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2.3.1
Suppose that a representative bank chooses to be prudent with αi = α, and
promises a nominal deposit contract di0 = γ
[
αR1 + (1 − α)R2
]
in order to
maximize its investors return. Then when the bad state with high liquidity
needs is realized, the central bank has to inject enough liquidity into the
market to keep interest rate at r = 1 in order to ensure bank i’s survival.
However, given r = 1, a naughty bank j can always proﬁt from setting α j = 0,
promising the nominal return dj0 = γR2 > d
i
0 to its investors. Thus, surely the
banks prefer to play naughty.
For those parameter values such that πpHR2 + (1 − π)pLR2 < 1 there exists
no equilibrium with liquidity injection. The reason is the following:
1. Any symmetric strategic proﬁle cannot be equilibrium, because
(a) If there is no trade under such strategic proﬁle, i.e. α is so small
that the real return is less than 1, one bank can deviate by setting
α = 1 and trading with investors;
(b) If there is trade under such strategic proﬁle, i.e. α > 0 for all the
banks, then one bank can deviate by setting α = 0 and getting
higher nominal return than the other banks.
2. Any asymmetric strategic proﬁle, or proﬁle of mixed strategies, cannot
be equilibrium, because
(a) If there is no trade under such strategic proﬁle, then the argument
of 1 (a) applies here;
(b) If there is trade under such strategic proﬁle, then one bank can
deviate by choosing a pure strategy, α = 0, and get better oﬀ —
there is no reason to mix with the other dominated strategies.
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A.1.3 Proof of Lemma 2.4.1
When π = 0,
d0 +
Π
2
· 0 = α (pH)R1 + (1 − α (pH)) pLR2
< α
(
pL
)
R1 +
(
1 − α (pL)) pLR2
= γE[RL];
When π = 1,
d0 +
Π
2
=
α
(
pH
)
R1 +
(
1 − α (pH)) pLR2 + α (pH)R1 + (1 − α (pH)) pHR2
2
< α
(
pH
)
R1 +
(
1 − α (pH)) pHR2
= γE[RH].
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4.2
Generically, there are three cases concerning the relative positions of Π(π, ·)
and Πe(π, ·):
1. As Fig. 2.5 shows, the intersection A lies between 0 and π1;
2. As Fig. 2.6 shows, the intersection A lies between π1 and π2;
3. As Fig. 2.7 shows, the intersection A lies between π2 and 1.
The intersection A takes the value of π, such that
γE[RL] = d0 +
Π
2
π.
Solve to get
A =
2
(
γE[RL] − d0)
γE[RH] − d0 =
2(R1 − pLR2)
(1 − γ)R1 + (γ − pL)R2 .
The intersection B takes the value of π, such that
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γE[RH]π + (1 − π)c = d0 + Π2 π.
Solve to get
B =
d0 − c
γE[RH]+d0
2 − c
=
2
[
(1 − γ)(cR1 − pLR1R2) + (γ − pH)(cR2 − R1R2)]
2(1 − γ)cR1 + 2(γ − pH)cR2 + [γ(pH − 1) − (γ − pH) − (1 − γ)pL]R1R2 .
Then the set S can be determined in each case:
1. As Fig. 2.5 shows, when A ∈ (0, π1],
2
(
γE[RL] − d0)
γE[RH] − d0 ≤ π1 =
γE[RL] − c
γR2 − c ,
rearrange to get
(
2γR2 − γE[RH] − d0) (γE[RL] − d0) + (2γE[RL] − γE[RH] − d0) (d0 − c)
≤ 0.
Since Πe(π, ·) is strictly increasing in π, then
Πe(π, ·)|π=B > Πe(π, ·)|π=A ≥ γE[RL]|π=π1 =
(
γE[RH]π + (1 − π)c) |π=π2
≥ Π(π, ·)|π∈[π1,π2],
which implies S = [A,B] ⊇ [π1, π2];
2. As Fig. 2.6 shows, when A ∈ (π1, π2],
π1 =
γE[RL] − c
γR2 − c <
2
(
γE[RL] − d0)
γE[RH] − d0 ,
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rearrange to get
(
2γR2 − γE[RH] − d0) (γE[RL] − d0) + (2γE[RL] − γE[RH] − d0) (d0 − c)
> 0.
What’s more, in this case B ∈ [π2, 1], and this is equivalent to
γE[RL] − c
γE[RH] − c = π2 <
d0 − c
γE[RH]+d0
2 − c
,
rearrange to get
γ (E[RH] − E[RL]) (d0 − c) ≥ (γE[RH] − c) (γE[RL] − d0) .
Similarly,
Πe(π, ·)|π≤A ≤ γE[RL]|π=π1 =
(
γE[RH]π + (1 − π)c) |π=π2 ≤ Π(π, ·)|π∈[π2,B]
≤ Πe(π, ·)|π≥B,
which implies S = [π˜,B] in which π˜ ∈ (π1, π2] and S⋂ [π1, π2] = [π˜, π2];
3. As Fig. 2.7 shows, when A ∈ (π2, 1],
π2 =
γE[RL] − c
γE[RH] − c <
2
(
γE[RL] − d0)
γE[RH] − d0 ,
rearrange to get
2
(
γE[RL] − d0) (γE[RH] − c) ≥ (γE[RH] − d0) (γE[RL] − c) .
Similarly,
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Πe(π, ·)|π≤B < Πe(π, ·)|π≥A ≤ γE[RL]|π=π1 =
(
γE[RH]π + (1 − π)c) |π=π2 ,
which implies S ⊆ [π˜,B] in which π˜ ∈ (π1, π2] and S⋂ [π1, π2] = [π˜, π2].
A.2 RESULTS OF NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
The following ﬁgures present numerical simulations representing the three
diﬀerent cases.
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Fig. A.2 Expected return with / without equity, with pH = 0.3, pL = 0.25, γ = 0.6,
R1 = 1.8, R2 = 5.5, c = 0.9
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Fig. A.3 Expected return with / without equity, with pH = 0.4, pL = 0.3, γ = 0.6,
R1 = 2, R2 = 4, c = 0.8
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Fig. A.4 Expected return with / without equity, with pH = 0.5, pL = 0.25, γ = 0.7,
R1 = 1.8, R2 = 2.5, c = 0
3
Illiquidity, Insolvency,
and Banking Regulation
There is no single big remedy for the banks’ ﬂaws. But better rules — and more
capital — could help.
—”Three trillion dollars later ...”. The Economist, May 14th, 2009
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
In banking literature, illiquidity and insolvency problems have been inten-
sively studied for decades. Illiquidity means that one ﬁnancial institution is
not able to meet its short term liability via monetizing the future gains from
its long term projects — in other words, there’s only a mismatch between
the time when the long term projects return and the time when its liability
is due, i.e. it’s ”cash ﬂow trapped” but ”balance sheet solvent”. In contrast,
insolvency of one ﬁnancial institution generallymeans in its balance sheet lia-
bilities exceed assets, i.e. it is not able to meet due liabilities even by perfectly
monetizing the future gains from its long term projects. Existing banking
models usually focuses on either problems; and if a ﬁnancial ﬁrm’s ailment
is diagnosed to be one of them, the solution is then (at least intuitively) clear.
For example, illiquid banks may be bailed out by central bank’s liquidity in-
jection (against their illiquid assets ”good” collateral, see Chapter 1, 2 or Cao
& Illing, 2009a, b), and insolvent banks have to be closed down for avoiding
contagion (see Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, 2004).
Since mid-2007, the world has seen one of the worst ﬁnancial crises in
history, which has stolen millions of jobs and held the entire global economy
to ransom. As is observed in the past two years, one prominent feature about
this crisis is the ambiguity in the ﬁnancial institutions’ health, especially
the daunting question whether the problem for the large banks is illiquidity
or insolvency. Financial innovation in the past two decades doesn’t only
help improve market eﬃciency, but also creates high complexity (hence,
asymmetric information) which blurs the boundary between illiquidity and
insolvency. The over complicated ﬁnancial products, as Gorton (2009) states,
ﬁnally ”could not be penetrated by most investors or counterparties in the
ﬁnancial system to determine the location and size of the risks.” For example,
subprime mortgages, a ﬁnancial innovation and from which the current crisis
broke out, were designed to ﬁnance riskier long-term borrowers via short-
term funding. So when the trend of continuing US house price appreciation
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started to stagger and giant investment banks came into trouble, the trouble
seemed to be mere illiquidity problem — as long as house price goes higher
in the future, the long-term yields of subprime mortgages related assets
will be juicy as well. However, since the location and size of the risks in
these complicated ﬁnancial products could not be fully perceived even by
the designer banks themselves, there was a probability that these ﬁnancial
institutions were insolvent. With this ambiguity banks could hardly get
suﬃcient liquidity from market and the crisis erupted.
Such new feature brings new challenges to both market practitioners and
banking regulators. If there’s no ambiguity between illiquidity and insol-
vency, conventional wisdoms work well: if the problem is just illiquidity,
then liquidity regulation works perfectly — banks can get enough liquidity
from the central bank with their long-term assets as collateral, since the high
yields from these assets will return in the future for sure. If the problem is just
insolvency, then equity holding can be a self-suﬃcient solution for the banks
to get rid of the losses. However, if there’s uncertainty about the banks’ trou-
ble, things become complicated—banks cannot get enough liquidity because
the collateral, in the presence of insolvency risk, is no longer considered to
be good, therefore liquidity regulation may fail; on the other hand equity re-
quirement may be ineﬃcient as well because the dual problems make equity
holding even costlier. This chapter is thus going to step into the troubled
water, hoping to shed some light on understanding the market failure and
designing proper regulatory rules with a compact and ﬂexible model.
3.1.1 Summary of the chapter
In this chapter, banks are intermediaries ﬁnancing entrepreneurs’ short-term
(safe) and long-term (risky) projects via short-term deposit contracts, as the
standard view such as Diamond & Rajan (2006). Illiquidity is modelled in the
following way as Chapter 2, or Cao & Illing (2009a): some fraction of risky
projects turns out to be realized late. The aggregate share of late projects
is endogenous; it depends on the incentives of ﬁnancial intermediaries to
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invest in risky, illiquid projects. This endogeneity captures the feedback from
liquidity provision to risk taking incentives of ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Departing from models with pure illiquidity or insolvency problems, in
the intermediate period the market participants only observe the aggregate
amount of early returns from the risky projects, but they don’t know whether
these risky assets are just illiquid (i.e. the majority of high yield risky projects
will return late) or the banks are insolvent (i.e. the substantial amount of the
risky projects will fail in the next period). The introduction of such ambiguity
has both signiﬁcant impacts on equilibrium outcome and new implications
for banking regulation.
Given the same structure of the banking game as in Chapter 1, or Cao &
Illing (2008, 2009a), the equilibria in this extended model are similar: two
intervals for pure strategy equilibria — the banks coordinate to be risky
when the sun always shines and be prudent when it always rains, and mixed
strategy equilibrium for mid-range case. However the gap between the
expected return from the risky projects in good state and that in bad state
gets higher with the ambiguity between the dual plagues — asset price is
more inﬂated in good state because of the probability that the risky assets are
just illiquid, while asset price is more depressed in bad state because of the
probability that the banks are going to be insolvent. The bigger gap makes
the interval for mixed strategy equilibrium wider in current setting, making
free-riding more attractive (more excessive liquidity supply when time is
good).
New insights have been discovered for banking regulation. Solution for
pure illiquidity risk as proposed in Cao & Illing (2009b), ex ante liquidity
requirement with ex post conditional bailout, is not suﬃcient now. The reason
is simple: because the central bank doesn’t have superior knowledge to
market participants, i.e. it isn’t able to distinguish between illiquidity and
insolvency risks as well, the value of the banks’ collaterals in the bad state
cannot be as high as that at that in the good state for diﬀerences in their
insolvency risks. Therefore, the banks cannot get suﬃcient liquidity from
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the central bank in the bad state even they do observe the ex ante liquidity
requirement. Bank run is thus not avoided any more.
Such ﬁnding suggests that the additional insolvency problem implies an
extra cost for stabilizing ﬁnancial system, i.e. the regulator needs extra re-
sources to hedge against the insolvency risk. Therefore, a counter-cyclical
deposit insurance mechanism will work. The proposal is as following: the
banks have to be taxed away part of their revenue in the good state, and
the taxation revenue can be used to cover the gap in central bank’s liquidity
provision in the bad state.
On the other hand, equity requirement as a typical solution for pure insol-
vency risk seems to be suboptimal as well. The co-existence of two banking
plagues means higher capital ratio, hence higher cost, should be imposed for
banking industry.
Since it’s hard to catch two rabbits at the same time, it would be optimal
to combine the advantages of several instruments. A hybrid regulatory
scheme is therefore proposed in this chapter, allowing liquidity regulation to
discourage the inferior mixed strategy equilibrium (which leads to liquidity
shortage) and equity requirement to absorb the loss from insolvency.
3.1.2 Review of literature
This chapter is a natural extension of the baseline model from the previous
chapters, or Cao& Illing (2008, 2009a, 2009b), in amore realistic context. It has
been shown that when there is only pure illiquidity risk, there’s an incentive
for a ﬁnancial institution to free-ride on liquidity provision from the others,
resulting in excessively low liquidity in bad states. Since illiquidity is the
only risk, conditional (with ex ante liquidity requirements for banks’ entry to
the ﬁnancial market) liquidity injection from the central bank fully eliminates
the risk of bank runs when bad states are less likely, and the outcome of such
conditional bailout policy dominates that of capital requirement scheme since
the banks have to incur a substantially high cost of holding equity in order
to fully stabilize the system. However, one may ask what happens if there’s
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an additional risk of insolvency. Indeed, when insolvency is mixed with
illiquidity and market participants cannot distinguish between them, banks
would have diﬃculties in raising suﬃcient liquidity using their assets as
collateral. This may have profound impacts on both equilibrium outcomes
and policy implications, and exploring these issues is the main task of this
chapter.
This chapter diﬀers from the main contributions in the existing literature
in two respects:
1. This chapter addresses the systemic liquidity risk as an endogenous
phenomenon from the joint illiquidity-insolvency problem;
2. Central bank intervention and banking regulation are examined under
nominal contracts.
Although illiquidity and insolvency problems have been intensively stud-
ied respectively in the banking literature, the endogenous systemic liquidity
risk arising from the co-existence of both problems has been rarely inves-
tigated. Most past works that analyze these two problems in one model
mainly focus on how banking crises evolve, rather than why the banking in-
dustry arrives at the brink of collapse. Therefore, liquidity shortage is usually
introduced as an exogenous shock, instead of a strategic outcome. For exam-
ple, Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000, 2004) model systemic liquidity risk out
of coordinative failure from the interbank market, and a banking crisis may
be triggered by an exogenous insolvency shock; therefore, closing insolvent
banks helps cut oﬀ the contagion chain and save the system. Taking liquidity
risk as (partially) exogenously given surely works well for understanding
the development of banking crisis, however, one has to be cautious when
applying these models on banking regulation. As is stated in Acharya (2009),
”... Such partial equilibrium approach has a serious shortcoming from the
standpoint of understanding sources of, and addressing, ineﬃcient systemic
risk... ” In other words, if we admit that it is equally important to establish
proper regulatory rules ex ante as to bailout the failing banks ex post, it should
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be equally crucial to ask what causes the failure as to tell how severe the crisis
can be, i.e. systemic liquidity risk should be an endogenous phenomenon.
It seems that an increasing number of recentworks start analyzing endoge-
nous incentives for systemic risk. Acharya (2009) and Acharya & Yorulmazer
(2008) deﬁne such incentive as the correlation of portfolio selection, i.e. when
the return of a bank’s investment has a ”systemic factor”, the failure of one
bank conveys negative information about this factor which makes the market
participants worry about the health of the entire banking industry, increasing
the bank’s probability to fail. The concern of such ”informational spillover”
induces the banks to herd ex ante, leading to an ineﬃciently high correla-
tion in the banks’ portfolio choices. These insights are similar in spirit (but
quite diﬀerent in modelling) as in this chapter (for example, the ineﬃciently
high correlation corresponds to the mixed strategy equilibrium and public
information about the early returns means perfect informational spillover);
however, since illiquidity problem is not explicitly modelled in their works,
liquidity regulation doesn’t play any role (in contrast to this chapter).
Recent endogenous approaches to modelling systemic liquidity risk in-
clude Wagner (2009, in which ineﬃciency comes from the externalities of
bank runs), Korinek (2008, in which ineﬃciency comes from the fact that
ﬁnancial institutions don’t internalize the impact of asset prices on the pro-
duction sector), etc. However, to the best ofmyknowledge, works addressing
joint illiquidity-insolvency problem and its impact on macro policy still seem
to be rare, if not absent. In this sense, this chapter contributes to understand-
ing the new features in current credit crunch and the lessons for banking
regulation.
The mostly closely related work is probably the model considered in
Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2009a, a.k.a. BSS as in the following). The
feature that the market participants can hardly distinguish between illiquid-
ity and insolvency is captured in their model, while they mainly focus on the
supply side of liquidity, i.e. liquidity from ﬁnancial institutions’ own cash
reserve (inside liquidity) or from the proceeds from asset sales to the other
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investors with longer time preference (outside liquidity), and the timing per-
spective of liquidity trading. This chapter takes BSS’s view that (outside)
liquidity shortage arises from the banks’ coordinative failure, but the timing
of liquidity trading is not going to be my focus. Rather, I provide a dif-
ferent explanation of systemic liquidity risk, i.e. liquidity under-provision
may come from the banks’ incentive of free-riding on each others’ liquidity
supply, which is not covered in BSS (in which they restrict attentions to pure
strategy equilibria); and clear-cut results from a more compact and ﬂexible
model in this chapter make it easier to be applied on banking regulation.
What’s more, since ﬁnancial contracts in BSS are real, they (BSS, 2009b) con-
clude that eﬃciency can be restored by central banks’ credible supporting
(real) asset prices. However, in contrast, this chapter shows that the intro-
duction of (more realistic) nominal contractsmay alter the policy implications
drastically — nominal liquidity injection from central banks may crowd out
market liquidity supply without improving eﬃciency, therefore policy mak-
ers should take a more careful view on designing regulatory rules and bailout
policies.
In banking literature, such inside-outside liquidity approach has been
much explored in Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998, 2008), etc. (although their
focuses and methodologies are quite diﬀerent from this chapter). In these
works. it has been argued that since private liquidity supply is ineﬃcient,
public provision of emergency (real) liquidity as a pure public good improves
allocation in the presence of aggregate shocks. However, central banks usu-
ally lack the capability of redirecting the economy’s real resources to ﬁnancial
sector via lump sum taxation; instead, more likely they can only achieve re-
distribution through nominal instruments. This view is in line with Allen &
Gale (1998), in which public liquidity intervention works through nominal
contracts and the price level is adjusted via cash-in-the-market principle. Dia-
mond & Rajan (2006) explores this mechanism further, however, unlike this
chapter it focuses on monetary policy in banking crisis — liquidity shocks
are thus taken as exogenously given.
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3.1.3 Structure of the chapter
Section 3.2 presents the baseline model with real deposit contracts. Section
3.2.1 shows the equilibrium when liquidity and solvency shocks are both
deterministic, then Section 3.2.2 extends the results with uncertainty in the
types of shocks and Section 3.2.3 gives the equilibria of such laissez-faire
economy. The failure of liquidity regulation is analyzed in Section 3.3.1,
and an alternative scheme with additional taxation is proposed. It is shown
in Section 3.4 that equity requirement becomes too costly in the presence of
dual problems, therefore an improved regulatory scheme combining liquidity
regulation and minimum level of capital ratio is discussed. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 THE MODEL
In this section the deposit contracts are restricted to be real, i.e. central bank
as ﬁat money issuer is absent in the game. The model is almost the same as
that from Chapter 1, or Cao & Illing (2008); the diﬀerences are (1) the payoﬀ
structure of the risky assets; (2) the information. The basic elements of the
game are summarized in Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.1
Agents with diﬀerent time preferences Three types of risk neutral agents: a
continuum of investors (each endowed with unit of resources), N banks
(run by bank managers or bankers, engaging in Bertrand competition)
and a continuum of entrepreneurs. Impatient investors want to con-
sumeoneperiod after investing their endowments, while entrepreneurs
and bank managers are indiﬀerent between consuming early or late;
Technologies Investors only have access to inferior storage technology so
that they will take the deposit contract if the expected gross return rate
from the deposit is higher than 1. Two types of entrepreneurs with
diﬀerent projects: safe (liquid) projects returning R1 > 1 for sure at
t = 1, risky (illiquid) projects as explained later. Bank managers have
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Table 3.1 The basic elements of the extended model: Agents, technologies, and pref-
erences
Investors • Unit t = 0 endowment — stored or invested in projects;
• Investors want to consume at t = 1.
Entrepreneurs • With type 1 project
— Return R1 > 1, safely realized at t = 1;
• With type 2 project
— Highest return R2 > R1, risky. It may return at t = 1,
· but also may be delayed to t = 2, or
· fail with zero return.
Banks • Engage in Bertrand competition;
• Expertise to collect 0 < γ < 1 from projects return;
• Oﬀer deposit contracts
— Commitment device not to abuse the expertise, and
— Making banking industry fragile;
• Risk of bank runs: poor liquidation return 0 < c < 1.
the expertise in collecting a shareγof theprojects’ return—amotivation
for intermediation;
Timing At t = 0 banks compete for investors by providing a take-it-or-leave-
it deposit contract
(
αi, di0
)
inwhich αi is the share of bank i’s investments
on safe projects and di0 the promised t = 1 return for investors. The
illiquid projects’ riskiness is unknown at t = 0 but partially revealed at
t = 12 , at which time the investors decide whether to run the banks or
wait till t = 1. If run, both safe and risky projects have to be liquidated
with a poor return 0 < c < 1;
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Limited liability All the ﬁnancial contracts only have to be met with the
debtors’ entire plausible resources. For the deposit contracts between
investors and banks, when bank run happens only the early withdraw-
ers can get promised di0 with the bank’s run value; for the liquidity
contracts between banks and entrepreneurs at t = 1, although in equi-
librium the contracted interest rate is bid up by the competing banks
to the level that the entrepreneurs seize all the return from the risky
projects in the good state of the world at t = 2 (the details will be
explained later), the entrepreneurs cannot claim more than the actual
yields in the bad state.
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Fig. 3.1 The timing of the game
Here the risky project has the following special features, as shown in Fig.
3.1
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1. With probability p the project returns early. For projects with early
returns
(a) With probability η the return is as high as R2;
(b) With probability 1 − η the return is as low as 0;
2. With probability 1 − p the project returns late. For projects with late
returns
(a) With probability η the return is as high as R2;
(b) With probability 1 − η the return is as low as 0.
p can take three values, pL < p < pH. η can take three values as well,
ηL < η < ηH. Assume that ηR2 > R1 such that the expected return for each
unit of risky asset invested at t = 0 is higher than the that for safe asset.
At t = 12 , p · η, or the early return from the risky projects, becomes pub-
lic information. However, no player, even the bank managers themselves,
knows the exact values of p and η. Further, assume that there can be only
one shock at t = 1, i.e. it’s only possible that either p or η takes its ”extreme”
value, but not both; and assume there are only two possible values 1 for p · η
1There are both technical and practical reasons for such assumption. Recall that what simpliﬁes
Chapter 1, or Cao & Illing (2008) most is assuming two states of the world, making computing
mixed strategy equilibrium straightforward; otherwise with more states the solution gets more
complicated (Chapter 1, or Cao& Illing (2008) has a brief discussion in the end)while contributes
no more insights. Now back to current settings, two states for p and two states for η make
four states of the world, which makes it tricky to apply the previous exercises. However,
current market turmoil suggests that one of the most problematic features of modern ﬁnancial
crisis is that one can hardly distinguish between illiquidity and insolvency (even the ﬁnancial
institutions fail to do so in the presence of excessive securitization), therefore among the entire
four states, pH · ηH and pL · ηL are actually trivial and non-interesting. So without much loss of
generality we may concentrate on the two states in which players aren’t able to tell insolvency
from illiquidity; this makes the research, in the author’s opinion, both technically tractable and
practically appealing.
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and (p · η)L = p · ηL = η · pL < p · ηH = η · pH = (p · η)H. The higher early return,
(p · η)H, occurs with probability π and the lower early return, (p · η)L, occurs
with probability 1 − π. Therefore,
1. If one observes a high p·η, it may comes from either pH (with probability
σ) or ηH (with probability 1 − σ);
2. If one observes a low p ·η, it may comes from either pL (with probability
σ) or ηL (with probability 1 − σ).
Such p - η setting captures the dual concerns in banking industry. p deﬁnes
how likely the cash ﬂow is materialized earlier, i.e. the liquidity of the risky
projects, and η deﬁnes how successful the projects are — or, how likely the
banks stay solvent.
In the following, let’s ﬁrst analyze the baseline case in which there’s no
uncertainty concerning the values of p and η. Then the model is extended to
the case in which the true reason for a liquidity shock is not discernable.
3.2.1 The baseline result (when p and η are deterministic)
Suppose that both p and η are deterministic. In this case, the expected return
for each unit of risky asset invested at t = 0 is
E [R2] = pηR2 + (1 − p)ηR2 = ηR2.
Then for each unit deposit the bank manager collects, her liability to her
depositors is
αγR1 + (1 − α)γE [R2] = αγR1 + (1 − α)γηR2;
and at t = 1 the aggregate liquidity available is
αR1 + (1 − α) pηR2.
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The optimal symmetric equilibrium is therefore the α that equates these
two terms, i.e.
αγR1 + (1 − α)γηR2 = αR1 + (1 − α) pηR2,
solve to get
α =
γ − p
(γ − p) + (1 − γ) R1ηR2
=
1
1 + (1 − γ) R1ηR2(γ−p)
. (3.1)
When η = 1, i.e. no insolvency risk, equation (3.1) degenerates to the
baseline case in Chapter 1, or Cao & Illing (2008). It can be seen that ∂α∂η > 0,
i.e. when insolvency is less severe, illiquidity problem dominates so that
more funds should be invested on the safe assets; similarly, since ∂α∂p < 0,
more funds should be invested on the safe assets when the long term projects
get riskier.
3.2.2 Introducing aggregate risk (when p and η are stochastic)
Now suppose that at t = 12 , the value p · η is stochastic, i.e. either (p · η)H or
(p · η)L is observed. Then when (p · η)H reveals
• If the true state is pH with η, then the expected return from the late risky
projects at t = 2 is
(
1 − pH) ηR2;
• If the true state is ηH with p, then the expected return from the late risky
projects at t = 2 is
(
1 − p) ηHR2.
So the expected return at t = 2 is given by
RH2 =
[(
1 − pH) ησ + (1 − p) ηH(1 − σ)]R2
=
[
ησ +
(
1 − p − σ) ηH]R2
= [
(
1 − p) η + (1 − p − σ) (ηH − η)︸︷︷︸
>0
]R2, (3.2)
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and the aggregate expected return from the risky projects is
E
[
R2|(p · η)H] = (p · η)HR2 + [(1 − p) η + (1 − p − σ) (ηH − η)]R2. (3.3)
Similarly when (p · η)L is observed at t = 12 , then
• If the true state is pL with η, then the expected return from the late risky
projects at t = 2 is
(
1 − pL) ηR2;
• If the true state is ηL with p, then the expected return from the late risky
projects at t = 2 is
(
1 − p) ηLR2.
So the expected return from the late risky projects at t = 2 is given by
RL2 =
[(
1 − pL) ησ + (1 − p) ηL(1 − σ)]R2
=
[
ησ +
(
1 − p − σ) ηL]R2
= [
(
1 − p) η + (1 − p − σ) (ηL − η)︸︷︷︸
<0
]R2, (3.4)
and the aggregate expected return from the risky projects is
E
[
R2|(p · η)L] = (p · η)LR2 + [(1 − p) η + (1 − p − σ) (ηL − η)]R2. (3.5)
To make our analysis interesting, assume that
E
[
R2|(p · η)H] > E [R2|(p · η)L] ,
(p · η)H − (p · η)L > (1 − p − σ) (ηL − ηH).
If there’s only illiquidity risk as in Chapter 1, or Cao & Illing (2008, 2009a),
the expected return from the late risky projects is just R2 (the only thing that
matters is the timing of cash ﬂow). Now with co-existence of insolvency risk,
such return is determined by the probability and scale of insolvency, as (3.2)
and (3.4) suggest:
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1. When time is good, the conﬁdence in the risky assets (less likely to be
insolvent) raises future expected return (hence asset price at t = 1);
2. When time is bad, the lack of conﬁdence in the risky assets (more likely
to be insolvent) depresses future expected return (hence asset price at
t = 1).
In the following sections, we’ll see that this new feature in late risky
projects’ expected return makes current model depart from Chapter 1, 2
or Cao & Illing (2008, 2009a) in many ways.
3.2.3 Equilibria for the laissez-faire economy
Suppose that only (p·η)H is the only intermediate state of theworld and all the
bank managers set their α, call it αH, according to that. Then the equilibrium
should be the αH under which the banks get the cheapest liquidity without
bank runs, i.e.
αHγR1 + (1 − αH)γE [R2|(p · η)H] = γ {αHR1 + (1 − αH)E [R2|(p · η)H]}︸︷︷︸
E[RH]
= αHR1 + (1 − αH) (p · η)HR2
αH =
1
1 + (1 − γ) R1
γE[R2 |(p·η)H]−(p·η)HR2
.
Similar as in Chapter 1, assume that γE
[
R2|(p · η)H] > (p · η)HR2 to ensure
that banks need to hold both liquid and illiquid assets.
If (p · η)L is the only intermediate state of the world and all the bank
managers set their α, call it αL, according to that, then
αL =
1
1 + (1 − γ) R1
γE[R2 |(p·η)L]−(p·η)LR2
.
Similar as before, assume that γE
[
R2|(p · η)L] > (p · η)LR2.
To simplify the notations in the following, denote
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E [RH] = αHR1 + (1 − αH)E [R2|(p · η)H] ,
as well as
E [RL] = αLR1 + (1 − αL)E [R2|(p · η)L] .
The equilibria for the laissez-faire economy are then summarized in the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 3.2.1 The equilibria for the laissez-faire economy depend on the value
of π, such that
1. There is a unique optimal symmetric equilibrium of pure strategy such that all
the banks set α∗ = αH as long as the probability of (p · η)H satisﬁes π > π2 =
γE[RL]−c
γE[RH]−c . In addition,
(a) At t = 0 the banks oﬀer the investors a deposit contract with d0 =
γE [RH];
(b) The banks survive at (p · η)H, but are run at (p · η)L;
(c) The investors’ expected return is E [R (αH, c)] = πd0 + (1 − π)c;
2. There exists a unique optimal symmetric equilibrium of pure strategy such
that all the banks set α∗ = αL as long as the probability of (p · η)H satisﬁes
0 ≤ π < π1 = γE[RL]−cγE[R2 |(p·η)L]−c . In addition,
(a) At t = 0 the banks oﬀer the investors a deposit contractwith d0 = γE [RL];
(b) The banks survive at both (p · η)H and (p · η)L;
(c) The investors’ expected return is E [R (αL)] = d0;
(d) At (p·η)H the bankmanagers get a rent ofγ(1−αL) (E [R2|(p · η)H] − E [R2|(p · η)L])
for each unit of deposit;
3. When π ∈ [π1, π2] there exists no symmetric equilibrium of pure strategies.
What’s more, there exists a unique equilibrium of mixed strategies in which
for a representative bank manager
104 ILLIQUIDITY, INSOLVENCY, AND BANKING REGULATION
(a) With probability θ the bank chooses to be naughty — those who set
α∗r = 0, oﬀer high return for investors at (p · η)H and are run at (p · η)L;
and with probability 1 − θ to be prudent — those who set α∗s > 0 and
survive both (p · η)H and (p · η)L;
(b) At t = 0 a naughty bank oﬀers a deposit contract with higher return
dr0 = γ
[
(p · η)HR2 + R
H
2
rH
]
, but the banks is run when (p · η)L is ob-
served; a prudent bank oﬀers a deposit contract with lowerer return
ds0 = γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
(p · η)HR2 + (1−α
∗
s)RH2
rH
]
, but the banks survive in
both states;
(c) The expected returns for both types are equal, i.e. πdr0 + (1 − π)c = ds0,
and the probability θ is determined by market clearing condition, which
equates liquidity supply and demand in both states;
(d) The expected returns for prudent banks are equal at both states. Espe-
cially, at (p · η)L,
ds0 = min
{
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
(p · η)LR2, γ [α∗sR1 + (1 − α∗s) (p · η)LR2
+
(
1 − α∗s
)
RL2
]}
.
Moreover, rL = 1 with α∗s ≥ αL when
ds0 = γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
(p · η)LR2 + (1 − α∗s)RL2] ;
and rL ≥ 1 with α∗s ≤ αL when
ds0 = α
∗
sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
(p · η)LR2.
α∗s = αL only when
γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
(p · η)LR2 + (1 − α∗s)RL2]
= α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
(p · η)LR2.
Proof See Appendix A.1.1.
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So far the results seem to be similar as those in Chapter 1, or Cao &
Illing (2008). Although the ambiguity between illiquidity and insolvency
problems makes four states of the world at t = 2, namely
(
pH, η
)
,
(
ηH, p
)
,(
pL, η
)
, and
(
ηL, p
)
, only two signals are actually observed in t = 1. As long as
the equilibria are still driven by just two t = 1 signals, the outcomes should
be of similar pattern.
The diﬀerence here lies in the mixed strategy equilibrium, i.e. what
Proposition 3.2.1 (3d) shows. Recall that in the presence of pure illiquid-
ity risks, the expected return of the risky assets remains the same (i.e. R2)
in both states because the only problem there is the timing of getting the
fractions of the yields. But if there are additional insolvency risks as in cur-
rent settings, the expected return of the risky assets diﬀers in both states, i.e.
E
[
R2|(p · η)L] < E [R2|(p · η)H] as shown in equations (3.3) and (3.5). Therefore
at (p · η)H there’s a trade-oﬀ for prudent banks now:
1. (p · η)H implies a lower probability of insolvency at t = 2, therefore the
value of risky assets gets higher. With higher networth of illiquid assets,
the banks are able to pledge more liquidity in liquidity market (hence,
oﬀer higher ds0 at t = 0). Such ”income eﬀect” encourages prudent banks
to set higher α∗s;
2. (p · η)H implies higher early return from the risky projects, making it
easier to fulﬁll ds0. Such ”substitution eﬀect” discourages prudent banks
to set higher α∗s.
The equilibrium value α∗s then depends on the cost of the banks’ liquidity
ﬁnancing at t = 1, i.e. the interest rate rH. Since rH is bid up by the free-riders,
or the naughty banks, its value reﬂects the incentive for free-riding, which
hinges on the probability of being in a good state, π
1. When π is just a bit higher than π1, the proﬁtability of free-riding is not
much higher than being prudent. Therefore, there won’t be many free-
riders and rH won’t be that high. The prudent banks can thus pledge
more liquidity with their risky assets, i.e. they can get higher early
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return while they need less high yield risky assets to fulﬁll ds0. In this
case ”substitution eﬀect” dominates and prudent banks will choose to
set a higher α∗s;
2. When π is much higher than π1, the proﬁtability of free-riding is much
higher than being prudent. Therefore, there will be many free-riders
and rH will be high. The prudent banks thus cannot pledge more
liquidity with their risky assets, i.e. they have to fulﬁll ds0 by competing
for liquidity. In this case ”income eﬀect” dominates and prudent banks
will choose to set a lower α∗s.
The investors’ expected return in equilibriumas a functionofπ is summarized
in Fig. 3.2.
& ! Nofreeriding
Freeriding
  
&"# $!
&!
Fig. 3.2 Investors’ expected return in laissez-faire economy
All in all, in current settingswith co-existence of insolvencyproblem the in-
eﬃciencies are again (1) inferior mixed strategy equilibrium — the investors’
expected return is lower whenever α∗s  αL, ∀π ∈ [π1, π2] and (2) the costly
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bank runs, which are to be ﬁxed by proper regulatory rules. However, when
it comes to banking regulation, typical (one-handed) schemes may be no
longer optimal or even become infeasible when insolvency gets involved, as
the next section shows.
3.3 LIQUIDITY REGULATION, NOMINAL CONTRACT AND
LENDER OF LAST RESORT POLICY
Similar as Chapter 1, 2, or Cao & Illing (2008, 2009a), now we introduce
central bank as a fourth player. Banks are required to invest a minimum
level α on safe projects, and only those who observe the rule of game will be
oﬀered the lifeboat when there’s liquidity shortage. Liquidity injection is im-
plemented via creating ﬁat money, and the timing of the game is summarized
as Fig. 3.3. The key elements in the settings are as following:
Nominal contracts Since central banks don’t produce real goods, rather, they
increase liquidity supply by printing ﬁat money at zero cost, therefore
in this section all ﬁnancial contracts have to be nominal, i.e. one unit of
money is of equal value to one unit real good in payment and central
bank’s liquidity injection inﬂates the nominal price by cash-in-the-market
principle a` la Allen & Gale (2004) — the nominal price is equal to the
ratio of amount of liquidity (the sum of money and real goods) in the
market to amount of real goods;
Liquidity regulation At t = 0 a minimum level α of investment on safe
projects is announced by the central bank;
Conditional entry and bailout InCao& Illing (2009b) two scenarios are con-
sidered concerning the role of liquidity requirementα: either (1) it’s both
a requirement for entry to the banking industry and a prerequisite for
getting liquidity injection; or (2) it’s a voluntary option for the banks,
but only those who observe it get the lifeline from the central bank. In
this chapter, we concentrate on the ﬁrst scenario. However, later it can
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be seen that the same conclusions mostly hold when the second one is
considered as well.
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Fig. 3.3 The timing of the game with central bank
3.3.1 Liquidity regulation with conditional bailout
Remember that in the presence of pure illiquidity risk liquidity injection
eliminates the costly bank run, reducing ineﬃciency, as Chapter 2, or Cao &
Illing (2009a) suggests. Suppose the same policy is applied that at t = 0 all
banks are required to invest α = αH when π > π2, and will be bailed out by
the liquidity injected against their assets as collateral when necessary. Then
when (p · η)H is indeed observed, the banks can meet the depositors’ demand
without the need for liquidity injection, i.e.
d0 = αHγR1 + (1 − αH)γE [R2|(p · η)H] .
However, when (p · η)L is observed, the nominal contract on d0 cannot be
met purely by the banks’ expected real return so that they need to apply
for central bank’s liquidity injection with their assets as collateral. However,
since there’s a positive probability that the banksmay be insolvent, the central
bank can only inject liquidity up to the fair value of the the risky projects, i.e.
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the expected return of the risky assets, or, in this case the maximum nominal
payoﬀ the depositors can get
d0|(p·η)L = αHγR1 + (1 − αH)γE
[
R2|(p · η)L] (3.6)
< d0
— the banks will still be run even they obtain the promised lifeboat from
the central bank, and the outcome is no diﬀerent from that in the laissez-faire
economy. The scheme fails to eliminate the ineﬃcient bank runs for π > π2,
and the outcome is the same as that in the laissez-faire economy.
For 0 ≤ π ≤ π2, the liquidity requirement should be α = αL. Since α is
also the entry requirement for the entire banking industry, it is no longer
possible to free-ride for intermediate value of π; the inferior mixed strategy
equilibrium is thus eliminated, which improves eﬃciency. On the other hand,
banks survive on both contingencies by setting α = αL, so there will be no
need for liquidity injection.
As a conclusion, in contrast to Cao & Illing (2009b), with the additional
insolvency risk this scheme can only eliminate the ineﬃciency from themixed
strategy equilibrium, but fails to avoid the high cost from bank runs. It’s
eﬀectiveness is rather limited.
If the liquidity requirement α is voluntary instead of obligatory, even such
limited eﬀectiveness will disappear. The outcomes under π > π2 and 0 ≤ π <
π1 maintains, however, for intermediate π ∈ [π1, π2] the prudent banks are
guaranteed with cheap injected liquidity, leaving their entrepreneurs to sell
liquidity in themarket, which generates evenmore excessive liquidity supply
when time is good. This only makes free-riding more attractive — in the end,
the scheme aggravates the ineﬃciency in the mixed strategy equilibrium
instead of ﬁxing it!
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3.3.2 Conditional liquidity injection with procyclical taxation
The failure of this scheme comes from the following fact: the insolvency risk
brings awedge between the expected return of the late risky projects at (p ·η)H
and that at (p · η)L; therefore, even if the banks are guaranteed with liquidity
injection when time is bad, they are not able to obtain as much liquidity as
they need — in other words, the potential insolvency risk adds an extra cost
to stabilizing the ﬁnancial system. This suggests that the regulator needs to
ﬁnd a second instrument for covering such cost, for example, an additional
procyclical taxation may help solve this problem by imposing a tax at t = 0
on the banks’ revenue when (p · η)H is observed, and bailing out the troubled
banks with liquidity injection plus such tax revenue when (p ·η)L is observed.
The proposed augmented schemeworks as following. At t = 0 aminimum
liquidity requirement, the minimum share αT of the funds invested on the
safe projects, is imposed on all banks; and at t = 1 the banks are taxed away
a certain amount TH ≥ 0 out of their revenue when (p · η)H is observed. The
banks are bailed out with liquidity injection (with their assets as collateral)
plus the tax revenue when (p · η)L is observed — surely in this case the banks
pay no tax, TL = 0.
αT and TH are determined byπ, i.e. regulatory policies are only introduced
where there are ineﬃciencies
1. For π ≥ π2, a positive tax TH > 0 is levied at (p · η)H and the revenue is
used as bailout funds at (p · η)H. Bank managers have to set (αH,T, d0,T)
at t = 0 by internalizing TH as an additional cost at t = 1. In this
case, costly bank run is the source of ineﬃciency which is to be entirely
eliminated by the conditional liquidity injection and the tax;
2. For 0 ≤ π ≤ π1, banks are required to set αT = αL as an entry condition.
Since the ineﬃcientmixed strategy equilibrium is deterred by imposing
such obligation, and the banks always survive in this case, no safety
funds are necessary. Therefore, TH = 0.
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Now we have to examine whether this scheme works; and if yes, how
much TH should be imposed. Let’s concentrate on the case where TH > 0, i.e.
π ≥ π2. (αH,T, d0,T) is set by
αH,TγR1 +
(
1 − αH,T)γE [R2|(p · η)H] − TH = αH,TR1 + (1 − αH,T) (p · η)HR2
= d0,T. (3.7)
The liquidity requirement αT should be so high that the banks are just able
to utilize the resources optimally (as equation (3.7) shows), i.e. αT = αH,T,
and the conditional bailout policy must make sure that the banks are not to
be run in the worst case, i.e.
αH,TγR1 +
(
1 − αH,T)γE [R2|(p · η)H] − TH
= αH,TγR1 +
(
1 − αH,T)γE [R2|(p · η)L] + TH π1 − π. (3.8)
αH,T, d0,T, and TH are determined by equations (3.7) and (3.8), solve to get
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
αH,T =
(p·η)HR2−γπE[R2 |(p·η)H]+γπE[R2 |(p·η)L]−γE[R2 |(p·η)L]
γR1−R1+(p·η)HR2−γπE[R2 |(p·η)H]−γE[R2 |(p·η)L]+γπE[R2 |(p·η)L] ,
d0,T = − γR1{π(E[R2 |(p·η)H]−E[R2 |(p·η)L])+E[R2 |(p·η)L]−(p·η)HR2}γR1−R1+(p·η)HR2−γπE[R2 |(p·η)H]−γE[R2 |(p·η)L]+γπE[R2 |(p·η)L] ,
TH =
γR1(π−1)(1−γ)(E[R2 |(p·η)H]−E[R2 |(p·η)L])
γR1−R1+(p·η)HR2−γπE[R2 |(p·η)H]−γE[R2 |(p·η)L]+γπE[R2 |(p·η)L] .
To get rid of complications, further assume that γE
[
R2|(p · η)L] > (p ·η)HR2,
i.e. even in the worst case, it is still appealing for the banks to hold both
liquid and illiquid assets.
The eﬀectiveness of the scheme is summarized in the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 3.3.1 When π ≥ π2, with αT as both the requirement for entry to the
banking industry and a prerequisite for getting liquidity injection from the central
bank, as well as an additional tax TH charged at (p · η)H as safety funds for rescuing
banks at (p·η)H, the requiredαT should be so high thatαT > αH and the corresponding
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investors’ expected return is (weakly) higher than that in the laissez-faire economy
under the same π, as long as c is suﬃciently small.
Proof See Appendix A.1.2.
The intuition behind the proposition is fairly straightforward. The gain
from such modiﬁed scheme is to avoid the costly bank runs, however, the
scheme also adds additional direct and indirect costs for banking business.
The direct one comes from TH, the ”safety funds” to make up the losses in
bad time as equation (3.8) shows, i.e. to distribute the tax revenue in the
downturn, TH π1−π ; the indirect one comes from αH,T — at t = 0 the banks
have to invest more on the safe projects to pay the tax at t = 1, leaving less
resources for risky, but high yield projects. Whenπ is suﬃciently high and the
bad state seldom happens, the regulator doesn’t need to charge too high TH
and the regulatory cost is comparatively lower than the economy’s gain from
the regulation, and this is more likely to hold when the gain from avoiding
bank runs (i.e. when c is suﬃciently small) is suﬃciently large.
Fig. A.1 (Appendix A.2) visualizes the results by numerical simulation.
When the cost of bank runs is fairly high (too low c), this scheme signiﬁcantly
improves eﬃciency when π is high, where TH doesn’t need to be high and
the opportunity cost from investing on higher αH,T is much lower than the
gain from completely avoiding bank runs.
However, in reality such safety funds via procyclical taxation are certainly
subject to implementation diﬃculties. The funds have to be accumulated to
a suﬃcient amount before they are in need, i.e. when a crisis hits. Otherwise,
when a crisis comes before the funds are fully established, the government
must face a public deﬁcit which can only be covered by the future taxation
revenue. Usually raising public deﬁcits implies political debates and com-
promises, substantially restricting the eﬀectiveness of such scheme. In this
sense, a ”self-suﬃcient” solution such as equity holding may be superior,
which is to be studied in the next section.
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3.4 INSOLVENCY RISK AND EQUITY REQUIREMENT
As seen above, with dual plagues the scheme of liquidity requirement with
conditional bailout only works if an additional cost is introduced. Such cost
can be either ”external”, for example, establishing safety funds via taxation as
the past section suggested, or ”internal”, for example, covering the cost with
equity holdings. In current settings, introducing equity requirement may
not be so costly as in Chapter 2, or Cao & Illing (2009a) since the cheaper
stabilizing instrument there ceases to work here. Therefore, comparing with
the bigger cost caused by bank runs, taking a costly equity requirement may
be the lesser of two evils.
3.4.1 Pure equity requirement and narrow banking
Now suppose equity requirement is adopted as a sole instrument for the
regulator to stabilize ﬁnancial system in a self-suﬃcient way, i.e. all the losses
will be absorbed by equity holders. Here equity is introduced a` la Diamond
& Rajan (2005) such that the banks issue a mixture of deposit contract and
equity for the investors. Assume that the equity holders (investors) and the
bank managers share the proﬁt equally (that is, to set ζ in Chapter 2, or Cao
& Illing (2009a) to be 0.5), i.e. in the good time the level of equity k is
k =
γE[RH]−d0,E
2
γE[RH]−d0,E
2 + d0,E
, d0,E =
1 − k
1 + k
γE [RH] .
The minimum equity requirement k should make the banks just able to
survive from bank runs in the worst contingency, i.e. all the equity is wiped
out when (p · η)L is observed,
1 − k
1 + k
γE [RH] = αHR1 + (1 − αH) (p · η)LR2︸︷︷︸
E[RH |(p·η)L]
= d0,E, (3.9)
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or,
k =
γE [RH] − d0,E
γE [RH] + d0,E
.
Since ∂k∂(p·η)L < 0 by equation (3.9), banks need higher equity ratio to survive
in the worst contingency when both (or either) of the two plagues get(s) more
severe, implying a higher regulatory cost.
Fig. A.2 (Appendix A.2) visualizes the results by numerical simulation.
Again, as Chapter 2 or Cao & Illing (2009a) shows, holding equity is costly
when π is high (i.e. less funds are available for the risky assets with rela-
tively safe, high yields, although costly bank runs are completely eliminated).
Holding equity may be superior to mixed strategy equilibrium of laissez-faire
economydependingonparameter values, but is inferior to conditional liquid-
ity injection with procyclical taxation — because taxation revenue is entirely
returned to investors as bailout funds while in current scheme part of proﬁts
goes to bank managers as dividends. However, concerning the implemen-
tation diﬃculties of imposing an extra tax, this may be a necessary cost for
both investors and regulators.
3.4.2 Combining equity requirement with liquidity regulation
Liquidity requirement with conditional liquidity injection works best with
pure illiquidity risk, but the scheme fails when there’s additional insolvency
risk; on the other hand, pure equity requirement is able to stabilize the system
under both settings at a relatively high cost. Now the question is: is it possible
to design a regulatory scheme that combines the advantages of these two at
a minimum cost?
The answer is yes. Look at the right hand side of equation (3.9). If the
banks are required to maintain the ﬁnancial stability in a self-suﬃcient way,
in all contingencies the depositors can only get the same expected return as
in the worst case, i.e. the total t = 1 liquidity when time is bad. However,
since there’s a positive probability that the risky assets are simply illiquid,
the expected future return from the risky assets can be higher, i.e. the ”fair”
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value of the risky assets (as the right hand side of equation (3.6) shows) is
higher. Therefore, liquidity injection from the central bank enables the banks
to pledge for bailout funds up to the fair value of their late risky assets.
However, as Section 3.3.1, 3.3.2 argued, without imposing extra costs such
as taxation these bailout funds won’t be enough for the banks to avoid the
costly bank runs, as long as there’s still a positive probability that the banks
will be insolvent. The regulator can impose equity requirement to cover this
part of cost. By doing so, since the banks need equity to cover only part of
the regulatory cost, it’ll be much less costly for the banks to carry equity.
The regulatory scheme is as following. First, all the banks are required to
invest αE = αH of their funds on safe assets at t = 0 for high π, and αE = αL for
low π (the cutoﬀ value of π is diﬀerent from π2, and we’ll compute it later);
second, all the banks are required to meet a minimum equity ratio k′ for high
π2. Then the banks are bailed out by liquidity injection in the form of ﬁat
money provision when time is bad. In this case, the regulator only needs to
set k′ to ﬁll in the gap after liquidity injection when (p · η)L is observed, i.e.
1 − k′
1 + k′
γE [RH] = αHγR1 + (1 − αH)γE [R2|(p · η)L] (3.10)
in which k′ < k since the right hand side of (3.10) is higher than that of
(3.9). Then when (p · η)H is observed, the investors’ real expected return is
1−k′
1+k′γE [RH]; however, when (p · η)L is observed, the investors’ real expected
return isE
[
RH |(p · η)L] (the right hand side of (3.9)) and the liquidity is injected
for the banks to meet the nominal deposit contract. Therefore, the investors’
real expected return is
2For suﬃciently low π the banks coordinate on the safe strategy, therefore there will be no bank
runs and no need for liquidity injection, hence no need for equity to cover the gap in bailout
funds.
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1 − k′
1 + k′
γE [RH]π + (1 − π)E [RH |(p · η)L]
=
{
αHγR1 + (1 − αH)γE [R2|(p · η)L]}π + (1 − π)E [RH |(p · η)L] . (3.11)
For suﬃciently low π the banks coordinate on the safe strategy, i.e. α∗ =
αE = αL, and the investors’ expected return is γE [RL]. It pays oﬀ for the banks
to choose αL instead of αH only if they get higher expected real return than
(3.11), i.e. when
γE [RL] >
1 − k′
1 + k′
γE [RH]π + (1 − π)E [RH |(p · η)L] ,
γE [RL] >
{
αHγR1 + (1 − αH)γE [R2|(p · η)L]}π + (1 − π)E [RH |(p · η)L] .(3.12)
The solution gives the cutoﬀ value π′2, which can be solved from (3.12) when
it holds with equality
π′2 =
γE [RL] − E [RH |(p · η)L]
αHγR1 + (1 − αH)γE [R2|(p · η)L] − E [RH |(p · η)L] .
Fig. A.3 (Appendix A.2) visualizes the results by numerical simulation.
Such hybrid scheme indeed eﬀectively reduces regulatory cost in comparison
to pure equity requirement, since the banks do not have to hold that much
equity to stabilize the system, i.e. regulator needs two instruments to deal
with dual plagues.
Fig. A.4 (AppendixA.2) compares the investors’ returns under all schemes.
Again, the outcome under conditional liquidity injection with procyclical
taxation is superior to all the others, since all the proﬁts that are levied as
the safety tax will be entirely returned to the investors. However, when
the political cost is too high to impose an extra tax and raise public deﬁcit,
combining the advantages of liquidity regulation and equity requirement is
the best self-suﬃcient scheme.
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3.5 CONCLUSION
In existing banking literature, illiquidity and insolvency shocks are usually
insulated in the sense that market participants have perfect knowledge about
the type of the shock. This chapter attempts to model the new feature of
modern ﬁnance that ﬁnancial innovation makes it harder to tell whether a
ﬁnancial institution is illiquid or insolvent. Such ambiguity doesn’t only alter
the equilibrium outcomes under laissez-faire economy, but also signiﬁcantly
complicates the regulator’s roadmaps.
In order to capture the core of the problem in a relatively tractable frame-
work, it is assumed that the only uncertainty in the economy is that market
participants cannot distinguish between illiquidity and insolvency shocks.
That is, when some intermediate signal, say, a negative shock in intermediate
outcome, has been observed, nobody can tell whether it’s because more risky
projects return late (a liquidity shock) or more risky projects fail (a solvency
shock). So in this stage, when pricing the illiquid assets market players have
to take into account the risk that the ﬁnancial institution is going to be in-
solvent in the future, therefore, such price should be lower than that in an
economy under pure illiquidity risks where the only problem is the timing
of return.
Though more complicated than the prototype model, the equilibrium out-
comes under laissez-faire economy still look similar. When either of the two
signals has been observed in t = 1, there’s a price of liquidity associated with
it, i.e. the value of risky assets can be uniquely determined. Therefore, the
banks coordinate to be safe when the probability of bad weather is too high,
and to be risky otherwise. In the intermediate range, there’s a free-riding
incentive to exploit the excessive liquidity supply in the good state of the
world, and the outcome here is a prevailing mixed strategy equilibrium with
both prudent and naughty banks.
However, the mixed strategy equilibrium is made a bit diﬀerent by the
additional insolvency risk. A good signal doesn’t only mean a higher inter-
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mediate output, but also a lower risk of future insolvency which inﬂates the
value of illiquid assets and makes the banks able to pledge more liquidity
in t = 1, and vice versa. Therefore, the prudent banks have the trade-oﬀ
between these two eﬀects, and the balance depends on the cost of funding,
which is driven by the free-riders. However, the strategic proﬁles of the
banks in equilibrium deviate from the coordinate solution which maximizes
their expected payoﬀs, the mixed strategy equilibrium is inferior, anyway.
Again the ineﬃciencies under current settings are the inferior mixed strat-
egy equilibrium and the costly bank runs, which are to be ﬁxed by properly
designed regulatory rules. However, with the mixture of both illiquidity and
insolvency risks, traditional regulatory rules need to be carefully reviewed.
First, it has been shown that under current settings, liquidity requirement
with conditional lender of last resort policy, which was the optimal scheme
when there’s only illiquidity risk, ceases towork. The reason is fairly straight-
forward: when bad state comes, since there’s a risk that the banks in trouble
may be insolvent in the future, the price of the illiquidity assets is thus de-
pressed. When the banks turn to the central bank for help, they cannot
get suﬃcient liquidity as needed because the collaterals, i.e. illiquid assets,
don’t worth that much as in the good state. Therefore, the banks will be run
anyway, even if they do observe the rules of liquidity!
The fact that the illiquidity assets worth less in the bad state implies that in
the presence of insolvency risk an extra informational cost is needed for both
bailing out banks ex post and making regulatory rules ex ante. One proposal,
suggested by the author, is to set up a safety funds via procyclical taxation,
as a complement for conditional liquidity rules. The tax revenue, which is
levied in the good state, is used in the bad state to ﬁll in the gap which is
left by pure liquidity injection. Under such scheme eﬃciency is improved:
the costly bank runs are thus entirely eliminated and the mixed strategy
equilibrium is deterred by the industry’s entry requirement. However, if
crisis hits before the funds are fully established, a public deﬁcit has to be
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initiated. Considering the political cost of increasing public deﬁcit, it may be
tricky to implement such scheme in reality.
An alternative approach to covering the informational cost is the self-
suﬃcient way, i.e. the banking industry stabilize itself by issuing equities.
The investors and bank managers share the proﬁt in the good state, but
the equity is eliminated in the bad state. As a regulatory requirement, the
minimum equity level to stabilize the economy is the amount which is just
suﬃcient tomake the banks survive in the bad state. Because of the additional
informational rent more equity is required under current settings; and since
holding equity is costly, the outcome is inferior to the market solution when
the probability of the bad state is very low.
Now it is known that equity holding is able to cushion the ﬁnancial shocks
at a cost, and liquidity requirement together with conditional liquidity in-
jection is able to partly cover the liquidity shortage in economic downturn;
therefore, regulators may combine the advantages from both instruments to
achieve higher eﬃciency. Indeed, it is shown that given that banks observe
the liquidity requirement as well as the minimum equity holding, they can
pledge the liquidity from the central bank up to the value of their collaterals,
and the rest of the cost to stay solvent is shouldered by the shareholders; and
the corresponding outcome dominates that under pure equity requirement.
However, investors achieve the highest expected return under the scheme
of conditional liquidity injection with procyclical taxation because here the
proﬁt taxed away in the good state will be fully refunded in the bad state,
instead of being pocketed by the bank managers under the schemes with
equity holdings. But self-suﬃcient schemes can be implemented at a much
lower political cost, which seem to be more attractive for regulators in reality.
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Appendix
A.1 PROOFS
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2.1
Proof Given that under current settings there are still two t = 1 states of
the world, the equilibria of the game can be easily constructed following the
same method as in the proofs for Proposition 1.4.1 and 1.4.2, Chapter 1. The
only necessary step here is to clarify the mixed strategy equilibrium.
When (p · η)H reveals, the prudent banks get a high early return from their
risky assets, i.e (p · η)HR2. On the other hand, the value of the late assets, RH2 ,
gets higher as well because of lower probability of insolvency and this allows
them to get more liquidity in the market at t = 1 with market rate rH. So
the trade-oﬀ for the prudent banks here is whether to invest more on liquid
assets (increase α∗s) or to invest more on illiquid assets (decrease α∗s), and the
reference point is αL.
The market rate rH is pinned down by t = 1 liquidity demand and supply,
and these are jointly determined by the number of both prudent and naughty
banks (note that naughty banks only survive at (p · η)H), i.e.
1. When rH is low, i.e. the free-riding incentive is not high, orπ is not high,
prudent banks are able to getmarket liquidity at a lower cost. Therefore,
there’s no need to invest in more illiquid assets and it’s preferable for
the prudent banks to reap the early harvest, i.e. α∗s > αL in this case.
And rL = 1 because of the overinvestment in liquid assets;
2. When rH is high, i.e. the free-riding incentive is high, or π is high,
prudent banks are no longer able to get market liquidity at a low cost.
Therefore, they have to invest in more illiquid assets to compete with
naughty banks on t = 1 market liquidity, i.e. α∗s < αL in this case. And
rL > 1 because of the underinvestment in liquid assets.
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A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3.1
Proof To show that αT > αH, we only have to show
(p · η)HR2 − γπE [R2|(p · η)H] + γπE [R2|(p · η)L] − γE [R2|(p · η)L]
γR1 − R1 + (p · η)HR2 − γπE [R2|(p · η)H] − γE [R2|(p · η)L] + γπE [R2|(p · η)L]
>
1
1 + (1 − γ) R1
γE[R2 |(p·η)H]−(p·η)HR2
,
simplify to get
{ −γπE [R2|(p · η)L] + γπE [R2|(p · η)H] + πE [R2|(p · η)L] − πE [R2|(p · η)H]
γR1 − R1 + (p · η)HR2 − γπE [R2|(p · η)H] − γE [R2|(p · η)L] + γπE [R2|(p · η)L]
+
−γE [R2|(p · η)H] − E [R2|(p · η)L] + γE [R2|(p · η)L] + E [R2|(p · η)H]
γR1 − R1 + (p · η)HR2 − γπE [R2|(p · η)H] − γE [R2|(p · η)L] + γπE [R2|(p · η)L]
}
· γR1−γE [R2|(p · η)H] + (p · η)HR2 + γR1 − R1
> 0. (A.1)
It can be seen that
−γE [R2|(p · η)H] + (p · η)HR2 + γR1 − R1
= γ
(
R1 − E [R2|(p · η)H]) + ((p · η)HR2 − R1)
< 0, (A.2)
as well as
γR1 − R1 + (p · η)HR2 − γπE [R2|(p · η)H] − γE [R2|(p · η)L] + γπE [R2|(p · η)L]
= R1(γ − 1) + ((p · η)HR2 − γE [R2|(p · η)L]) + γπ (E [R2|(p · η)L] − E [R2|(p · η)H])
< 0 (A.3)
since each term is negative. What’s more,
−γπE [R2|(p · η)L] + γπE [R2|(p · η)H] + πE [R2|(p · η)L] − πE [R2|(p · η)H]
−γE [R2|(p · η)H] − E [R2|(p · η)L] + γE [R2|(p · η)L] + E [R2|(p · η)H]
= (1 − π)(1 − γ) (E [R2|(p · η)H] − E [R2|(p · η)L])
> 0
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since each term is positive. Given that the sign of each part of inequality
(A.1)’s left hand side has been determined, it’s easily seen that inequality
(A.1) indeed holds.
To show that d0,T ≥ E [R (αH, c)] = πd0 + (1 − π)c, we only have to show
d0,T − πd0 + (1 − π)c ≥ 0. (A.4)
Deﬁne the left hand side of inequality (A.4) as a function of c, i.e.
g(c) = d0,T − πd0 + (1 − π)c.
Insert the expressions for d0,T and d0, and evaluate g(c) at c = 0 and c = R1
respectively, one can get
g(0) = − 1−γE [R2|(p · η)H] + (p · η)HR2 + γR1 − R1
· 1
γR1 − R1 + (p · η)HR2 − γπE [R2|(p · η)H] − γE [R2|(p · η)L] + γπE [R2|(p · η)L]
·
(
−R21γE
[
R2|(p · η)L] + π2γ2R1E2 [R2|(p · η)H] + R21γ(p · η)HR2 − R1γ(p · η)2HR22
+R21γE
[
R2|(p · η)L]π − π2γ2R1(p · η)HR2E [R2|(p · η)H] + 2πγ2R1E [R2|(p · η)H]
·E [R2|(p · η)L] + πγ2R21(p · η)HR2 − πγR21(p · η)HR2 − R1γE [R2|(p · η)L]π(p · η)HR2
+R1γE
[
R2|(p · η)L]π(p · η)HR2 + πγR1(p · η)2HR22 − πγ2R1(p · η)HR2E [R2|(p · η)L]
+π2γ2R1(p · η)HR2E [R2|(p · η)L] − π2γ2R1E [R2|(p · η)H]E [R2|(p · η)L]
−R1γ2E2 [R2|(p · η)H]π + R1γ2(p · η)HR2E [R2|(p · η)H] − R21γ2E [R2|(p · η)L]π
−R21γ2(p · η)HR2 − R1γ2E
[
R2|(p · η)L]E [R2|(p · η)H] + R21γ2E [R2|(p · η)L]) .
Inequality (A.2) shows that the ﬁrst term, − 1−γE[R2 |(p·η)H]+(p·η)HR2+γR1−R1 , is posi-
tive, and Inequality (A.3) shows that the second term,
1
γR1 − R1 + (p · η)HR2 − γπE [R2|(p · η)H] − γE [R2|(p · η)L] + γπE [R2|(p · η)L] ,
is negative. Further, the fact that π ≥ π2 = γE[RL]−cγE[RH]−c implies that the third term
is non-positive as well. Therefore, g(0) ≥ 0.
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Similarly, when c = R1
g (R1) = − 1−γE [R2|(p · η)H] + (p · η)HR2 + γR1 − R1
· 1
γR1 − R1 + (p · η)HR2 − γπE [R2|(p · η)H] − γE [R2|(p · η)L] + γπE [R2|(p · η)L]
·
(
−2R21γE
[
R2|(p · η)L] + 2π2γ2R1E2 [R2|(p · η)H] + 2R21(p · η)HR2 − 2R31πγ
+R1π(p · η)2HR22 − R21γ(p · η)HR2 − R1γ(p · η)2HR22 + 3R21γπE
[
R2|(p · η)L]
+R31πγ
2 + R21γ
2
E
[
R2|(p · η)H] − R21E [R2|(p · η)H]γ − π2γ2R1R2(p · η)H
·E [R2|(p · η)H] + 4πγ2R1E [R2|(p · η)H]E [R2|(p · η)L] + R1γ2E [R2|(p · η)L]π2
−R31γ2 − R21γ2π2E
[
R2|(p · η)H] + R1R2γ(p · η)HE [R2|(p · η)H] + πγ2R21R2(p · η)H
+πγR21R2(p · η)H − 3R1R2γπ(p · η)HE
[
R2|(p · η)L] + 2R1R2γ(p · η)HE [R2|(p · η)L]
+πγR1R22(p · η)2H − πγ2R1R2(p · η)HE
[
R2|(p · η)L] + π2γ2R1R2(p · η)HE [R2|(p · η)L]
−2π2γ2R1E [R2|(p · η)H]E [R2|(p · η)L] + 2R31γ − R1R22(p · η)2H − R31 + R1R2γ
·π2(p · η)HE [R2|(p · η)L] − R1R2γπ2(p · η)HE [R2|(p · η)H] − 2R1γ2πE2 [R2|(p · η)H]
+R1R2γ2(p · η)HE [R2|(p · η)H] + R31π − 2R21R2π(p · η)H − R21γπ2E [R2|(p · η)L]
+R21π
2γE
[
R2|(p · η)H] − 3R21γ2πE [R2|(p · η)L] − R21R2γ2(p · η)H − 2R1γ2
·E [R2|(p · η)H]E [R2|(p · η)L] + 2R21γ2E [R2|(p · η)L]) .
The ﬁrst two terms are the same as those in g (0), and the fact that π ≥ π2 =
γE[RL]−c
γE[RH]−c implies that the third term is non-negative. Therefore, g (R1) ≤ 0.
Since g(c) is continuous and monotone in c, then there exists a c0 ∈ [0,R1]
such that d0,T ≥ E [R (αH, c)], ∀c ∈ [0, c0].
A.2 RESULTS OF NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
The following ﬁgures present numerical simulations for various regulatory
schemes.
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Fig. A.1 Investors’ expected return in equilibrium: laissez-faire economy (solid blue
line) versus economy with conditional liquidity injection & procyclical taxation (solid
green line). Parameter values: (p · η)H = 0.36, (p · η)L = 0.24, γ = 0.6, R1 = 1.5, R2 = 4,
c = 0.3, η = 0.8, ηH = 0.9, ηL = 0.6, p = 0.4, pH = 0.45, pL = 0.3, σ = 0.5.
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Fig. A.2 Investors’ expected return in equilibrium: laissez-faire economy (solid blue
line) versus economy with (1) equity requirement (solid red line) (2) conditional liquid-
ity injection & procyclical taxation (solid green line). Parameter values: (p ·η)H = 0.36,
(p · η)L = 0.24, γ = 0.6, R1 = 1.5, R2 = 4, c = 0.3, η = 0.8, ηH = 0.9, ηL = 0.6, p = 0.4,
pH = 0.45, pL = 0.3, σ = 0.5, ζ = 0.5. The outcome under equity requirement is superior
to that of laissez-faire economy for π ∈
[
π′1, π
′
2
]
.
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Fig. A.3 Investors’ expected return in equilibrium: laissez-faire economy (solid blue
line) versus economy with (1) pure equity requirement (solid red line) (2) equity re-
quirement & liquidity regulation (solid orange line). Parameter values: (p · η)H = 0.36,
(p · η)L = 0.24, γ = 0.6, R1 = 1.5, R2 = 4, c = 0.3, η = 0.8, ηH = 0.9, ηL = 0.6, p = 0.4,
pH = 0.45, pL = 0.3, σ = 0.5, ζ = 0.5. The outcome under equity requirement &
liquidity regulation is superior to that of laissez-faire economy for π ∈
[
π′′1 , π
′′
2
]
.
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Fig. A.4 Investors’ expected return in equilibrium: laissez-faire economy (solid blue
line) versus economy with (1) conditional liquidity injection & procyclical taxation
(solid green line) (2) pure equity requirement (solid red line) (3) equity requirement &
liquidity regulation (solid orange line). Parameter values: (p ·η)H = 0.36, (p ·η)L = 0.24,
γ = 0.6, R1 = 1.5, R2 = 4, c = 0.3, η = 0.8, ηH = 0.9, ηL = 0.6, p = 0.4, pH = 0.45,
pL = 0.3, σ = 0.5, ζ = 0.5.

Part IV
Epilogue
Our long voyage of discovery is over and our bark has drooped her weary sails in
port at last. Once more we take the road to Nemi. It is evening, and as we climb
the long slope of the Appian Way up to the Alban Hills, we look back and see the
sky aﬂame with sunset, its golden glory resting like the aureole of a dying saint
over Rome and touching with a crest of ﬁre the dome of St. Peter’s. The sight
once seen can never be forgotten, but we turn from it and pursue our way darkling
along the mountain side, till we come to Nemi and look down on the lake in its
deep hollow, now fast disappearing in the evening shadows. . . . ButNemi’swoods
are still green, and as the sunset fades above them in the west, there comes to us,
borne on the swell of the wind, the sound of the church bells of Aricia ringing the
Angelus. Ave Maria! Sweet and solemn they chime out from the distant town and
die lingeringly away across the wide Campagnan marshes. Le roi est mort, vive le
roi! Ave Maria!
—Sir James Frazer (1922), Farewell to Nemi
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The monograph deviates from the standard Arrow-Debreu economy by
allowing some minimal frictions in the ﬁnancial market:
1. Collecting returns from the projects requires speciﬁc skills, which moti-
vates the banks’ intermediation between investors and entrepreneurs.
However, the bank managers would have an incentive to renegotiate
with investors to exploit rents, making standard contracts break down.
Therefore ﬁxed payment deposit contract serves as a credible commit-
ment device, and the costly bank runs punish those bank managers
who abuse their collection skills;
2. If the projects have to be terminated before they mature, only a small
part of their value can be recovered;
3. Financial institutions only have limited liabilities in their debts.
Now since ﬁnancial institutions ﬁnance the long-term and high yield
projects via short term borrowing, they have to hold suﬃcient liquid assets to
meet investors’ short term demand (to avoid the costly bank runs). Assume
that illiquidity is the only risk in the economy, i.e. some projects are likely
to return late. The ﬁrst chapter shows that even under pure illiquidity risks
banks have strong incentive to free-ride on the others’ liquidity provision in
the mixed strategy equilibrium, — to maximize their revenue in the good
state without fully shouldering the cost in the bad state, — leading to under-
investment in liquid assets across the entire economy. This result doen’t only
explain why there’s still liquidity shortage even when market participants
have a perfect information about the likelihood of the bad weather, but also
sheds some light onmonetarypolicy andbanking regulation. Withmodelling
the feedback between Lender of Last Resort policy and incentives of private
banks, the second chapter shows that minimum liquidity standards for banks
ex ante are a crucial requirement for sensible Lender of Last Resort policy. In
the presence of pure illiquidity risks, it’s not surprising that imposing equity
requirement is a strictly inferior solution.
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Modern ﬁnancial innovations are rapidly blurring the boundary between
illiquidity and insolvency risks, which creates another dimension of com-
plexity. The potential risk of insolvency inﬂates asset price in the good state,
but depresses it in the bad state, making the troubled ﬁnancial institutions
even harder to get funding. Then the third chapter shows that with the
co-existence of both risks, ex ante liquidity regulation with ex post Lender of
Last Resort policy fails to work. In order to cover the informational cost for
banking regulation, regulators have to ﬁnd additional resources via either
public solutions, e.g. establishing safety funds by taxing the banks’ revenue
in the good state, or private solutions, e.g. making the ﬁnancial system sta-
bilize itself by imposing minimum equity requirement. Regulatory cost can
be reduced by combining the advantages of diﬀerent schemes.
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